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ABSTRACT 
Social Capital’s Dark Side: Knowledge, Reciprocity, and the 
Liability of Relationships.  (December 2006) 
Jamie D. Collins, B.S., Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri;  
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Social capital resources for the firm can be conceptualized as those executive-to-
executive connections held by a firm’s top management team, as well as firm-to-firm 
relationships that exist fairly independently of particular individuals.  This type of 
resource can compose an important portion of any firm’s overall resource portfolio.  The 
potential benefits associated with social capital include enhanced economic exchange 
opportunities, improved innovation capabilities and increased firm survival rates, among 
others.  This study adds to the literature stream focusing on the positive consequences of 
social capital by demonstrating the cross-level influence of social capital on the 
development of reciprocity within a joint venture network.  It also highlights the link 
between social capital resources and the quality of knowledge available to a firm via its 
joint venture partnerships. 
More importantly, though, we specifically investigate the conditions under which 
a firm’s social capital (firm-to-firm relationships or the social capital held by key 
executives) can contribute to undesirable firm-level behaviors.  One often mentioned, yet 
rarely explored dimension of social capital is the phenomenon frequently called the 
‘dark side’ of social capital.  This dark side of social capital is argued to exist whenever 
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the behavioral expectations accompanying social capital limit contribute to undesirable 
outcomes for the firm.  Several hypotheses are tested in the context of joint ventures 
among S&P 500 firms.   
The likelihood of a firm having legal action taken against it by federal regulatory 
agencies or other firms is demonstrated herein to be related to the number and strength 
of social capital relationships.  In general this research supports the view that having a 
large number of weak ties is beneficial for firms.  More specifically, we found that in the 
wake of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, an inverse relationship exists 
between the likelihood of firms engaging in the undesirable behaviors investigated and 
the number of Boards of Directors on which the firms’ respective executives held seats.  
Conversely, firms were more likely to engage in these undesirable behaviors whenever 
the firm-to-firm ties within their network of joint ventures were strongest.  Furthermore, 
executive discretion was highly related to the likelihood of firms engaging in undesirable 
behaviors. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Although numerous benefits are associated with social capital, I specifically 
investigate the conditions under which a firm’s social capital (firm-to-firm relationships 
or the social capital held by key executives) can be linked to undesirable behaviors for 
the firm.  One often mentioned, yet rarely explored dimension of social capital is the 
phenomenon frequently called the ‘dark side’ of social capital.  This dark side of social 
capital is argued to exist whenever the behavioral expectations accompanying social 
capital limit a firm’s strategic options and may eventually lead to undesirable outcomes 
for the firm.  Several hypotheses are tested in the context of joint ventures among 
Standard & Poor’s 500 firms.  The likelihood of a joint venture firm having legal action 
undertaken against it by federal regulatory agencies or other firms are predicted to be 
curvilinearly related to executive-level and firm-level social capital measures. 
A commonly held position in the management literature is that social capital is a 
potential source of economic opportunities and performance benefits for firms.  In fact, a 
large body of research has demonstrated that relationships provide access to potentially 
valuable economic opportunities (Burt, 1997, 2001; Ellis, 2002; Palmer & Barber, 
2001).  Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) found that social capital is positively related to the 
extent of resource exchange between organizations.  Social capital is often thought of in 
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Journal. 
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terms of connections within and across networks (Burt, 1992, 1997; Gulati, 1995a; Tsai 
& Ghoshal, 1998).  These and other authors have presented a convincing argument that 
social capital can be a source of firm-level benefits.  Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) 
propose that networks of relationships constitute a valuable resource for its owners.  This 
paper addresses the potential for social capital to cease being an asset for the firm and 
eventually become detrimental to its owners. 
In order to possess social capital firms are required to have relationships with 
other firms and/or executives are required to have relationships with other executives 
outside his or her firm.  While there is lack of consensus on exactly how firm-level 
social capital is created within networks, there is widespread agreement that networks 
create the potential for firm-level social capital (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000).  Social 
capital can provide a firm with a unique ability to gain access to resources from partner 
firms and economic opportunities.  While this notion is both intuitively appealing and 
widely supported empirically, social capital has been argued by many to have an as-yet 
unexplored ‘dark side’ (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  I intend to 
explore this much alluded to “dark side of social capital.”  Thus, this study is among the 
first research efforts to explicitly develop theory and empirically test the expected causal 
mechanism(s) which lead from social capital resources to undesirable or maladaptive 
behaviors. 
Kostova and Roth (2003) argue that social capital is “the potential value arising 
from certain psychological states, perceptions, and behavioral expectations that social 
actors form as a result of both their being part of social structures and the nature of their 
relationships in these structures” (2003: 301).  The benefits of social capital within a 
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network structure have been demonstrated in numerous organizational settings.  Gulati 
(1995a, 1995b) investigated the role of social networks in the facilitation of new alliance 
formation and subsequent inter-firm relationships.  Examples of social capital benefits 
include: knowledge transfer, resource exchange and the level of innovation within a firm 
(Stuart, 2000; Tsai, 2001; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998).  Pennings et al. (1998) demonstrated 
that firm social capital is directly linked to organizational survival.  Furthermore, firm 
level social capital has been shown to affect organizational advantage (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998; Westphal, 1999). 
A central notion in this paper is that social factors play an important role in firm-
level decisions, as has been demonstrated in a number of settings (Baker, 1990; Palmer 
& Barber, 2001).  For example, Palmer and Barber (2001) presented a class theory of 
corporate acquisitions which built extensively on previous work regarding social capital.  
In addition, numerous authors have focused on the important influence which social 
capital has on firm outcomes.  Among others, authors such as Beckman et al. (2004), 
Reagans and McEvily (2003), Ahuja (2000a), Podolny and Baron (1997) and Burt 
(1997, 2001) each have illustrated the importance of inter-firm network connections as 
direct influences on firm outcomes such as knowledge transfer, intra-firm and inter-firm 
collaboration, as well as firm performance.  This earlier research emphasizes that the 
social context in which any potential economic exchange is embedded must be 
considered (Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1996).  Accordingly, my intent is to consider the 
influence of the social context by expanding on the notion that the behavioral 
expectations accompanying social capital resources can influence firm-level decisions in 
such a manner as to eventually cause social capital to become a liability for the firm.  
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Behavioral expectations include specific norms of behavior regarding how firms and 
executives interact with each other within the context of a network of relationships.  For 
the purposes of this study, the behavioral expectations related to reciprocity between 
actors are especially relevant. 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) point out that although two actors may occupy 
equivalent positions in similar network configurations, they may engage in significantly 
different actions.  This difference in action is based on different personal and emotional 
attachments to others in the network.  Further, Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) point out 
that network members with the same network connections may utilize them quite 
differently.  In this dissertation, I argue that yet another perspective may also help 
account for significant differences in the value of social capital resources.  This 
additional perspective extends existing social capital research by arguing that the 
behavioral expectations accompanying social capital resources often limit the quality 
and thoroughness of firm-level decision making, especially when social capital ties are 
particularly strong.  The expectation of reciprocity, which is strongly associated with 
social capital, is argued to be the key behavioral expectation responsible for sub-optimal 
firm-level decision making.  Moreover, as the number of social capital ties increases, 
diminishing returns eventually develop in terms of the complementarity of knowledge 
gained via such connections. 
There is little disagreement that all social ties within the same network are not 
equally valuable.  Some researchers have argued that this differential in the value of 
network connections could be attributed to such factors as differences in the types of 
information being exchanged (Koka & Prescott, 2002), the number of connections 
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(Mizruchi, 1996), the density of the network (Sparrowe et al., 2001), or the structural 
holes created by connections (Burt, 1997; Ahuja, 2000a, 2000b).  The results of this 
differential value of social capital resources can be notable for its owner(s).  For 
example, the performance of entrepreneurial firms which were less successful in 
establishing relationships within their network was associated with weaker performance 
compared to firms able to establish strong relationships.  Batjargal and Liu (2004) found 
that relationships between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have a significant direct 
effect on the success of their firms in acquiring financial backing.  The firms in this 
study which attracted less venture capital funding were the firms whose founders failed 
to develop strong ties with venture capitalists.  In contrast to these earlier researchers, I 
focus specifically on the conditions which cause social capital to cease being an asset for 
its owner(s) and which lead the firm to engage in detrimental behavior.  The arguments 
developed herein focus on sociological (i.e., non-economic) causes and consequences of 
social capital’s dark side. 
The aim of this dissertation is to illuminate conditions under which a firm’s 
social capital (its firm-to-firm relationships or the social capital held by key executives) 
is likely to cease being an asset and become detrimental to the organization.  At some 
point, the cumulative behavioral expectations accompanying social capital are likely to 
limit the thoroughness and quality of decision making on behalf of the firm’s executives.  
Such expectations may actually lead to undesirable or maladaptive actions by the firm.  
Examples of undesirable or maladaptive actions by a firm include: conflict between 
partner firms, strategic alliance dissolution, violating environmental, health and safety 
rules, engaging in ethically questionable corporate behaviors such as falsifying earnings, 
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hiding corporate debt, insider trading, front-running trades by mutual fund managers, 
utilizing contractors who employ child labor in developing countries, bribing 
government officials, among others.  These actions are characterized as undesirable or 
maladaptive because they are generally considered to lack legitimacy by third party 
constituents (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). 
Furthermore, the number and strength of relationships maintained by the 
organization are expected to have opposite effects on the level of reciprocity between 
parties to social capital connections.  Both the number of ties and the strength of existing 
social capital connections are expected to curvilinearly related to the likelihood of 
maladaptive or dysfunctional firm strategic actions.  As the number of ties increases, a 
greater level of knowledge diversity is expected to exist within the network of social 
capital relationships, initially decreasing the likelihood of undesirable firm-level actions.  
However, as the network of relationships becomes overly diverse, knowledge 
complementarity between partners’ knowledge stocks begins to decline and diminishing 
returns on those relationships set in.  Conversely, as the strength of individual social 
capital ties increases, the quality of information made available via social capital 
connections is expected to initially increase, leading to a reduced likelihood of 
undesirable firm behavior.  However, diminishing returns are expected to eventually set 
in as extra high levels of knowledge quality causes firms to rely too heavily on a limited 
number of knowledge sources.  Further, reciprocity expectations are likely to lead to less 
thorough evaluation of strategic options available to the firm.  Multiple authors have 
suggested that a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship exists between level of 
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social capital and firm outcomes (Gulati, 1995a, 1995b; Uzzi, 1997a, 1997b).  These 
earlier studies were almost universally concerned with the consequences of socially-
acceptable and/or desirable firm behavior.  However, knowledge of the underlying 
causal mechanism(s) responsible for social capital’s dark side is important for expanding 
our collective understanding of the potential limitations on social capital resources’ 
value to an organization.  In turn, this should aid firms desiring to achieve sustainable 
performance advantages vis-à-vis competitors by enabling them to determine how social 
capital fits into the firm’s optimal mix of resources. 
Purpose of the Study 
Whereas much existing social capital literature emphasizes the numerous benefits 
associated with social capital, I specifically investigate the conditions under which social 
capital can be detrimental to its owner(s).  One often mentioned, yet rarely explored 
dimension of social capital is the phenomenon frequently called the ‘dark side’ of social 
capital (Collins & Uhlenbruck, 2004; Gargiulo & Benassi, 1999; Gulati & Westphal, 
1999).  This dark side of social capital is argued to exist whenever the reciprocity-based 
behavioral expectations accompanying social capital limit a firm’s strategic options and 
may even lead to maladaptive and/or undesirable behavior (Borgatti & Foster, 2003).  I 
intend to test this assertion by exploring the relationship between the strength and 
number of executive-level social capital connections, the impact of social capital on the 
thoroughness of strategic decision making (i.e., the quality and complementarity of 
knowledge exchanged in firm-to-firm relationships), and subsequent undesirable firm-
level actions. 
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This research relies extensively on existing strategic management literature.  In 
particular, it draws from social capital/network theory literature, the resource-based view 
of the firm (RBV) and the knowledge-based view (KBV).  Theory is developed and 
tested regarding the potential for social capital to lead to maladaptive or undesirable 
strategic actions and firm outcomes.  This study is unique in that it is designed 
specifically to investigate the influence of social capital on undesirable firm-level 
strategic actions and outcomes.  The current lack of empirical support for the notion of a 
dark side to social capital has been due, in large part, to the traditionally positive framing 
of social capital as a resource.  For example, numerous authors (Burt, 1992; Ireland et 
al., 2002; Tsai, 2001) argue that social capital is important because of the resources to 
which it provides access.  In contrast, this study empirically tests the notion that under 
certain circumstances social capital can potentially become a liability for the firm. 
Contributions of the Study 
This study makes contributions to several areas of strategic management 
research.  In the broadest sense, this study enhances our collective understanding of the 
nature of social capital as well as the potential limitations in this resource’s value to an 
organization.  Researchers continue to respond to Putnam’s (1995) call to further clarify 
dimensions and effects of social capital.  This study continues in the pursuit of greater 
understanding of social capital’s dimensions as well as its value and limitations.  
Although much strategic management research is focused on how to achieve and/or 
maintain positive benefits for the firm and a sustained competitive advantage there are 
certainly undesirable aspects of organizational life which can affect strategic decision 
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making and outcomes.  Such undesirable behaviors can be harmful to individuals and 
organizations, undermining the credibility of institutions, and if left unchecked, 
potentially damaging to the fabric of society as a whole.  Therefore, I seek to elucidate 
the causal mechanisms driving the ‘dark side of social capital.’ 
Furthermore, literature has largely ignored the fact that inter-firm relationships 
are influenced by both organization-level and individual-level factors (Marchington & 
Vincent, 2004).  In fact, very little empirical research exists which specifically takes into 
consideration both organization-level and individual-level influences on firm-level social 
capital.  This study focuses on social capital at both the firm-level of analysis and the 
executive level. 
Units and Levels of Analysis 
Due to the existence of relationships across levels (individual-to-individual, firm-
to-firm, group-to-group, individual-to-firm, etc.), social capital can be conceptualized as 
a multi-level construct.  For this study I focus on two levels of social capital: executive 
level and firm level.  I do not attempt to explicate the process via which organizations 
appropriate executives’ social capital and convert it into a firm-level resource or vice 
versa.  Instead, I use separate measures to investigate how social capital at each level of 
analysis effects firm-level strategic actions and outcomes.  At the executive level, this 
study focuses on executives’ social capital stocks represented by board memberships.  At 
the firm level, this study focuses on firm-to-firm relationships (joint ventures) as well as 
the number and duration of those relationships as the primary indicators of firm-level 
social capital. 
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Research Questions 
In order to adequately explore the influence of different dimensions of social 
capital on undesirable firm-level strategic actions and outcomes, a model is developed to 
test the relationship between the number of social capital connections as well the 
strength of those connections and the likelihood of engaging in undesirable firm 
behavior.  The questions addressed by this study are: 
1. Is there a relationship between social capital (at executive level) and 
undesirable firm-level behaviors and outcomes? 
2. Do extra high levels of firm-level social capital stocks tend to lead to 
undesirable behavior than when firms have low levels of social capital? 
3. Do reciprocity and knowledge quality influence the likelihood of undesirable 
behavior?  
Overview of Research Methods 
The theory and hypotheses developed in this dissertation will be tested by using 
data from multiple sources.  The Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Database on 
Alliances and Joint Ventures is the primary source for the basic information regarding 
the joint ventures (JVs) in this study.  This database contains information compiled from 
publicly available sources such as SEC filings and their international counterparts, trade 
publications, wires, and news sources.  This database currently represents one of the 
most comprehensive sources of information on strategic alliances and joint ventures.  
Further, Gartner Dataquest is relied for additional JV-specific data for firms in the 
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information technology (hardware and software), communications, semiconductor and 
technology consulting industries. 
Data pertaining to firm-level undesirable behavior will come from multiple 
sources.  A number of public datasets exist which contain data regarding various types of 
undesirable firm-level behavior.  Public datasets from the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) will be utilized to acquire data related to regulatory sanctions 
imposed against firms in this sample.  Each agency keeps a complete record of 
administrative actions taken against companies deemed to violate specific regulations.  
In addition, because the most severe violations of federal regulation often lead to 
lawsuits being filed in federal courts against alleged violating firms, the Lexis-Nexis 
legal database will be used to collect information pertaining to this form of sanction.  
Lexis-Nexis will also be use to collect data regarding lawsuits involving disputes 
between (former) partner firms.  Partner-to-partner lawsuits are considered 
manifestations of the extent to which partner firms have experienced conflict in their 
relationships.  Each publicly-traded firm in the U.S. is required by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to disclose material legal proceedings initiated against the firm in 
their 10-K filings and/or proxy statements.  Thus, these filings will be one of the primary 
sources of data pertaining to undesirable firm behaviors in this study.  The Investor 
Responsibility Research Center’s Directors Database will be the primary source of board 
membership data.  Firm proxy statements also will be utilized to collect supplemental 
executive-level social capital data. 
 12 
 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter II reviews relevant literature on the construct of social capital, earlier 
efforts to operationalize and measure social capital (at both the executive level and the 
firm level), and the empirical evidence related to the benefits provided by social capital 
stocks.  The first section provides a general overview of social capital theory, as well as 
highlights the multiple definitions of social capital which exist in the literature.  A 
review is provided of the literature arguing for a connection between top management 
team members’ social capital being a potential resource for their respective firms.  
Finally, I provide a summary of existing firm-level social capital literature and empirical 
results. 
Chapter III develops theory to explain the ‘dark side’ of social capital and 
hypotheses related to the potential for social capital resources to become a liability for its 
owner(s).  More specifically, theory is developed to explain the potentially negative 
influence of reciprocity expectations which accompany social capital and the influence 
of different dimensions of knowledge involved in an exchange between partners.  The 
role of status in potentially distorting firm-level decision making, as well as the 
influence of executive discretion in potentially limiting the value of social capital 
resources are also considered. 
Chapter IV provides an in-depth discussion of the research methods used to test 
the hypotheses developed in Chapter III.  Chapter V explores the results from the 
empirical analyses.  Chapter VI provides a discussion of the results and their 
implications, limitations, and future avenues for extended this research.
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research study investigates the relationships between executive-level social 
capital, firm-level social capital and firms’ likelihood to engage in undesirable behavior.  
Specifically, I am interested in the relationship between social capital resources and the 
associated behavioral expectations, the type of knowledge made available via social 
capital relationships and likelihood of firms engaging in undesirable behavior. 
The literature reviewed in this chapter is covered in several sections.  First, a 
general summary of social capital theory and its history are presented.  An overview of 
the wide range of definitions and operationalizations which have been used for this 
construct is then provided.  Although researchers have applied social capital theory in 
widely-varied contexts, only the most commonly utilized definitions and measures of 
social capital at the executive level and the firm level are explored.  The most commonly 
sought benefits of social capital resources are highlighted, as are the dimensions of 
social capital.  Then I explain the potential value of social capital resources for firms, 
drawing insights from the resource-based view (RBV) and the knowledge-based view 
(KBV). 
Social capital literature at the executive level is summarized and board 
memberships, as an important source of executive social capital, are reviewed.  The 
conceptual link between executive-level social capital and firm-level outcomes is also 
highlighted.  Next, I review social capital literature at the firm level and strategic 
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alliances (including most notably, joint ventures), which are among the most common 
forms of firm-level social capital.  Due to the importance of executives’ connections in 
establishing some strategic alliances, this form of organization is particularly relevant for 
investigating potential cross-level issues pertaining to a firm’s use of social capital 
resources.  Then I provide a review of the literature regarding the vital role of trust in 
establishing and maintaining social capital.  The chapter concludes with a review of the 
potential for social capital to hold risks for its owner(s). 
Social Capital Theory 
The roots of the concept of social capital are well established in the field of 
sociology (Bourdieu, 1985; Granovetter, 1973).  The initial focus of social capital 
research was often on the effect of family relations, community ties and resources on the 
development of children and economic opportunities for minorities (Bubolz, 2001; 
Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993).  The construct has been expanded and used in a wide 
variety of settings, at both the individual-level of analysis and the firm-level of analysis 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002).  Among the topics related to individual-level social capital 
which have been examined include: career success (Burt, 1992; Podolny & Baron, 
1997), labor market mobility (Burt, 1997; Granovetter, 1973; Lin et al., 1981), executive 
compensation (Belliveau et al., 1996; Burt, 1997), and employee turnover (Krackhardt & 
Hanson, 1993).  At the firm level, topics studied include: resource exchange and product 
innovation (Bouty, 2000; Hansen, 1999; Hitt et al., 2000; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), 
organizational dissolution rates (Pennings et al., 1998), new firm start-ups (Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993; Walker et al., 1997), firm learning (Ahuja, 2000a; Kraatz, 1998), 
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customer-supplier relations (Baker, 1990; Uzzi, 1997a, 1997b), and firm performance 
(Baker, 1990; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
Due to the ever-expanding amount and foci of social capital research, there are a 
correspondingly large number of definitions and operationalizations which have been 
used by prior researchers in this area.  In addition, divergent research streams analyzing 
social capital at the individual level versus the group level has created theoretical and 
methodological confusion (Leenders & Gabbay, 1999; Lin, 1999).  Burt (1997) suggests 
that whereas human capital is a quality of individuals, social capital is a quality created 
between people.  He also argues that social capital is the contextual complement to 
human capital (Burt, 1997).  Social capital exists in the relationships held by individuals, 
groups, firms and other actors, and is therefore intangible.  Just as physical capital and 
human capital facilitate productive activity, social capital does as well (Coleman, 1988). 
Bourdieu (1985) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual and 
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (p. 248).  
According to Bourdieu (1985), social capital has two components: 1) the social 
relationship between individuals that allows these individuals to claim resources 
possessed by their associates, and 2) the amount and quality of those resources.  Social 
capital arises from durable obligations arising from feelings of gratitude, respect, and 
friendship or from the institutionally guaranteed rights derived from membership in a 
network such as a family, a class, or a school (Coleman, 1988).  Significant social capital 
can be derived from membership in specific networks, particularly those in which such 
membership is relatively restricted (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  Further, Coleman 
 16 
 
 
(1988) argues that a high degree of trustworthiness among parties to a relationship is 
essential for the existence of social capital. 
As pointed out by Burt (1992), social capital research often falls into two broad 
categories: a) “whom you know,” and b) “how you are connected” to others.  Research 
in the former category often views a network as one actor’s access to other actors with 
specific resources.  Research in this tradition generally holds that the greater the volume 
of resources held by counterparts in a network, the more valuable the connections (Lin 
et al., 1981; Mizruchi, 1996).  Research in the latter category tends to emphasize the 
structure of social networks as a key factor in the value of connections within the 
network (Ahuja, 2000b; Burt, 1992). 
Further, Lin and colleagues (1981) views social capital as the resources 
embedded within an individual’s social network and which are accessible through direct 
and indirect ties.  Portes (1998) defines social capital as “the ability of actors to secure 
benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or social structures” (p. 6).  One of 
the first articles to introduce the concept of social capital to management scholars was 
written by Coleman (1988).  Coleman established that relationships can have inherent 
value because of the access they provide to resources and opportunities.  In a refinement 
of this view, Kostova and Roth (2003) argue that social capital is “the potential value 
arising from certain psychological states, perceptions, and behavioral expectations that 
social actors form as a result of both their being part of social structures and the nature of 
their relationships in these structures” (Kostova & Roth, 2003: 301). 
Moreover, some definitions of social capital are broader than those listed above, 
in that they include not only relationships, but also include the norms and values 
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associated with the relationships (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Putnam, 1995; Tsai & 
Ghoshal, 1998).  What all of these definitions have in common is the position that in 
order to possess social capital, an actor (individual, group or organization) must have 
relationships with others, and this relationship is the actual source of value of the social 
capital (Portes, 1998).  In addition, each of the authors cited here also appear to agree 
that social capital both enhances trust between parties, as well as is enhanced by trust 
between the parties involved. 
Benefits of Social Capital 
Social capital has been argued to have three primary benefits for its owner(s) 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002).  First, social capital increases the value of information shared 
between partners because it provides easy access to information, facilitates the 
dispersion of information, and improves the quality of information (Coleman, 1988; Lin, 
1999).  Network members with high levels of social capital generally acquire higher 
volumes of information from others in the network.  As executives interact with others 
within the firm and outside the firm, they acquire new knowledge as well as insights into 
how that knowledge is relevant for their firms.  This knowledge can be either explicit or 
tacit.  According to Hansen (1999) and Uzzi (1997a), social capital networks provide 
access to new knowledge and facilitate the transmission of difficult-to-transfer 
knowledge. 
A second benefit associated with social capital resources is the ability to 
influence important decisions (Burt, 1992, 1997; Coleman, 1988).  Due to being linked 
to multiple other members in a network, actors with higher levels of social capital have 
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higher levels of influence over decisions within the network.  Further, network members 
with greater influence over decision making are more able to achieve their goals than 
less well-connected members.  In addition to providing greater power over individual 
decisions, higher levels of social capital are also accompanied by greater social norms, 
expectations and constraints on behavior.  Thus, cohesion among network members is 
the third benefit associated with social capital.  Networks in which strong normative 
pressures exists are more likely to be characterized as being able to control behavior of 
members (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1982).  The greater social control associated 
with cohesive networks further facilitates interaction among network members and eases 
the flow of information among members. 
Dimensions of Social Capital 
Relationships built upon repeated interactions between firm representatives and 
in which mutual trust exists tend to produce social capital for partner firms (Kale et al., 
2000).  Although Kale and colleagues refer to the relationship developed between 
partners and its resulting benefits as ‘relational capital’, for all intents and purposes, their 
arguments parallel the fundamental arguments of social capital theory.  The primary 
distinction between their argument and earlier social capital theory-based arguments is 
that Kale et al. (2000) focus more explicitly on the inter-personal dynamics and 
behavioral expectations involved in firm-to-firm collaborations. 
One of the most recent trends in social capital research has been the recognition 
that social capital has both a relational dimension and a structural dimension (Kostova & 
Roth, 2003; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Rowley et al., 2000).  The structural dimension 
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of firm-level social capital is the formal firm-to-firm connection which exists 
independent of the individuals involved in executing any transaction.  The structural 
dimension of social capital is the underlying source of network “closure” or 
interconnectedness (McFadyen & Cannella, 2004; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  These 
connections must exist in order for a firm to successfully engage in knowledge 
exchanges (particularly for tacit knowledge) with its partner(s).  However, I argue that 
whether or not the true potential of a social capital resources are realized depends on the 
nuances of the relational dimension of firm-level social capital.  I posit that whether or 
not the full opportunities created by the social capital connections are ever realized is 
directly influenced by the level of trust developed between exchange partners.  
Moreover, I argue that the likelihood of firms engaging in maladaptive or undesirable 
behavior is influenced by the relational dynamics affiliated with social capital resources.  
This is due to the fact that network connections cannot have significant social capital 
benefits independent of the content of such ties (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Podolny & 
Baron, 1997). 
One of the most developed theories related to the structural dimension of social 
capital is the structural holes theory (Burt 1992, 1997).  The theory describes social 
capital as a function of brokerage opportunities in a given network of relationships.  The 
theory views social capital in terms of the information and control advantages of being 
the broker in relations between people or groups otherwise disconnected in social 
structure.  According to this view, the manager or entrepreneur who creates a bridge 
between otherwise disconnected contacts has a say in whose interests are served by the 
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bridge.  Managers with contact networks rich in structural holes know about, are 
involved in, and exercise control over the more rewarding exchange opportunities. 
However, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) point out that although two actors may 
occupy equivalent positions in similar network configurations, they may engage in 
significantly different actions.  This difference in action is based on different personal 
and emotional attachments to others in the network.  Further, Tsai (2000) points out that 
while they exist in the same network, some actors are better than others in the network at 
capturing opportunities.  This argument is complementary to Adler and Kwon’s (2002) 
assertion that the value derived from network connections is dependent of the content of 
such ties.  The content of social capital ties is comprised of the knowledge involved in 
exchanges, as well as the social dynamics between the individuals involved (whether on 
an individual basis or as representatives of their respective firms).  As a result, research 
related to the structural dimension of social capital needs to be augmented by insights 
into the relational dimension and factors which influence the relational dimension. 
Whenever discussing the relational dimension of social capital and the trust 
developed between partners, I am implicitly acknowledging the existence and 
importance of the structural dimension.  Without some type of network connection to its 
partners, the potential to exchange knowledge or other resources would not be 
discovered.  However, social factors are crucial constraints on top executives and firm-
level decisions.  For example, Portes (1998), Waldinger (1995) and Portes & 
Sensenbrenner (1993) highlight the importance of factors such as social class and 
ethnicity in influencing the economic actions taken by individuals.  This influence exists 
both within a firm and in inter-organizational networks.  It is only by capturing exchange 
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opportunities once they have been discovered and engaging in exchange with partner 
firms, that a firm’s full resource acquisition and utilization potential is realized. 
The relational dimension of social capital pertains to the nature of the inter-
personal dynamics of partner firms’ representatives.  It is best conceptualized as 
consisting of the strength of an individual’s interpersonal relationships with her or his 
counterparts to an exchange.  Although two firms or business units may have agreed to 
work together to achieve a common purpose, achieving the desired outcome is not 
automatic or guaranteed.  The implementation of any such agreement is heavily 
influenced by the interaction between the individuals filling key roles at their respective 
firms.  Although two actors may occupy equivalent positions in similar network 
configurations, they may engage in significantly different actions (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998).  Further, network members with the same network connections may utilize them 
quite differently (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994).  Moreover, social forces can at times 
blunt the economic rationality employed in the development and maintenance of 
exchange relationships (Larson, 1992).  While economic considerations are obviously 
important in the formation and development of exchange relationships, social factors are 
important in this process.  The less readily transferable the knowledge involved in a 
transfer, the more likely individuals will need to interact in order to facilitate the 
knowledge transfer (Bouty, 2000; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998).  Therefore, firms attempting 
to transfer knowledge resources (especially tacit knowledge) must emphasize the 
development of positive inter-personal dynamics between their representatives. 
It is unlikely for all firms to be equally effective at developing the relational 
dimension of social capital.  While competitive reasons (i.e., economic rationale) may 
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often be the primary motivation in establishing and developing intra-firm and inter-firm 
relationships, I suggest that they are frequently balanced or muted by how well firms 
develop the relational dimension of social capital.  As previously noted, Larson (1992) 
argues that while economic rationales for exchange are obviously important in the 
formation of new network relationships, so too are social factors.  This is essentially the 
long-standing argument that economic transactions are embedded in social contexts 
(Granovetter, 1973, 1982; Gulati, 1995a).  I propose that the exchange of knowledge 
resources between firms and the value of the knowledge exchanged are influenced by the 
relational dimension of social capital.  The inter-personal relationships between firms’ 
representatives are the mechanisms via which knowledge is exchanged.  However, inter-
personal relationships are subject to influence by social norms and expectations which in 
certain circumstances can lead to undesirable behavior.  Thus, the influence of these 
social norms and expectations on the decision-making by executives representing their 
respective firms is relevant for this study.  Moreover, the importance of the relational 
dimension of social capital will likely be amplified when the firms and their 
representatives come from different cultural backgrounds.  Effectively establishing and 
maintaining social capital in this circumstance will also be more challenging, thus, 
potentially inhibiting the exchange of knowledge. 
Executive-Level Social Capital 
Adler and Kwon (2002) provide a summary of the wide range of attempts to 
clarify the nature and value of social capital at the individual level of analysis.  They 
distill much of the existing research in this area to conclude that a common theme among 
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a multitude of definitions of social capital is that the nature of relationships held by 
individuals varies widely and is predictive of resources made available to the individual.  
They argue that an actor’s social ties create opportunities for potential exchange, which 
is generally aided by social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002).  Due to being an 
idiosyncratic, difficult-to-imitate resource, social capital can be highly valuable to its 
owner(s).  Relationships between executives develop as a result of shared experiences 
and through interpersonal exchanges.  Examples of potential sources of executive social 
capital include sharing such connections as university ties, prior work experiences, 
church and non-profit ties, living in the same neighborhood, and similar family social 
status, among others (Coleman, 1988; Knoke, 1999).  Executive-level social capital 
reduces the costs associated with building and maintaining social networks inside and 
outside the firm.  As a result of enhanced trust accompanying social capital, the cost of 
monitoring and enforcing behavioral expectations reduces (Williamson, 1985).  Coleman 
(1988: 102) argues that “if A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the 
future, this establishes an expectation in A and an obligation on part of B.”  Thus, when 
executives possess high levels of social capital with other executives and important 
institutional actors outside the organization, there will also tend to be high levels of trust 
between these actors.  This trust increases the ease of communication and cooperation 
between parties to an exchange.  Stated differently, by enhancing trust, social capital 
among executives increases the ease of cooperation both inside and outside the 
organization. 
Executive-level social capital provides access for exchanging knowledge 
between individual executives.  Social capital enables executives to share information 
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which, in turn, accelerates knowledge transfer (Bouty, 2000) and facilitates the creation 
of intellectual capital within an organization (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  According to 
Castanias and Helfat (1991, 2001), rent generating resources and organizational abilities 
emerge only in conjunction with effective top management within the firm.  
Furthermore, effective top management does not arise without effective communication 
networks (both inside and outside the firm) (Castanias & Helfat, 1991).  In turn, 
executive-level social capital can be used to acquire external resources for the firm.  Top 
management team members often have externally-oriented roles that may generate rents 
for their firms (Ungson & Steers, 1984).  The extent to which executives in these 
externally-oriented roles are successful is highly dependent on the ability of the 
executives to leverage their social capital resources.  Executives who can effectively link 
their organization(s) to the institutional environment via their social capital resources 
tend to be more successful than those top managers without extensive social capital.  
Further, executive social capital is vital for the firm as it provides influence with 
stakeholders, is a key source of connections to the environment and essential for 
acquiring information from external sources. 
Board Memberships 
One of the most visible, and most widely-researched, forms of executive-level 
social capital involves executives’ board of director memberships (Gulati & Westphal, 
1999; Mizruchi, 1996).  There are a number of mechanisms which are used to align the 
interests of shareholders and executives, with the board of directors being one of the 
foremost (Fama, 1980; Walsh & Seward, 1990).  Members of boards of directors have a 
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fiduciary responsibility to serve the financial interests of investors.  Boards are generally 
composed of a mix of inside directors, who are also executives of the firm, and outside 
directors, who hold no management position inside the firm.  Membership on multiple 
boards of directors provides executives with an important source of social capital which 
can potentially be utilized by the executive and her or his firm. 
Directors are generally expected to fulfill three roles while serving as a board 
member—providing strategic advice, resource access and oversight of management 
(Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 1996).  Multiple researchers have argued that a 
primary role of the board of directors is to monitor the behavior of corporate executives 
so as to minimize agency costs by aligning the incentives of owners and executives 
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In addition to being 
primarily responsible for the minimization of agency costs and the alignment of 
executives’ and shareholders’ interests, board members often provide the firm with 
unique access to valuable resources (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  By providing the firm with access to resources such as legal 
expertise, cheaper financial capital, government contacts and business relationships, 
board members potentially enable the firm to realize performance benefits.  Further, 
according to the strategic leadership theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Miller et al., 
1998) board members provide the firm with additional cognitive and decision-making 
capabilities.  By being involved in the formulation and implementation of significant 
strategic decisions by the firm (such as acquisitions, alliance formations, divestitures, 
etc), board members can improve the quality of decision-making by the firm’s 
executives.  This is consistent with the ‘service’ role discussed by Johnson et al. (1996).  
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Due to their heterogeneity of skills, experiences and backgrounds, board members can 
provide the firm with contrasting points of view and enhance the quality of firm 
decisions. 
The influence of executive-to-executive relationships on the effectiveness of 
boards of directors has been a topic of increasing interest.  Each type of director provides 
the board with important resources and fills critical roles for the firm.  Outside directors 
bring additional resources, beyond those provided by insiders, to firms on whose boards 
they sit.  Further, directors who have close personal or professional relationships with 
the corporation or its CEO are commonly referred to as “affiliated directors.”  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission defines affiliated directors as those who meet any 
of the following conditions: 1) employment by the corporation or any of its affiliates 
within the prior five years, 2) any family relationship by blood or marriage closer than 
second cousin, 3) affiliation in the last two years with a concern that has had a customer, 
supplier, banker, or creditor relationship with the corporation, 4) affiliation with an 
investment banker who has performed services for the corporation within two years or 
will do so within one year, 5) holding control of corporate stock, and 6) association with 
a law firm engaged by the corporation (Daily & Dalton, 1994: 1607).  A general theme 
in this area of research has been that firms need to find a balance between independent 
outsiders, who are more likely to provide greater oversight, versus affiliated directors 
and insiders, who are more likely to have a thorough understanding of the workings of 
the firm and the demands of its multiple constituents. 
Moreover, the behavioral implications of executives maintaining multiple social 
capital ties via board memberships are also important considerations.  Directors with 
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numerous ties or strong, fewer ties might be constrained in executing their 
responsibilities due to social constraints and feelings of reciprocity.  As a result, 
directors with personal or other professional affiliations with top executives at the 
firm(s) on whose board(s) they sit may be less effective at providing oversight and 
unbiased advice than those directors without such connections.  This is because 
reciprocity norms accompanying social capital resources may constrain board members’ 
behavior.  Thus, the balance of insider directors versus affiliated directors versus 
outsider directors on a board will likely influence the extent to which the board actively 
fulfills it multiple roles to the firm (Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). 
Executives can potentially hold seats on multiple boards of directors at any given 
time.  According to Westphal (1999), social ties between executives holding board 
memberships increase the involvement of the board in the strategic decision making of 
the firm.  This situation would be seen by social capital theorists as evidence that an 
executive with multiple board memberships held a high level of social capital (Mizruchi, 
1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 2001).  Further, executives with high levels of existing social 
capital via connections to other executives and firms will be more likely to be asked to 
assume future board memberships (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Zajac & Westphal, 1996).  
Board memberships, in turn, further enhance an executive’s stock of social capital 
resources.  While this form of executive social capital has been investigated by 
numerous researchers, few have explicitly sought to understand the potential for such 
social capital resources to lead to maladaptive or undesirable behavior. 
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Executive-Level Social Capital and Firm-Level Behavior 
Strategic leadership theory argues that organizations are reflections of top 
executives in that the experiences, values, specific knowledge, and preferences of top 
managers are reflected in firm-level decisions (Cyert & March, 1963; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984).  Cannella and Monroe (1997) provide an overview of early work in this 
area.  Researchers in this area tend to argue that executives can, and frequently do, have 
a positive impact on the firm’s performance.  Thus, much prior research on top 
management teams has sought to identify traits, knowledge, skills, and capabilities of top 
managers and to understand the determinants of effective strategic leadership (Cannella 
& Monroe, 1997; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  In general, literature on top 
management teams (TMTs) has largely focused on the influence that demographic 
characteristics have on firm behavior and performance.  Researchers have relied 
extensively on variables such as educational background, functional background, age, 
and tenure as predictor variables in TMT studies.  The popularity of this approach also 
seems to be due in part to the availability of TMT demographic data.  While a useful 
initial approach, it does not actually measure the phenomenon of interest—cognitive 
processes within the TMT (Miller et al., 1998). 
The empirical evidence linking demographic variables to firm performance has 
thus far been mixed at best.  This is one area in which March and Sutton’s (1997) 
caution against using organizational performance as a dependent variable seems to be 
appropriate.  Although some individual studies have seemed to suggest a link between 
demographic variables and firm performance, it is difficult to assert this conclusion with 
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much confidence.  In part, these inconsistent results may be due to underspecified 
models which have not accounted for important mediating and/or moderating factors.  
While, Barsade et al. (2002) found that affective diversity impacts team conflict and 
decision making, Dalton and co-authors (1998) found no systematic relationship 
between leadership characteristics and firm performance.  Carpenter and colleagues 
(2001) found that while international assignment experience is predictive of CEO pay, it 
is not predictive of firm performance.  Further, a recent meta-analysis by Certo et al. 
(2006) found that demographic characteristics such as tenure heterogeneity and 
functional heterogeneity are predictive of firms’ strategic choices, but not of firm 
performance.  Thus, firm strategic may actually be a mediating variable in these earlier 
studies.  Collectively these studies suggest that one or more intervening variables likely 
impact the relationship between the demographic characteristics and firm performance. 
Thus, we know that demographic variables are imperfect proxies for cognitive 
processes and that no systematic relationships between demographic variables and firm 
performance have been discovered by existing studies.  Therefore, an understanding of 
the still undiscovered mediating and/or moderating variables is required and, maybe 
more importantly, researchers should begin to investigating factors which influence 
cognitive processes for members of the top management team.  In fact, some researchers 
have called for an end to TMT research using demographic variables (Certo et al., 2006).  
Insofar as they influence cognitive processes of top management team members, social 
dimensions of inter-executive and inter-firm relationships merit further research.  The 
characteristics and dimensions of social capital are key examples of potential intervening 
variables which influence the TMT decision making process. 
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Firm-level decision making frequently involves political coalitions, with top 
executives as the most influential political actors in the organization (Cyert & March, 
1963; March, 1962).  According to this perspective, firm behavior is directly influenced 
by the interests and beliefs of the dominant coalition of executives in the firm.  
Furthermore, whenever executives’ have discretion about how to fulfill their 
responsibilities to the firm (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; 
Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), and power over firm-level decisions (Finkelstein, 1992), 
executive-level social capital is also influential in firm-level strategic actions. 
The establishment and maintenance of internal and external communications 
systems is the primary task of executives.  In their roles as boundary spanning agents for 
their respective firms, executives frequently build communications networks through 
which information is exchanged inside and outside the organization (Tushman, 1977; 
Tushman & Scanlan, 1981).  Moreover, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) classify 
executives’ roles into three categories: 1) external and internal activities, 2) strategy 
formulation and implementation (including context creation), and 3) managing substance 
and symbols.  Each of these roles involves a combination of economic and socially-
constrained actions (Granovetter, 1973, 1985).  Thus, their actions are partially guided 
by social norms and expectations. 
Executives routinely engage in acquisition, assimilation and utilization of 
knowledge from outside their firms.  In carrying out their responsibilities to their various 
stakeholders, executives deal with two general categories of knowledge: 1) explicit 
knowledge, and 2) tacit knowledge (which by definition is not publicly-available).  
Because explicit knowledge is easily codifiable, it can be easily transferred between 
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individuals, often without interpersonal interaction (McFadyen & Cannella, 2004).  
Publicly-available explicit knowledge is readily accessible to anyone interested in 
acquiring it. 
The existence of firm-level social capital requires firms to have relationships 
with other firms.  Integral to the development of the relationship between organizations 
is the development of a relationship between the firms’ top management team members 
and other key boundary-spanning representatives.  Over time the firm-to-firm 
relationship becomes institutionalized as more members of the firms become involved in 
the exchange relationship and as the firms develop trust in each other, which results from 
repeatedly engaging in exchanges with each other (Gulati, 1995a, 1995b; Kostova & 
Roth, 2003).  During this process firm-level relationships can become institutionalized.  
As a result of the institutionalization of the exchange relationships between the firms, the 
inter-personal relationship between their representatives may become less crucial 
(Larson, 1992).  Even if the representatives of each firm exit their organizations, the 
relationship between the firms can survive due to an established assumption of how each 
party will behave, i.e., once the connection between them has become institutionalized. 
Firm-Level Social Capital  
Although early research in this area focused on the social capital of individuals, 
the notion of social capital is applicable to firms as well as individuals (Ellis, 2002; 
Florin et al., 2003; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Palmer & Barber, 2001; Pennings et al., 
1998; Uzzi, 1997b).  Firms routinely interact with numerous other organizations in the 
conduct of their business activities.  Firm-level social capital can be conceptualized as a 
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firm’s relationships with other companies.  These relationships can be independent of the 
firms’ representatives (i.e., institutionalized) (Larson, 1992) or they can be explicitly 
dependent on executives and key employees’ relationships with others outside of their 
own firm.  Therefore, social capital is a product of relationships that have developed 
through long-term interactions and is developed through networks of relationships (both 
personal and firm-level). 
Social capital can be thought of as a combination of firm’s relationships and the 
resources available to the firm as a result of its relationships with other companies.  The 
development and maintenance of social capital requires mutual commitment and 
cooperation from the individuals/groups involved (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Coleman, 
1988; Portes, 1998; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993).  Developing social capital often 
requires intentional effort and is accumulated over time and with experience (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989; Ireland et al., 2002).  Research has shown that social factors, especially 
social capital, play an important role in firm-level outcomes (Baker, 1990; Hitt et al., 
2002; Palmer & Barber, 2001).  Although firm-level social capital is an organizational 
resource, it is built through the relational networks of individuals.  For example, social 
capital between firms develops as representatives of each partner firm interact with one 
another (Ireland et al., 2002).  Resource exchanges between two firms can be influenced 
by the nature of the non-business connections between each firm’s agents (Knoke, 
1999).  For example, executives at two firms also may be members of the same social 
organizations, have children enrolled in the same school, be alumni of the same 
university, attend the same church or volunteer for the same not-for-profit groups. 
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Social capital increases the probability of success for inter-firm cooperative 
ventures as a result of the development of trust and a willingness to share resources 
(Bouty, 2000; Hitt et al., 2000).  Walker et al. (1997) demonstrated that social capital is 
an essential ingredient in network formation and industry growth for biotechnology start-
ups.  Additionally, firm-level social capital facilitates resource exchange and the level of 
innovation within a firm (Ahuja, 2000a; Stuart, 2000; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). 
Inter-Firm Partnerships 
Strategic alliances involve any voluntarily initiated agreement between firms in 
which they cooperate in sharing, exchanging, or jointly-developing resources (Gulati, 
1998; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Stuart, 1998).  Joint ventures (JVs), which involve mutual 
equity investment, have become one of the most frequently used forms of strategic 
alliances (Currall & Inkpen, 2002; Dollinger et al., 1997; Houston & Johnson, 2000).  
Alliances can be effective vehicles through which knowledge can be acquired more 
rapidly than via internal development or acquisition of another firm (Hamel et al., 1989; 
Inkpen, 1996; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998).  Multiple researchers have employed a social 
network perspective in assessing the consequences of strategic alliances (Das & Teng, 
2002; Gulati, 1998; Koka & Prescott, 2002). 
Strategic alliances are widely viewed as an important firm strategy (Gulati, 
1998).  Thus, firms utilizing strategic alliances normally have multiple strategic alliances 
(Parise & Casher, 2003).  For example, the top 500 global businesses each have an 
average of 60 major strategic alliances and multiple non-major alliances (Dyer et al., 
2001).  This popularity is likely due to the numerous potential benefits associated with 
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strategic alliances.  Strategic alliances enable the participating partners to acquire skills 
and knowledge from each other (Hitt et al., 2000; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).  The 
knowledge acquired can relate to customers preferences, institutional demands, supplier 
relationships, cultural idiosyncrasies, and more.  Further, strategic alliances provide 
access to resources which can enhance a firm’s ability to innovate (Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2004; Tsai, 2001) and firm-level performance (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Harrison et al., 
2001). 
Firms build alliances (including JVs) to access complementary assets held by 
partner firms.  Partners voluntarily pool their resources in an attempt to achieve strategic 
purposes that are either not possible or too costly to achieve independently (Ireland et 
al., 2002).  In addition, collaborating with prestigious partners may provide endorsement 
and status enhancement (Podolny, 1994, 2001).  Several studies have observed that firm-
to-firm collaborations contributed to firm’s innovative performance through mutual 
learning and knowledge acquisition.  Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) found that by 
allying with large firms, start-up firms are able to improve their ability to innovate.  
Further, Ahuja (2000b) found that engaging in alliances increases the probability of 
producing radical technological breakthroughs.  Similarly, Powell and colleagues (1996) 
found that partnerships between biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical firms 
significantly enhanced firm innovation. 
Further, investors often respond favorably to alliance formations and seem to 
respond to the potential of such collaborations to create value (Anand & Khanna, 2000).  
Earlier research has also shown that inter-firm partnerships promote firm growth 
(Chung, 1996; Powell et al., 1996) and enhance firm survival (Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
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Mitchell & Singh, 1996; Singh & Mitchell, 1996).  Moreover, JVs prove to be an 
effective strategy for entering new markets (Inkpen, 1998; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). 
Social capital from inter-firm collaborations is derived from each unique 
partnership and can serve as a basis for subsequent formation of additional partnerships 
(Kale et al., 2000).  Firms may seek partners with significant social capital to gain access 
to the network’s resources.  In addition, greater diversity in terms of with whom firms 
form partnerships creates more social capital (Baker, 1990).  Earlier research has 
demonstrated that inter-firm collaborative success is directly influenced by the quality of 
relationships between partners (Glaister & Buckley, 1999; Ireland et al., 2002).  Thus, 
social capital gained via alliances such as joint ventures is a resource that attracts firms 
seeking access to the resource base of firms’ networks.  Social capital via alliances, in 
turn, provides exposure to a wider, more valuable, range of knowledge resources. 
The Key Role of Trust 
Trust is a willingness to be vulnerable and potentially exposed to opportunistic 
behavior on behalf of the exchange partner because of a positive expectation about that 
partner’s behavior (Hitt et al., 2000; Kale et al., 2000).  When trust exists between firms, 
the partners do not fear the other partner’s actions (McAlister, 1995).  Trust is learned 
and is reinforced through repeated interactions among partners (Powell, 1996).  
Similarly, Gulati (1995a) argued that familiarity (via repeated interactions) tends to be 
associated with trust between organizations.  Therefore, regular interaction between 
partners is one of the essential characteristics of trust-based relationships (McEvily et al., 
2003). 
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Research by numerous authors points out the direct benefits of trust, both to 
executives and to firms.  Trust between partners serves as a governance mechanism 
which promotes voluntary, non-obligating exchanges of resources (Uzzi, 1996). For 
example, Gulati (1995a, 1995b) found that trust resulting from multiple alliance 
experiences with partners decreases the likelihood of costly equity-based governance 
mechanisms.  A prominent concern for firms entering alliances and joint ventures is the 
predictability of their partners’ behaviors.  Trust is necessary for the parties to make 
good-faith efforts not to take advantage of the other.  Zaheer et al. (1998) indicate that 
increased trust between exchange partners reduces the level of conflict and negotiation 
costs between partners.  In addition, Gulati and Westphal (1999) found that trust due to 
social ties promotes alliance formation.  Relationships based on mutual trust and 
interactions between representatives of partner firms tend to produce increased social 
capital (Kale et al., 2000).  Trusting relationships are the basis for managing alliances to 
maximize their potential value.  Social capital increases the probability of strategic 
alliance success because of the trust and willingness to share resources among partners. 
Currall and Inkpen (2002) demonstrate that lower levels of trust at the individual 
level lead to lower levels of organizational-level trust.  Through earlier interactions, 
partner firms understand each other’s know-how, operating routines, and dominant logic.  
Over time the firm-to-firm relationship becomes institutionalized as more members of 
the firms become involved in the exchange relationship and as the firms develop trust in 
each other, which results from repeatedly engaging in exchanges with each other (Gulati, 
1995a, 1995b; Kostova & Roth, 2003).  Familiarity with partners facilitates the 
development of mutual understanding and trust which eases communication and 
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cooperation between partners.  In turn, partners with a history of repeated each with one 
another come to take the relationship for granted, often assuming it to be beneficial 
without explicitly comparing its benefits to other potential partnerships (Gulati, 1995a, 
1995b). 
Willingness to share resources may be necessary to ensure that both partners gain 
from the relationship (Hitt et al., 2000).  As exchange partners engage in repeated 
interaction with each other, their relationships tend to strengthen and the partners 
become more willing and able to share tacit knowledge with each other.  Partners are 
better able to understand knowledge from each other in long-lasting partnerships, and 
have more efficient exchange relationships, than those who have not developed long-
term relationships (Bouty, 2000; McFadyen & Cannella, 2004).  The frequency of 
interactions between partners is also an important indicator of the resources the partners 
have invested in their relationship.  Greater amounts of time spent interacting also lead 
to the establishment of behavioral expectations. 
Whereas Granovetter (1985) argued that ongoing experience within a network of 
exchange relationships is likely to be a key source of trust, ongoing interaction is a 
necessary but insufficient factor in the development of trust when firms are faced with 
uncertainty.  In inter-organizational relationships both parties are potentially exposed to 
risks (Kollock, 1994).  Existing network members are especially exposed to risk due to 
their lack of knowledge about the potential new exchange partner’s capabilities and 
behavior. 
Without exchanges occurring, social capital between firms cannot develop 
(Bourdieu, 1985).  Repeated ties are evidence of partners’ efforts to optimize its 
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relationship-specific assets (Koka & Prescott, 2002).  Social capital is created through 
exchange—and in turn facilitates exchange (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  The economic 
exchanges between firms in a network create an accumulated history for the firms 
involved.  The accumulated history of transactions enables firms to develop trust and to 
predict each others’ behavior (Ireland et al., 2002; Gulati, 1995b).  This accumulated 
history is built through frequent interactions which permit actors to know one another, to 
share information, and to create a common understanding (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998).  The 
greater the number of previous transactions between exchange partners, the more trust 
exists between partners, as greater amounts of information are shared (Larson, 1992) and 
fear of opportunistic behavior decreases (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Uzzi, 1996). 
Undesirable Behavior by Partner Firms 
A number of potential problems associated with inter-firm collaborations have 
been noted in the literature.  For example, partnerships can become redundant if they 
provide access to the same information (Burt, 1992) or complementary capabilities 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1994).  In addition, a given new partnership can create unnecessary 
duplications (Park & Ungson, 2001).  Further, firms participating in joint venture also 
risk leaking proprietary knowledge to partners or losing control of other important assets 
(Hamel, 1991; Williamson, 1991).  Several researchers have argued that the 
collaboration process is dynamic, with partnerships being forced to either evolve to meet 
changing conditions or likely encounter conflict and possible dissolution due to failure to 
meet expectations (Doz, 1996; Hutt et al., 2000; Jones et al., 1998).  Changes to the 
competitive environment facing a partnership often leads to either a renegotiation of the 
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terms of the partnership (Kale, & Puranam, 2004; Weber & Camerer, 2003), or to firms 
modifying their behavior unilaterally in order to maintain an acceptable level of 
satisfaction with the partnership (Arino & de la Torre; 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).  
Such changes lead the affected partner to attempt to regain an acceptable expected 
outcome from the partnership by readjusting the firm's contributions to the venture 
and/or the firm’s share of the outcome.  The more extreme the imbalance, the more 
drastic the affected partner’s actions, and the more likely the relationship will be 
dissolved (Arino & de la Torre; 1998; Hutt et al., 2000). 
The arguments presented herein are an extension of this earlier research in that I 
argue that the reciprocity expectations and knowledge-related characteristics of social 
capital cause some firms to engage in undesirable behaviors in response to competitive 
constraints.  This is due to the drastic nature of the responses which likely accompany 
poor-performing partnerships.  Firms that are constrained by high levels of reciprocity 
will be slow to response to changes external to the partnership.  This causes short-term 
performance problems and can eventually place the partnership at a competitive 
disadvantage.  Thus, one or more of the partners is more likely to engage in undesirable 
behavior in an attempt to restore a desired level of outcome for the firm.  The more 
constrained a firm is by reciprocity expectations, the slower it will be to respond to 
external changes.  The slower the response, the more drastic an eventual response will 
need to be in order to adjust to the change.  Thus, firms are expected to become more 
likely to engage in actions such as behaving opportunistically towards partner firms, 
violating terms of agreements, and violating federal regulations. 
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Examples of undesirable or maladaptive actions which are of particular interest 
include: conflict between partner firms; violating regulatory, environmental, health and 
safety rules; and engaging in behavior which leads to legal action between partner firms 
or legal action against the focal firm by a non-partner firm.  These actions are considered 
undesirable or maladaptive because they are generally viewed unfavorably by outsiders 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Social Capital’s Risks 
The idea that social capital is not universally beneficial to its owners is not a new 
concept.  Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) point out that while social capital is 
frequently beneficial to ethnic entrepreneurs, the associated social constraints can 
overwhelm social capital’s value in many instances.  Since behavioral expectations 
inevitably accompany social capital resources, it is necessary to consider their influence 
on both executive-level and firm-level social capital.  For example, when social capital 
ties are particularly strong, they may enhance the volume of information shared, at the 
expense of slowing down decision making (Hansen, 1999).  This suggests that greater 
amounts of social capital resources (stronger ties and/or more ties) are more expensive to 
maintain than fewer, weak ties (Granovetter, 1973).  Actors can become over-embedded 
in a network of social capital relationships (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 
1997a).  When a network of relationships becomes characterized by over-embeddedness, 
the network members fail to effectively acquire valuable knowledge outside the reach of 
the network.  As a result, they may become complacent (Gargiulo & Bernassi, 1999, 
2000) and so committed to existing relationships that they fail to innovate as quickly as 
 41 
 
 
firms who are not as highly embedded in a network (Kern, 1998).  Social capital also 
requires ongoing resources and attention to maintain (Gabbay & Leenders, 1999).  Other 
researchers have found that networks of actors with high levels of social capital can also 
be plagued by insularity, free-rider problems, and a lack of entrepreneurship (Portes, 
1998; Waldinger, 1995).  These problems arise because limited interaction with others 
outside the network limits the diversity of information available to the network and 
promotes the development of an us-vs.-them mentality within the network (Krackhardt 
& Stern, 1988).  Although numerous problems have been associated with social capital 
resources, very few studies exist which specifically investigate the potential for social 
capital resources to lead to undesirable behavior (for a few rare exceptions, see Baker & 
Faulkner, 1993; Brass et al., 1998; Raab & Milward, 2003).  I will specifically explore 
several theoretical explanations for causal mechanisms underlying the potential for 
social capital resources to become liabilities in the following chapter. 
Summary 
A commonly-held perspective in the management literature is that top executives 
directly influence the actions undertaken by their firms and the outcomes resulting from 
those actions.  Thus, central to this paper is the view that social factors play an important 
role in firm-level decisions.  Executives focus much of their effort on the establishment 
and maintenance of connections to important stakeholders outside the firm.  As a crucial 
link to the firm’s environment, top management team members provide access to 
knowledge residing outside the firm’s boundaries.  Executives’ social capital is often 
central to building networks through which information and resources are exchanged and 
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economic opportunities are discovered.  In particular, connections to external actors via 
board memberships and firm-level strategic alliances are of interest for this study. 
Social capital theory provides complementary insights to traditional economics-
based perspectives on firm actions and outcomes.  This perspective offers an alternative 
logic to explain the behavior of firms and their senior executives.  According to social 
capital theory, socially-embedded economic actions are facilitated by social norms and 
expectations.  Social capital resources provide their owners with access to valuable 
knowledge, eases the flow of that knowledge between partners, and generates economic 
opportunities.  In fact, social capital has been demonstrated to be valuable to its owners 
in numerous contexts.  Social capital generates trust, which reduces the fear of partner 
opportunism and reduces the need for costly monitoring of partners’ behavior.  Repeated 
interaction between the social capital counterparts leads to enhanced communication and 
cooperation. 
The aim of this dissertation is to illuminate the potential for social capital to hold 
negative implications for firm-level behaviors and outcomes.  Earlier research has 
emphasized that the social context in which any potential economic exchange is 
embedded must be considered.  My intent is to consider the influence of the social 
context by expanding on the notion that the behavioral expectations accompanying 
social capital resources can influence firm-level decisions in such a manner that these 
resources become a liability for the firm.  Although multiple authors have made 
reference to social capital’s ‘dark side,’ this concept has yet to be satisfactorily 
developed in the management literature.  Whereas the characteristics and behavioral 
expectations of social capital are associated with numerous benefits, these characteristics 
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and behavioral constraints can potentially become detrimental for the owner(s) of social 
capital.  At the extreme, social capital may become a liability rather than an asset, as 
decision-making processes are distorted and economic rationality becomes increasingly 
rare.  I develop a number of theoretical arguments pertaining to social capital’s dark side 
in Chapter III.  Several hypotheses are offered regarding the potential for the 
characteristics inherent to social capital and the behavioral expectations affiliated with 
social capital to produce undesirable behavior by top executives and their firms. 
The perspective offered in Chapter III extends existing social capital research by 
arguing that the behavioral expectations accompanying social capital resources often 
limit the thoroughness and quality of firm-level decision making, especially when social 
capital ties are particularly strong and/or overly similar in content.  The expectation of 
reciprocity, which is strongly associated with social capital, is argued to be the key 
behavioral expectation responsible for sub-optimal firm-level decision making.  
Moreover, as the number of social capital ties increases, diminishing returns eventually 
develop in terms of the complementarity of knowledge gained via such connections.  
Further, the relationships between social capital’s characteristics, social norms and 
sanctions, social status, and the nature of knowledge involved in an exchange are 
explored.
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Whereas Chapter II provides a review of several literature streams connected to 
social capital at the executive level and the firm level, this chapter is intended to 
establish the potential for social capital to become detrimental for its owner(s).  In this 
chapter I develop several arguments pertaining to the relationships between important 
factors influencing social capital’s potential to lead to undesirable behavior.  This 
discussion covers: social capital’s characteristics (including the strength of existing 
network ties, the number of social capital ties held, and network closure/cohesion), 
reciprocity, trust, the influence of status and the nature of information being exchanged 
via social capital connections. 
The specific purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework 
explaining the mechanisms involved in social capital becoming a liability to firms.  The 
conceptual model is presented in Figure 1.  Both firm-level and executive-level social 
capital are argued to influence the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behavior.  In 
particular, the number of executive ties via board memberships and affiliated 
relationships as well as the strength of an executive’s ties are expected to be 
curvilinearly related to the likelihood of the firm behaving opportunistically towards its 
partners, violating terms of agreements and/or violating industry regulations.  In this 
model, reciprocity and knowledge quality are predicted to mediate the relationship 
 45 
 
 
between social capital resources and the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behaviors.  
In addition, status similarity is expected to be a moderating factor in the model. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Conceptual Model 
 
Social Capital’s Dark Side: Undesirable Firm-Level Behavior 
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Social capital is argued to become a liability to firms whenever the behavioral 
expectations and social dynamics related to social capital limit firms’ options for 
strategic actions, distort the quality of executive decision making and ultimately lead to 
undesirable or maladaptive behavior.  Further, a distinction is drawn between existing 
arguments which allude to social capital’s dark side in terms of its diminishing return to 
holders versus a view that key characteristics of social capital hold the potential to 
become detrimental for firm-level decision quality and firm actions due to their 
influence on knowledge quality and reciprocity involved in social capital relationships. 
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First, I establish the conceptual link between executive-level social capital and 
firm-level social capital.  Then I broadly highlight the potential downside of each social 
capital benefit discussed in Chapter II.  Next I explain how the characteristics of social 
capital resources can become detrimental and ultimately lead to undesirable firm 
behavior(s).  Several hypotheses are presented pertaining to the relationships between 
the strength and number of social capital resources at the executive level versus firm 
level behaviors. 
Linking Executive-Level and Firm-Level Social Capital 
According to Brass and colleagues (2004), greater emphasis on how leadership 
effectiveness is influenced by social capital and network constraints is merited.  This 
study responds to this need by focusing on the characteristics of executives’ social 
capital (in the form of board memberships and affiliated ties) influence the quality of 
executive decision making.  Although economic rationales are certainly influential in 
determining the decisions of executives and the influence exerted by boards of directors, 
so too are the dynamics of inter-personal relationships involved in any decision (Larson, 
1992; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Marchington & Vincent, 2004).  Thus, behavioral 
expectations provide the backdrop against which formal governance and oversight occur 
(Larson, 1992; Seabright et al., 1992).  In addition to experience, skills and general 
knowledge, executives possess varying levels of resources in their personal social capital 
networks.  These resources can be of benefit to firms for which executives are employed 
and also for those on whose boards of directors an executive is a member, as executives’ 
social capital can speed the acquisition of information residing outside of the firm’s 
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boundaries.  The link between executive social capital and firm social capital is expected 
to lead to a larger number of inter-firm partnerships for firms whose executives have the 
largest number of connections and strongest connections to other executives. 
In their external capacity, executives represent the firm to the outside world and 
interact with other firms’ key executives.  Bartel (2001) and Friedman and Podolny 
(1992) demonstrate that these representatives in boundary-spanning roles are unlikely to 
be completely systematic and rational in their evaluation of strategic alternatives.  
Individuals in boundary-spanning roles acquire information from outside their respective 
organizations, interpret and distribute the information, and influence firm-level decisions 
that incorporate such information (Au & Fukuda, 2002; Tushman, 1977; Tushman & 
Scanlan, 1981).  Especially when these representatives are empowered with a great deal 
of autonomy or discretion, such as is the case for members of a firm’s top management 
team, inter-personal dynamics and associated behavioral expectations influence their 
decision-making on behalf of the firm (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Perrone et al., 
2003). 
In situations where interlocking boards of directors exist between firms, there is a 
significant overlap in the executives holding board memberships for a given set of firms.  
There is also likely to be a strong relationship between the level of social capital for a 
firm’s executive team members and the firm’s level of social capital.  Further, the social 
capital of these executives frequently is utilized to generate social capital for their 
respective firms (Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Westphal, 1999).  Ties between the boards 
of directors on which executives serve are shaped by the dynamics between the key 
executives involved.  Often collaboration between firms results from executives having 
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first established inter-personal relationships.  Interlocking directorates can aid the 
development of communication networks between executives and facilitate information 
sharing among board members and their respective firms. 
Moreover, Granovetter (1985) suggested that economic relations are embedded 
in social contexts.  Especially when executives operate with a great deal of autonomy or 
discretion (Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1987; Perrone et al., 2003), they 
have the ability to exert a great deal of influence over the strategic actions undertaken by 
a firm.  It is also likely that the business experience of executives affect their perceptions 
and social obligations.  By interacting frequently with their counterparts on various 
Boards, executives develop an understanding of how to interpret knowledge gained from 
other executives and what limits exist regarding social constraints on their behavior. 
In general, the transferability of executive social capital into firm-level social 
capital is useful in helping firms involved in exchanges achieve their desired outcomes.  
This has been demonstrated repeatedly in various contexts including: product innovation 
(Hansen, 1999; Hitt et al., 2000; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), firm start-up and growth (Portes 
& Sensenbrenner, 1993; Walker et al., 1997), customer-supplier relations (Baker, 1990; 
Uzzi, 1997a), and firm performance (Baker, 1990; Tsai, 2001).  By gaining access to 
trusted sources of knowledge and using social capital as the conduits for that knowledge, 
firms can benefit from their executives’ social capital connections (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati 
& Gargiulo, 1999).  Regardless of various industry and competitive conditions, there 
should be a strong positive relationship between executive-level social capital resources 
and firm-level social capital resources. 
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Exploring Social Capital’s Dark Side 
Executives’ ability to leverage their social capital resources into opportunities for 
their respective firms is related to the extent to which they have the ability to effect firm-
level decisions.  Executive teams with greater control over strategic decisions have more 
latitude to initiate inter-firm partnerships based on executives’ connections.  Conversely, 
top management teams constrained by significant oversight from its board of directors 
are more limited in their ability to convert personal connections into firm-to-firm 
relationships.  The appropriate balance of power between a top management team and its 
board of directors is an area of much debate, with researchers generally adhering to one 
of two important theoretical perspectives on the issue. 
Agency theory has been a dominant perspective utilized in researching 
executives’ behavior (Daily et al., 2003).  Agency theory seeks to explain executives’ 
behaviors as a functional of opportunism and information asymmetry (Lane et al., 1998).  
Further, the theory deals with incentive agreements and decision rights among 
individuals with conflicting interests or priorities (Eisenhardt, 1989).  According to this 
theory, individuals are self-interested, limited by bounded rationality, and are risk-
averse.  Partial goal conflict among participants exists and information is asymmetric 
between the principal and the agent.  An agency problem arises when the desires or 
goals of the principal and agent conflict and it is difficult and/or expensive for the 
principal to effectively monitor the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lane & Cannella, 1999).  A 
common view derived from agency theory is that managers, unless closely monitored, 
will generally behave in self-serving and opportunistic ways (Lane & Cannella, 1999; 
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Lane et al., 1998).  Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the board of directors provides 
oversight and monitoring which minimizes the opportunism of top executives. 
More recently researchers have proposed a positive formulation for the influence 
of executive discretion.  For example, Perrone et al. (2003) present a view of trust in 
boundary spanners explained by their role autonomy.  Autonomy reflects the discretion 
that boundary spanners have in interpreting and enacting their roles.  This idea is 
generally consistent with notion of executive discretion presented by Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1987) and Finkelstein (1992).  Firm representatives will be trusted to a 
greater extent by potential exchange partners when they are free from constraints that 
limit their ability to interpret and execute their boundary-spanning roles.  Role autonomy 
permits boundary-spanning executives to engage in behaviors that allow their 
counterparts to learn about their underlying motives and intentions.  Representatives of 
firms who have significant latitude to interpret and implement their roles are more likely 
to influence firm behaviors, all else equal (Finkelstein, 1992; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 
1987; Perrone et al., 2003). 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, social capital has been argued to have three 
primary benefits for its owner(s) (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1996).  
An interesting void in extant social capital literature pertains to how the same 
characteristics which lead to social capital creating value for its owner(s) can eventually 
lead social capital to become detrimental.  First, social capital increases the value of 
information shared between partners because it provides easy access to information, 
facilitates the transfer and dispersion of information, and improves the quality of 
information shared between actors.  Social capital resources found within networks 
 51 
 
 
provide access to new knowledge and facilitate the transmission of difficult-to-transfer 
knowledge.  As partners repeatedly interact and exchange knowledge, trust develops 
between the partners, which leads to greater volumes of knowledge subsequently being 
exchanged. 
As is the case with virtually all types of resources, diminishing returns eventually 
set in as the knowledge made available by social capital connections becomes too 
heterogeneous.  A firm’s absorptive capacity is typically defined as the ability of an 
organization to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it with existing 
knowledge and apply it to create new capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 
2001; Zahra & George, 2002).  High absorptive capacity is associated with effectively 
applying new knowledge towards commercials ends, thereby leading to increased 
innovation and improved performance (Szulanski, 1996; Tsai, 2001).  However, 
although a firm may possess a high level of absorptive capacity, in order for each 
additional component of knowledge to be of value, it has to be somewhat related to 
existing knowledge stocks (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002).  Overly 
disparate new knowledge will be difficult to assimilate and combine with a firm’s 
current knowledge resources.  This suggests that the benefit garnered from acquiring 
knowledge is quadratic (curvilinear) rather than linear.  Whenever incremental 
knowledge obtained is too disparate from a firm’s existing knowledge stocks, more 
resources are required to assimilate and combine the incremental knowledge with a 
firm’s existing knowledge base than is warranted from the benefit associated with the 
incremental knowledge. 
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A second benefit associated with social capital resources is the ability to 
influence important decisions (Burt, 1992, 1997; Coleman, 1988).  Because of linkage to 
multiple other members in a network, actors with higher levels of social capital have 
greater influence over decisions within the network.  This influence helps direct the 
flows of knowledge and resources among network members.  By exercising such 
influence, network members with higher levels of social capital obtain financial and 
social rewards by influencing the allocation of resources.  However, when social capital 
resources are concentrated in a relatively small number of actors in the network, the 
quality of information these firms make available to network partners may be reduced as 
firms with the largest number of network ties and/or strongest network ties seek to 
exercise control over the network.  Although they have network connections, less 
influential actors can eventually be harmed by the influence exerted by highly-influential 
network members. 
Cohesion among network members is the third benefit associated with social 
capital.  In addition to providing greater power over individual decisions, higher levels 
of social capital are also accompanied by more prevailing social norms, expectations and 
constraints on behavior.  Networks in which strong normative pressures exists are more 
likely to be characterized by control of members’ behavior (Coleman, 1988; 
Granovetter, 1982).  The greater social control associated with cohesive networks 
facilitates interaction among network members and eases the flow of information and 
resources among members.  Whenever these higher levels of control are effective at 
preventing opportunistic behavior by network members, the efficiency of transactions in 
the network improves.  Thus, the overall network initially benefits from increased 
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control over member actions.  This control over network members can become 
dysfunctional, however, as cohesion prevents the import of external knowledge and 
fosters over-embeddedness among network members (Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1997a, 
1997b).  In circumstances where social capital networks are especially cohesive, the lack 
of external knowledge suggests that these networks are likely to be prone to 
parochialism and path dependence in learning.  Thus, the likelihood of executives being 
engaged in reduced quality decision-making and their respective firms engaging in 
undesirable actions are increased. 
The preceding arguments point to the potential for social capital resources to 
eventually limit the quality of decisions.  This is because social constraints do not exist 
in a vacuum—they exist in the context of making economic decisions.  As behavioral 
expectations play an increasingly important role in determining actions undertaken, 
social capital can impede economically-rational decision making.  For example, 
whenever executives become overly embedded in a network of directorships, the firms 
whose boards they occupy seats are likely to suffer from a lack of diversity of frames of 
reference about such things as customer needs, availability of new market opportunities, 
operational best practices, competitive interactions, and resource availability.  Moreover, 
as a firm develops more relationships within a given network of firms, behavioral 
constraints become increasingly influential and the complementarity of the knowledge 
exchanged via social capital connections is expected to be curvilinear.  Firms are 
simultaneously exposed to greater risk of opportunistic behavior by partners with weak 
ties inside the focal network.  Thus, the characteristics of social capital which frequently 
make this resource highly desirable to executives and their firms can ironically lead to 
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sub-optimal strategic behaviors.  When considered individually and collectively these 
arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: A curvilinear (U-shape) relationship exists between the number 
of social capital connections held by a firm’s key executives and the likelihood of firm-
level undesirable behaviors. 
Hypothesis 1b: A curvilinear (U-shape) relationship exists between the strength 
of social capital connections held by a firm’s key executives and the likelihood of firm-
level undesirable behaviors. 
Hypothesis 1c: A curvilinear (U-shape) relationship exists between the number 
of social capital connections held by a JV parent firm and the likelihood of firm-level 
undesirable behaviors. 
Hypothesis 1d: A curvilinear (U-shape) relationship exists between the strength 
of social capital connections held by a JV parent firm and the likelihood of firm-level 
undesirable behaviors. 
Embeddedness and Knowledge Quality  
Embeddedness research by Uzzi (1996, 1997a, 1997b) and Granovetter (1973, 
1985) and others (Coleman, 1988; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Waldinger, 1995) 
comprises a preeminent a position among the research streams related to social capital’s 
dual effects (having potential to be either positive or negative).  The actions of firms 
which are embedded in a network of relationships are influenced by the social nature of 
their ties to other firms.  These firms can have either: a) a large number of connections 
with other firms or b) strong connections with a smaller number of firms; they generally 
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do not have a large number of strong connections (Uzzi, 1996, 1999).  Thus, a firm’s 
embeddedness (via number and/or strength of connections) is indicative of its level of 
social capital resources within a network of firms.  Embeddedness has been 
demonstrated to affect factors ranging from cost of capital (Uzzi, 1997a, 1999; Uzzi & 
Gillespie, 2002) to selection of joint venture partners (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) to firm 
performance (Uzzi, 1997a).  The aggregate results for this extant literature demonstrate 
that the content of social capital connections, the social dynamics involved in an 
exchange and the structural connectedness within a network of relationships each exert 
influence over inter-executive and inter-firm exchange.  The number of connections held 
by a given actor within a network and the level of network cohesion determine the 
degree to which the exchange of high quality, complementary stocks of knowledge is 
possible.  Moreover, the strength of social capital relationships is a key determinant of 
whether or not this exchange potential is realized.  The key mechanism involved in 
optimizing the value of embedded social capital relationships is the constraint of 
opportunism provided by behavioral expectations.  Embedded social ties, therefore, 
constrain behavior and reduce the probability of opportunism by affecting actors’ 
motivations, expectations, and decision-making processes (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 
1993; Uzzi, 1996). 
Interorganizational networks and inter-personal networks serve as repositories of 
information (Gulati, 1995b) and are generally accompanied by social obligations, as well 
as the means to enforce them (Portes, 1998).  Embeddedness, the extent to which 
exchanges within a group are shaped by social relations, is often argued to directly 
influence the amount and quality of information available via a network (Uzzi, 1996, 
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1997b).  Further, embeddedness enhances the value of connections within a network as 
the formation of additional ties is greatest for actors that are already highly embedded 
within the network (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Powell et al., 1994).  Networks with larger 
numbers of direct exchange partners tend to possess greater amounts of information and 
resources (McFadyen & Cannella, 2004).  When a firm is highly embedded in a network, 
it tends have recurring interactions with other network firms, which in turn creates 
familiarity and trust between network firms. 
Networks of inter-firm relationships are useful for firms in numerous ways.  In 
addition to providing direct economic exchange opportunities, they can serve as a 
conduit for important resources sought by a firm.  Firms often search for exchange 
partners with resources they lack (Gulati & Nohria, 2000).  Firms can benefit from such 
resource combinations by leveraging the strengths of exchange partners in areas of 
particular weakness or need for the firm.  Related research has concluded that such 
complementarity allows firms to develop and take advantage of new opportunities (Hitt 
et al., 2001).  Harrison and his colleagues have persuasively argued and found that the 
complementarity of assets is potentially valuable for strategic alliances as well as for 
merged firms (Harrison et al., 1991, 2001a).  They argue that synergistic benefits from 
resource combinations are more likely to be generated by complementary rather than 
similar assets.  This theme is repeated in Madhok and Tallman’s (1998) argument that 
complementary resources offer the highest probability of creating value for partners. 
Although exchange partners actively seek to establish relationships which 
provide access to complementary resources, including knowledge, the question of how 
to ensure that information acquired via a partner is also of high quality is an important 
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consideration.  The number of social capital relationships maintained by a firm and by its 
key executives is expected to be positively related to the complementarity of knowledge 
available to the firm.  All else equal, as more connections are established with an 
increasingly large group of other actors, the higher the probability the knowledge 
exchanged among network members will be complementarity in nature.  In addition, the 
strength of the average network connection is likely to be positively related to the quality 
of knowledge exchanged between parties to a social capital relationship.  Strong social 
capital ties are the result of repeated interaction and an aggregated level of trust between 
the parties involved.  In such a situation, the parties will generally provide reliable 
information because of a positive expectation about each partner’s behavior (Hitt et al., 
2000; Kale, Singh & Perlmutter, 2000).  Because partners do not fear the other partner’s 
actions, they will be less inclined to provide partial information or incorrect information.  
In addition, partners understand each other’s know-how, operating routines, and 
dominant logic as a result of prior interactions.  This enables them to effectively transfer 
reliable, accurate knowledge between partners.  Consequently, whereas relationships 
with a large group of other actors enhance the complementarity of knowledge between 
partners, stronger ties are likely to be the source of higher quality information, ceteris 
paribus.  Thus, the next hypotheses are presented. 
Hypothesis 2a: The number of social capital connections held by a firm and its 
key executives is positively related to the quality of knowledge exchanged via firm-to-
firm partnerships. 
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Hypothesis 2b: The strength of social capital connections held by a firm and its 
key executives is positively related to the quality of knowledge exchanged via firm-to-
firm partnerships. 
Multiple relationships and repeated interaction among network firms have been 
argued to create greater levels of trust between organizations, as exchange partners know 
how to interpret each other’s behavior and tend to behave less opportunistically.  
However, building and maintaining multiple relationships requires a commitment of 
resources.  Eventually additional relationships provide diminishing returns.  Whereas 
additional transactions within a given relationship may continue to create value, once 
diminishing returns set in incremental relationships become detrimental to a given 
portfolio of social capital resources.  Establishing and maintaining more relationships 
can begin to consume scarce resources which can be better utilized in other activities 
(McFadyen & Cannella, 2004). 
Weak ties and sparse networks have been argued to be especially valuable 
sources of knowledge (Burt, 1992, 1997; Granovetter, 1973, 1985), suggesting that a 
trade-off exists between the strength of ties and their value to firms.  When social capital 
ties are particularly strong, they enhance the volume of information shared, although the 
decision making process is slowed (Hansen, 1999).  Thus, certain configurations of 
social capital resources (stronger ties and/or more ties) are more expensive to maintain 
than fewer, weak ties (Granovetter, 1973).  One of the primary benefits of having high 
levels of social capital, and thus being highly embedded in a network, is the improved 
quality of knowledge made available to the focal actor.  High levels of social capital 
provide overlapping sources of knowledge, which enables continuing assessment of the 
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accuracy and quality of the knowledge (Gulati, 1998; Uzzi, 1996).  However, actors can 
become over-embedded in a network of social capital relationships (Coleman, 1988; 
Granovetter, 1985, 2005; Uzzi, 1997b).  When a network of relationships becomes over-
embedded, the network members fail to effectively acquire valuable knowledge outside 
of the network.  Further, firms become increasingly isolated from changes in the external 
environment (Uzzi, 1996, 1999).  As a result, they may become complacent (Gargiulo & 
Benassi, 2000, 1999) and so committed to existing relationships that they fail to extend 
their knowledge search beyond the existing network (Kern, 1998; Krackhardt & Stern, 
1988).  Thus, any enhancements to existing knowledge stocks are only incremental in 
nature. 
This scenario may prevent firms from obtaining new and/or novel information 
which would enable their adaptation to external changes such as emerging technological 
innovation (Uzzi, 1997a).  Innovation can, therefore, become more incremental rather 
than radical as social capital relationships become embedded.  This leads to low levels of 
new complementary knowledge being absorbed and combined with existing knowledge 
stocks.  Although the knowledge shared among highly embedded network members is 
likely reliable and generally trustworthy, its value is reduced due to the lack of external 
input.  Because limited interaction with others outside the network limits the diversity of 
information available to the network, the ability of actors within the network to 
effectively respond to new competitive circumstances, resource constraints, 
technological improvements or other new information in the external environment is also 
limited. 
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As the knowledge shared between highly embedded partners becomes less 
valuable to the partnering firms, the likelihood of undesirable behavior is expected to 
increase.  High quality knowledge which is not complementary to existing knowledge 
stocks is of little value to firms in a collaborative agreement.  Such a lack of new 
complementary knowledge being shared among partners ultimately is likely to become 
dysfunctional and lead to undesirable behavior among partners.  As partners begin to 
recognize the diminishing incremental value of knowledge from their partnerships, they 
are likely to be less concerned with maintaining those relationships and be more 
concerned with responding to competitive pressures.  Thus firms become more likely to 
modify their behavior unilaterally in order to maintain an acceptable level of satisfaction 
with the partnership (Arino & de la Torre; 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).  Partners 
most affected by external changes will eventually attempt to regain an acceptable 
expected outcome from the partnership by either adjusting the firm’s contributions to the 
partnership and/or the firm’s share of the outcome.  The more severe the perceived 
disadvantage resulting from being slow to respond to competitive pressures, the more 
drastic the affected partner’s actions will become (Arino & de la Torre; 1998; Hutt et al., 
2000).  This is expected to cause some firms to eventually engage in maladaptive or 
undesirable behavior.  Thus, the following hypotheses are presented: 
Hypothesis 2c: The relationship between the number of social capital 
connections and the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behaviors is mediated by the 
quality of knowledge available via the firm’s joint venture network. 
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Hypothesis 2d: The relationship between the strength of the social capital 
connections and the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behaviors is mediated by the 
quality of knowledge available via the firm’s joint venture network. 
Reciprocity 
Inter-firm exchange and cooperation often has a social dimension as well as an 
economic dimension (Blau, 1964; Granovetter, 1973).  Social theorists often view 
people’s social behavior in terms of exchanges of resources (Blau, 1964).  According to 
Blau (1964), social exchange involves voluntary actions of individuals that are 
motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and is an ongoing reciprocal process.  
Social exchanges often do not involve benefits with clear, objective economic value.  
This means that exchange partners are uncertain whether they will ever receive direct 
benefits.  Reciprocity refers to a rule of behavior in social exchange situations in which 
parties to a transaction or exchange have social obligations to one another (Gouldner, 
1960; Westphal & Zajac, 1997).  As Westphal and Zajac (1997) point out, generalized 
norms of reciprocity exist whenever an obligation exists to reciprocate another’s action.  
Further, research has shown that high levels of group solidarity encourage cooperative 
behavior among group members.  Although originally formulated at the individual level, 
social exchange theory has also been applied at the organizational and inter-
organizational levels (Aiken & Hage, 1968). 
Should a party to an exchange violate an existing social norm, others in the 
network have “a context for generalized reciprocal ‘retaliation’, defined broadly as the 
repayment of injurious or otherwise undesired acts” (Westphal & Zajac, 1997: 164).  
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This often involves collective sanctions, in which all members punish those who violate 
group norms.  Social sanctions involve “the mutual monitoring between the participants 
and the rapid dissemination of information” about the behavior of any violations by an 
exchange partner (Hagen & Choe, 1998: 595).  Reciprocity exists not just between actors 
with a history of direct interactions, but also with each actor’s other partners in the 
network.  The norm of reciprocity obligates actors to assist an actor connected indirectly 
to the focal actor, even if a direct exchange between the two parties is unlikely in the 
future.  Punishment for any norm-breaking behavior can be collectively enforced by all 
network members or selectively enforced by individual firms in the form of competitive 
retaliation.  Thus, fear of damaging one’s reputation in a social network is often a 
motivating factor in enforcing norms of behavior.  As a result, social sanctions are an 
effective mechanism to ensure that network members do not violate network norms.  As 
the strength of existing connections increases, so does the level of reciprocity between 
the partners.  This logic, combined with earlier research, leads to the next set of 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3a: The number of social capital connections held by a firm and its 
key executives is positively related to the level of reciprocity involved in joint venture 
networks. 
Hypothesis 3b: The strength of the social capital connections held by a firm and 
its key executives is positively related to the level of reciprocity involved in joint venture 
networks. 
While initially a positive attribute of social capital relationships, whenever too 
much reciprocity exists between partners, there exists the potential for the decision 
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making process within a network of relationships to become distorted.  While repeated 
interaction aids in the development of trust between partners, it may also lead them to 
become overly embedded in established relationships.  Forming relationships with new 
partners outside of the existing network may be difficult to achieve, as this behavior is 
socially constrained by the expectation of reciprocity.  Moreover, firms may be locked 
into unproductive relationships, therefore being excluded from partnering with other 
more viable firms (Gulati et al., 2000). 
The potential for social capital to ultimately distort the quality of executive 
decision making has been illustrated by Mizruchi and Stearns (2001).  They found that 
while social capital between executives eases communications, when executives rely too 
heavily on their social capital connections, they often receive less constructive input and 
unique information, which generally improve decision quality (Mizruchi & Stearns, 
2001).  Moreover, executives can become complacent (Gargiulo & Bernassi, 2000, 
1999) and so committed to existing relationships that they fail to search beyond existing 
contacts for new knowledge (Kern, 1998).  Thus, when firms possess extremely high 
levels of social capital resources, the behavioral obligations associated with social 
capital resources hold the potential to distort the decision-making process and diminish 
the value of its social capital resources. 
It is a commonly-held view in social cognition psychology that “social behavior 
often operates in an implicit or unconscious fashion” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995: 4).  
Social connections can frequently lead to reciprocity in which a person will behave in a 
manner consistent with expectations without receiving any direct benefit in return 
(Bubolz, 2001).  Institutional theorists have long recognized that social obligations 
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provide strong pressures on individual behavior.  Decisions of executives therefore are 
also likely to be influenced by the social obligations they feel towards their counterparts. 
If social obligations exist between executives, the risk of engaging in 
opportunistic behavior is lowered significantly, transaction costs are reduced and the 
efficacy of cooperation is generally enhanced.  However, an often overlooked 
consequence of reciprocity between partners is the potential to lead to the exclusion of 
economically attractive alternatives.  The greater the level of reciprocity which exists 
between two partner firms, the more each partner’s behavior is constrained.  While this 
is likely to be a positive situation initially, firms can become overly constrained in that 
they fail to acquire knowledge residing beyond their current network of social capital 
connections. 
As a firm’s strategic alternatives become increasingly constrained by the 
behavioral expectations associated with reciprocity, the likelihood of a given firm 
ultimately engaging in undesirable behavior is expected to increase.  When the 
competitive environment is characterized by very low operating margins, a large number 
of competitors and/or rapid customer and technological changes, the incentive to engage 
in questionable behavior may be particularly intense.  This is because as firms are 
excluded from an ever increasing number of economically attractive alternatives due to 
norms of reciprocity, firms that do not respond to competitive pressures can quickly be 
negatively impacted by their inability to respond.  For example, whenever competing 
groups of firms work on alternative technology platforms, these groups often compete 
fiercely with one another.  However, as one of the designs begins to establish a dominant 
presence on the market, firms involved in the losing partnership(s) are expected to begin 
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actively considering options for maintaining their competitiveness, and to be more likely 
to engage in undesirable behavior than firms in the winning partnership(s).  Although 
they may be constrained by behavioral constraints within their network of firm-to-firm 
connections, this competitive pressure is expected to eventually lead to firms from the 
losing group to taking shortcuts, including potentially violating agreements and 
regulations in order to maintain a desirable level of competitiveness (Bernard, 2006; 
Buchan, 2005; Trevino & Brown, 2004).  Whereas a firm not constrained by high levels 
of reciprocity can maintain competitiveness via engaging in economically attractive 
economic opportunities, reciprocity forces some firms to forgo those opportunities and, 
in turn, find other avenues for maintaining short-term competitiveness. 
Hypothesis 3c: The relationship between the number of social capital 
connections and the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behaviors is mediated by the 
level of reciprocity involved in the joint venture network. 
Hypothesis 3d: The relationship between the strength of the social capital 
connections and the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behaviors is mediated by the 
level of reciprocity involved in the joint venture network. 
Manifestations of Social Capital’s Dark Side 
Multiple researchers have called for a closer examination of the circumstances 
under which strategic alliances, including joint ventures, are beneficial or detrimental to 
firm performance (Gulati, 1998; Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994; Houston & Johnson, 
2000).  Although the potential benefits associated with collaborative arrangements are 
numerous, partnerships are frequently plagued with difficulties and poor performance.  
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Partnerships often fail due to conflicts between the partners (Arino & de la Torre, 1998; 
Hutt et al., 2000).  Various risks existing in collaborations often undermine their 
economic effects (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994).  Further, firms may lose autonomy 
as the commitment to relationships grows and the ability of adaptation to external 
environments may be seriously affected (Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994; Uzzi, 1997b).  
The above noted difficulties highlight the need to develop firm capabilities of both 
establishing and managing partnerships (Dyer et al., 2001; Kale et al., 2000).  Whether 
or not these potential benefits can be fully realized depends, at least in part, on whether 
or not partner firms engage in undesirable behaviors towards one another and in regards 
to the external expectations.  The extent to which partners fail to behave in a desirable 
manner towards each other is likely highly correlated with the amount and intensity of 
partner-to-partner conflict and inter-firm rivalry.  In addition, undesirable behavior 
towards external constituents is likely negatively related to a partnership’s ability to gain 
access to valuable resources needed to meet customer expectations, maintain firm 
reputation and prestige, and ultimately, for firm survival. 
Reputation and Status 
Research regarding reputation and firm-level status is especially useful in social 
capital resources and the consequences associated with them.  Podolny (1999) argued 
that firm reputation and status are complementary concepts with a positive relationship 
existing between firm reputation and firm status.  Podolny (1994, 2001), Benjamin and 
Podolny (1999) and Podolny and Baron (1997) have demonstrated that firms are more 
likely to engage in transactions with those organizations that have established good 
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reputations and enjoy a similar status.  The status of an organization, which is 
determined by the patterns of affiliations and previous exchanges, is argued to be a very 
strong predictor of which firms engage in exchange with each other.  Overall, the firm’s 
status and the status of its exchange partners strongly influence the perception developed 
by potential exchange partners of the firm’s capabilities and product/service quality. 
When the capabilities of a potential exchange partner are difficult to discern, 
organizations instead rely on the status of the potential partner to choose among their 
alternatives (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1994).  A firm’s status is an indicator 
of the quality of that firm’s products or services.  In addition, a firm’s status is derived 
from past demonstrations of quality as well as the status of the firm’s exchange partners.  
Patterns of affiliations and previous exchanges with network firms become the basis on 
which the potential exchange partner is evaluated (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 
1993). 
Reputation, both of individuals and their respective organizations, is crucial to 
the development of exchange relationships between firms (Larson, 1992).  Firm 
reputation is a manifestation of the level of trust developed by a firm and may be 
conceptualized as the cumulative effect of a partner’s past behaviors (Parkhe, 1998).  
Firms with better reputations (and thus, have been demonstrated to be trustworthy) tend 
to be favorable exchange partners (Dollinger et al., 1997; Blois, 1999).  This is due to 
the desire of reputed firms to protect their reputation (Houston & Johnson, 2000).  A 
common sociological perspective is that potential exchange partners reduce uncertainty 
in market-related behavior by interpreting others’ potential future behavior, based on 
their prior behavior (Podolny, 1994; Stuart, 1998).  By providing a shared context for 
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interactions, social capital alleviates uncertainty among existing partners and facilitates 
the creation of new linkages (Tsai, 2000). 
Prior research has also found that organizations which have more overall 
collaborative experience are more desirable as partners (Gulati, 1995b; Mitchell & 
Singh, 1996).  Further, inter-firm linkages become stronger as partners learn more about 
each other and build trust (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  Zaheer and colleagues (Zaheer et al., 
1998; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995) define trust as the expectation of a partner’s 
reliability in regard to obligations, predictability of behavior, and fairness in actions and 
negotiations.  Such trust is based on predictability due to knowing the exchange 
partner’s tendencies and is rooted in repeated interactions between partners.  Moreover, 
trust diminishes the probability of opportunism (Gulati, 1995b; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998).  Relationships built upon repeated interactions between firm representatives and 
in which mutual trust exists tend to produce social capital for partner firms (Kale et al., 
2000). 
Only after a period of relationship development, in which partners’ behaviors are 
observed do companies develop trust and become able to take the relationship for 
granted (Larson, 1992).  As new network member firms accumulate a history of 
transactions with existing network member firms, trust builds between these firms.  As 
trust builds between these firms, partner firms’ reputations are enhanced and the 
likelihood that a member firm will benefit from intra-network referrals also increases 
(Uzzi, 1996).  Further, research has shown that information shared among network 
members is more influential than acquiring information via publicly available means 
(Haunschild & Beckman, 2002). 
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A major challenge to establishing inter-firm collaborations is the uncertainty 
which often exists regarding potential partners’ capabilities, knowledge base and 
product/service quality (Gulati, 1995a; Walker et al., 1997).  Multiple authors have 
argued that firm reputation is an antecedent for inter-firm relationships.  Most notable 
among these is Podolny (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Poldolny, 1994, 2001; Podolny & 
Baron, 1997) whose work has demonstrated that firms are more likely to engage in 
transactions with those organizations that have established good reputations and enjoy a 
similar status.  The status of an organization, which is determined by the patterns of 
affiliations and previous exchanges, is argued to be a very strong predictor of which 
firms engage in exchange with each other.  Overall, the firm’s status and the status of its 
exchange partners strongly influence the perception developed by potential exchange 
partners of the firm’s capabilities and product/service quality.  When the capabilities of a 
potential exchange partner are difficult to discern, organizations instead rely on the 
status of the potential partner to choose among their alternatives (Benjamin & Podolny, 
1999; Podolny, 1994).  A firm’s status is an indicator of the quality of that firm’s 
products or services.  In addition, a firm’s status is derived from past demonstrations of 
quality as well as the status of the firm’s exchange partners.  Furthermore, a firm’s 
pattern of behavior in prior network relationships influences their subsequent status in 
the network.  As firms develop a reputation for trustworthy behavior and as they interact 
with high status firms in the network, a focal firm’s status can improve.  Thus, patterns 
of affiliations and previous exchanges with network firms become the basis on which the 
potential exchange partner is evaluated (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1994). 
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The potential for undesirable behavior within inter-firm relationships is likely 
moderated by the status similarity of the partners involved.  According to Brass and 
colleagues (1998) the status differences between partners are reflective of the relative 
power of one actor over the other.  This suggests that whenever exchange occurs 
between firms of unequal status, one party has less to lose (by acting unethically) than 
the other (Brass et al., 1998).  Firms which are connected to relatively few others have 
little to lose in terms of reputation.  Instead, as the size of the focal network increases, 
and a firm’s status correspondingly increases, the importance of reputation and status 
increase.  Firms with better reputation and higher status have more to lose from 
undesirable behavior, but are less likely to experience a loss of status.  Paradoxically, 
knowledge from those firms with a lower status position may not be trusted and/or 
believed by others in the network.  For example, should a conflict occur between an 
exchange partner with a high status position and a partner without an equally desirable 
status, all else equal, others are more likely to believe the partner with a higher status 
than the partner without such status (Brass et al., 1998; Westphal & Zajac, 1997).  This 
suggests that status similarities further enhance the influence of reciprocity in network 
relationships.  Thus, exchange partners of equal status are unlikely to behave undesirably 
towards each other, whereas the status differences may lead to conflict between partners 
and increase the changes of undesirable behavior in a partnership. 
Interestingly, because partners tend to be more trusting of others with a higher 
status position, the greater the status difference between partners, the potential exists for 
intentional engagement in unethical or undesirable behavior by the higher status partner, 
as well as misinterpretation of knowledge exchanged between partner firms.  Although 
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social capital and its behavioral expectations serve as alternatives to formalized 
monitoring mechanisms between partners, enforcement can be especially cumbersome 
when firms engage in large numbers of relationships.  Furthermore, status similarity 
between partners tends to cause partners to automatically assume that knowledge 
acquired from a partner is accurate and relevant.  As partners become more similar to 
each other, they each face substantial potential losses of status from undesirable behavior 
and tend to rely on informal behavioral enforcement mechanisms to the exclusion of 
formal monitoring mechanisms.  In situations where partners are of unequal status 
position, the lower status partner is likely more exposed to opportunistic behavior.  Low 
status firms engaged in multiple collaborations are likely to be most exposed to 
undesirable behavior by their high status partners.  Thus, status similarity moderates the 
relationship between reciprocity and firms engaging in undesirable behavior. 
Hypothesis 4: Status similarity moderates the relationship between the level of 
reciprocity involved a firm’s joint venture network and the likelihood of firm-level 
undesirable behaviors. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the methodology utilized to test the hypotheses developed 
in the prior chapter.  The sample selection process and data collection procedures are 
outlined first.  Next the operationalization and measurement of independent variables, 
the dependent variable, moderating and control variables are detailed.  Then the 
statistical methods and analytical approaches used to test the hypotheses in this study are 
explained. 
Sample 
The sample for this study consists of randomly selected Standard & Poor’s 500 
firms involved in joint ventures between 2000 and 2004.  Firms in several industries rely 
extensively on collaborative relationships with other firms in order to spread the cost of 
technological development and to speed the rate at which products are commercialized.  
Data were collected for 300 of the S&P 500 firms.  Equality-of-means tests were 
conducted to assess the representativeness of the randomly selected 300 firms.  The t-test 
for firm sales, firm performance and firm age were 1.20, 1.39, and 1.48 respectively; 
these tests indicate that the randomly selected firms are not significantly different from 
the S&P 500 firms not included in the sample.  Appendix A contains a listing of the 
firms included in this sample. 
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A brief discussion of sample size calculation and power is merited.  Sample size 
is a key concern in assuring sufficient between-unit variability (Klein & Kozloswki, 
2000).  Inadequate sample size may lead to a lack of sufficient statistical power to detect 
the relationships of interest in a given study, or cause a misestimate of the magnitude of 
the relationships (Chueng & Rensvold, 2001; Hitt et al., 2004).  Statistical power is the 
extent to which the potential exists to yield a significant result, given the sample utilized, 
data quality, true population correlation between the variables and the significance level 
selected to control for Type I errors (Cohen, 1988, 1992).  Thus, power represents the 
ability to avoid a false finding of no significant relationship among variables in the 
model.  The recommended minimum threshold for statistical power is 0.80 (Cohen, 
1988).  Assuming that the true population relationship between executive social capital 
and a firm’s likelihood of engaging in undesirable behavior is moderate (r = 0.30), the 
alpha for controlling Type I errors is set at the commonly-accepted 5 percent level (p < 
0.05), and a power level of 0.90 is selected, the sample size needed to achieve these 
criteria is less than 100 observations (Boyd et al., 2005; Cohen, 1988).  Given that this 
study includes data for 300 firms and their joint venture partnerships during the 5-year 
study period, adequate power is achieved in the sample. 
The Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Database on Alliances and Joint 
Ventures is the primary source for the basic information regarding the joint ventures in 
this study.  A joint venture exists whenever at least two parent firms contribute resources 
to establish a partnership which operates with its own identity, although this identity 
may be in part derived from parent firms (Harrigan, 1986, 1988; Inkpen, 1998).  This 
database contains information compiled from publicly available sources such as SEC 
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filings and their international counterparts, trade publications, wires, and news sources.  
This database currently represents one of the most comprehensive sources of information 
on strategic alliances and joint ventures.  A summary of the number of JV partnerships 
formed by the firms in this sample during the study period can be found in Appendix B. 
Data pertaining to executive-level relationships and firm-level undesirable 
behavior will come from multiple archival sources.  Although the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) generally has the highest degree of discretion within the firm, and 
presumably influence on firm outcomes, he/she is not the sole representative of his/her 
firm in this study.  Instead, data were collected on the entire top management team 
(TMT) for each firm.  In order to be considered a member of the TMT, an executive had 
to be identified by the Investor Responsibility Research Center as occupying one or 
more of the following positions at his/her firm: Chief Executive Officer, President, Chief 
Financial Officer, Chief Operational Officer, Executive Vice President, Senior Vice 
President, or Secretary. 
A panel of executives, scholars, consultants and attorneys was asked to rank the 
extent to which each of the actions (legal actions by federal agencies and lawsuits 
involving partner firms) represent manifestations of undesirable firm-level behavior.  
The responses from the panelists were analyzed for inter-rater agreement (Bliese, 2000; 
Chen et al., 2004).  According to Simsek and Veiga (2001), electronic (email) surveys 
can be a more effective and efficient method of collecting data than traditional surveys.  
They argue that electronic surveys provide a better means of sample control since the 
survey can be sent directly to a targeted individual.  Hitt and colleagues (2001b, 2006) 
successfully utilized this approach to survey partners at the largest law firms in the 
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United States.  Following Hitt et al.’s (2001b, 2006) approach, potential panelists were 
identified prior to distributing the survey and asked to participate in the panel via 
electronic mail.  Dillman’s (2000) methodology was utilized, as he provides a detailed 
guide for conducting survey research.  He calls his approach a ‘tailored design method,’ 
which has its roots in a desire “to solve the immediate problem of how to collect 
meaningful survey data inexpensively” (Dillman, 2000: ix). 
Several prior studies involving firm-to-firm collaborative partnerships have 
demonstrated the value in collecting a combination of primary and secondary data for 
this area of research (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Kale et al., 2002; Zollo et al., 2002: 
Zollo & Singh, 2004).  Further, a number of public datasets exist which contain archival 
data regarding various types of undesirable firm-level behavior.  Publicly-traded firms 
are required by the Code of Federal Regulations (17 CFR 229.103) to disclose to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission any material pending legal proceedings, other than 
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the firm or any of its 
subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is the subject.  They must also 
include similar information as to any such proceedings known to be contemplated by 
governmental authorities.  In regards to pending and/or contemplated governmental 
action, firms are required to report any proceeding which may result in a fine of one 
hundred thousand dollars or more. 
Public datasets from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also 
were utilized to acquire supplemental data related to regulatory sanctions imposed 
 76 
 
 
against firms in this sample.  In addition, because the most severe violations of federal 
regulations often lead to lawsuits being filed in federal courts against alleged violating 
firms, the Lexis-Nexis legal database was used to collect information pertaining to this 
form of sanction.  Lexis-Nexis also was used to collect data regarding lawsuits involving 
disputes between (former) partner firms. 
Measures 
Whereas this study is focused on one key dependent variable, it is a cross-level 
study in that it examines the influence of independent variables at both the executive- 
and firm-level.  Therefore, measures used for testing relevant hypotheses are discussed 
for both executive-level and firm-level social capital.  In addition, the moderating and 
control variables in the model are discussed in the following sections.  The approach 
utilized in this study is consistent with earlier network research (Carrington et al., 2005; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Dependent Variable – Undesirable Firm Behavior 
Undesirable behavior is the dependent variable of interest in this study and is 
operationalized in two separate measures.  The first is a count variable representing the 
number of legal actions taken against a joint venture firm by selected federal agencies 
with regulatory authority over U.S. firms and the number of lawsuits filed and/or 
adjudicated against the firm by other firms in each year of the study.  The second is a 
count variable representing the number of lawsuits brought against a focal firm by one of 
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its current or former joint venture partners during the period of this study.  For 
illustration purposes, Appendix C lists a count of legal actions listed in each sample 
firm’s 10-K filings with the SEC during the final year of the study period. 
Each of these measures were validated via a panel of executives, scholars and 
attorneys with business law backgrounds.  A total of 14 experts participated in validating 
the proposed measures of the dependent variable.  Appendix D lists the panel members, 
their respective organizations and primary industry.  The panel members were asked to 
rank the extent to which each of the actions (legal actions by federal agencies, lawsuits 
involving partner firms, lawsuits by non-partner firms) represent manifestations of 
undesirable firm-level behavior.  Each item was ranked on a 5-point Likert scale. 
The responses from the panel of experts were analyzed for inter-rater agreement, 
which is the degree to which ratings from individuals are interchangeable.  The specific 
measure of inter-rater agreement utilized here is rwg, which calculated by comparing 
observed group variance to an expected random variance.  A generally accepted cutoff 
for minimum inter-rater agreement is .70 or higher (Bliese, 2000; Chen et al., 2004).  
The panel generally assessed litigation between partner firms as a more likely 
manifestation of undesirable behavior within the context of a JV (rwg = .8402) than legal 
action taken against a firm by a federal regulatory agency or non-partner firm (rwg = 
.7672).  Both of these measures exceed the critical .70 level for inter-rater agreement.  
Each of these measures of the dependent variable were tested separately. 
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Independent Variables 
Parent firm social capital is operationalized with two measures, the first 
representing number of connections held by parent firms involved in the joint ventures in 
this study, the second measure captures the strength of those connections.  The number 
of connections is first operationalized as a count of the joint ventures in which the parent 
firms are involved plus the number of joint ventures of each of the parent firm’s 
partners.  The number of joint ventures of the parent firms represents a measure of direct 
ties, whereas the measure of partners’ joint ventures assesses indirect ties.  The direct 
ties are weighted more heavily than the indirect ties to account for their greater influence 
on a focal firm (Lin, 1999; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002).  A higher number of ties held by 
a particular firm suggests that firm has a higher degree of embeddedness within the 
overall network of firms. 
Tie strength captures the influence of the duration of each joint venture 
partnership in which the parent holds an interest.  Long-term ties among firms enhance 
trust and the development of mutual understanding (Gulati, 1995a, 1995b).  The longer 
the tenure of a joint venture, the greater the likelihood that partner firms hold a strong 
commitment to each particular joint venture.  Thus, the resulting measures equal: 
a) number of ties (with direct ties being weighted twice as heavily as indirect ties) and 
b) tie strength, as indicated by the total length of each firm’s involvement in joint 
venture partnerships.  For example, a firm which has been involved in two joint ventures 
with partner firms which are each involved in 1 other joint venture, with each of the joint 
ventures having a duration of 3 years has a ”number of ties” measure equal to 6 (2 direct 
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ties * 2 (weight) + 2 indirect ties * 1 (weight)).  This firm has a “tie strength” measure 
equal to 18 (2 direct ties * 2 (weight) * 3 years + 2 indirect ties * 1 (weight )* 3 years). 
Executive social capital is also measured in terms of number of ties as well as the 
strength of those ties.  These data come from a variety of sources.  Executive level data 
for these firms comes from the firms’ proxy statements filed with the SEC.  These data 
were collected in the aggregate from the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s 
Directors Dataset.  To the extent additional data were required, the websites of joint 
venture firms in this sample were a supplemental source of information.  In addition, 
Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database provides this type of biographical data for a 
large number of executives.  The number of ties for a given executive is count variable 
representing the sum of that executive’s memberships on boards of directors. 
The strength of each executive’s social capital ties is a composite count measure 
of number of years the executive has been on the board of directors of other firms.  The 
appropriateness of this measure is found in the concept of multiplexity.  This concept is 
essentially that the greater the number of dimensions involved in each social capital 
relationship, the stronger the connection (Granovetter, 1973; Knoke, 1999; Koka & 
Prescott, 2002). 
Reciprocity is operationalized using a proxy of the overall level of reciprocity 
facing each firm, based on the density of the firm’s network connections (Freeman, 
1979; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  The density of each firm’s connections is the ratio of 
its total number of connections to the total possible connections.  The total possible 
connections for each firm will represent the total number of connections which would 
exist if all firms in the sample were uniformly connected with all other firms via one 
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direct connection.  Thus, the total number of ties is calculated (with multiplex ties 
counting as only one relationship) and then divided by the total possible connections.  
Given the difficulty of establishing boundaries for network studies (Carrington et al., 
2005), the total number of possible connections will be defined as the number of 
connections required to connect all parent firms in this study via direct ties.  This 
measure is appropriate given “greater density makes ideas about proper behavior more 
likely to be encountered repeatedly, discussed and fixed; it also renders deviance from 
resulting norms harder to hide and, thus, more likely to be punished” (Granovetter, 2005:  
34). 
Knowledge quality is assessed by using archival data to calculate a heterogeneity 
index (Blau, 1977; Blau et al., 1982; Smith et al., 1994) related to the 4-digit SIC codes 
of each firm with which a focal firm has an existing JV relationship.  A high 
heterogeneity index score indicates a high degree of diverse potential knowledge which 
can be exchanged between partner firms.  Such diverse sources of knowledge enable 
firms to take advantage of any complementarities existing between their existing 
knowledge stocks and the knowledge held by partners (Harrison et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 
2000). 
Moderating Variable 
Status similarity is measured by first calculating each partner firm’s centrality in 
the network, which is a frequently used measure of firm status (Bonacich, 1987; Salk & 
Brannen, 2000).  Then the ratio of the smaller to the larger centrality score of the two 
firms is computed.  The closer this ratio is to 1.0, the more similar the two organizations’ 
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positions in the network (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1994).  This score 
represents the difference in status similarity for any given pairing of firms in the sample. 
Centrality indexes measure the degree to which an actor is close to all other 
actors in a network, either directly, or indirectly.  A firm that is maximally close is 
directly related to all other network members.  Mediated relationships are accorded 
increasingly less weight than direct relationships with each intervening node.  Numerous 
approaches to measuring centrality exist in the literature (see Bonacich, 1987 and 
Freeman, 1979 for thorough reviews).  The primary interest for this study are 
‘betweenness centrality,’ a measure of the degree to which an actor mediates flows of 
information between others and ‘closeness centrality,’ which refers to the extent to 
which an actor can reach all others in the network in the fewest number of direct and 
indirect links (direct links being weighted as “closer” than indirect links; Freeman, 1979; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  Whereas, having a large number of direct connections 
increases the surveillance to which a firm is exposed, indirect connections determine the 
number of others who may learn about unethical behavior.  Thus, high closeness 
centrality suggests extensive potential loss of reputation by acting unethically (Brass et 
al., 1998). 
The closeness measure of centrality is calculated for each firm in the sample by 
adding the minimum number of links between the focal firm and all other firms in the 
sample (Carrington et al., 2005; Freeman, 1979).  Direct contact is counted is one link, 
indirect contact through one other individual as two links, indirect contact through two 
others as three links, and so forth.  This sum of direct and indirect links is then divided 
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by n - 1, with n equal to the number of firms in the sample.  Further, these scores are 
transformed using the formula  
1 - [(d -1)/dmax] 
In the preceding formula, d equals the shortest path distance and dmax equals the 
largest observed value of d. 
The betweenness measure of centrality used in this study is also based on 
Freeman’s (1979) formula (Carrington et al., 2005).  This formula sums the probability 
of a firm falling on the shortest path between any two pairs of firms over all unordered 
pairs of firms.  This value is then divided by (n2-3n + 2)/2, where n equals the number of 
firms in the sample.  The measure reflects the extent to which a focal firm mediates the 
relationship between any two other firms. 
Control Variables 
I propose that while executive discretion can indeed enhance trust between 
partners, the combination of trust, which lowers each party’s perceived need for 
oversight, and executive discretion can lead to undesirable behavior at both the executive 
level and the firm level.  Executives empowered with a great deal of discretion can 
develop trusting relationships with other executives.  However, due to the lack of 
visibility into their activities, they can also engage in actions such as behaving 
opportunistically towards partner firms, violating terms of agreements, violating federal 
regulations, etc.  Thus, the discretion held by key executives is expected to directly 
influence the likelihood of undesirable or maladaptive firm-level behavior.  Therefore, 
executive discretion is a key control variable in this study. 
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Executive discretion is assessed by using the widely-cited construct of 
managerial discretion developed by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987).  In their original 
formulation of the construct, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) argue that discretion is a 
multi-faceted construct and is influenced by executive-level factors, firm-specific factors 
and industry factors.  Although the notion of managerial discretion has been widely 
cited, a common approach to measuring the construct is lacking.  According to 
Finkelstein and Boyd (1998), it is preferable to use multiple indicators of executive 
discretion, rather than to aggregate discretion variables into an index score or treat them 
as separate variables in a regression model.  They argue that this multi-indicator design 
is superior because it is more efficient and is less biased than the alternatives.  They 
measured managerial discretion using several firm-level, financial-based indicators (such 
as standardized market growth at the firm level, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, 
demand instability and capital intensity) (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998).  I followed 
Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) and focus on multiple indicators of executive 
discretion.  First, I rely on the following industry-level indicator of executive discretion: 
a) Industry Sales Growth—measured as the average level of revenue growth for firms in 
each industry represented in the sample, and b) Industry Capital intensity—measured as 
the average level of property, plant, and equipment held by firms within each industry.  
In addition, I followed Finkelstein and Boyd’s (1998) approach by also including the 
following measures of executive discretion: firm sales growth and firm capital intensity. 
Several other control variables are also included to eliminate alternative 
explanations to the hypotheses.  These data were collected from multiple sources 
including SDC’s Platinum Database, the IRRC Director’s Database, firm websites, and 
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SEC filings (10-K and proxy statements), among others.  Firm size is measured by the 
natural log of the firm’s annual revenues.  This information was collected from 
CompuStat.  SDC was the primary source for the industry classification data for the 
firms in this sample.  Firm age is operationalized as the natural log of the number of 
years since the initial founding of each firm in the study.  SEC filings were the primary 
source of this information, with each firm’s website and SDC Platinum serving as 
supplemental sources for the information.  Year is also a control variable in this study.  It 
is expected that firms will report a larger number of legal actions against them following 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  This act was the legislative response by 
the United States Congress to a number of corporate scandals in America.  The act 
requires enhanced reporting practices and higher levels of scrutiny for top executives at 
publicly-traded firms (Rockness & Rockness, 2005). 
Analytical Methods 
It makes sense theoretically to hold that the relationship between behavioral 
constraints and firm-level outcomes of interest in this study would manifest only after 
some period of relationship development.  Therefore all independent and control 
variables were lagged for one- and two-year periods following the dependent variable.  
This allows their effects (if any) on the dependent variable enough elapsed time to be 
manifested.  It also helps control for unobserved variables. 
Several specific steps were taken to test for non-linear and interactive effects, as 
well as to enhance confidence in the results of the statistical analyses.  Given the use of 
count (non-negative integer) dependent variables in this study, the use of linear 
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regression models would be inappropriate.  In order to assure the models used are 
efficient, consistent and unbiased, nonlinear models are utilized to estimate the 
likelihood of the outcomes of interest.  Due to the low likelihood of the count outcomes 
being independently and identically distributed, and likelihood for overdispersion among 
the data, a Negative Binomial regression model is used in this study (Greene, 2000).  
This model predicts the number of times, represented by µ, that the predicted event has 
occurred.  The analyses in this study are based on a fixed-effects approach to controlling 
for omitted variables.  Moreover, since the data for this study are panel data, cross-
sectional time-series analysis are required to control for heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation among error terms and contemporaneous correlation among residuals 
(Certo & Semadeni, 2006).  It is important to note that in cases where no overdispersion 
(variance of the count data greater than the mean) exists, a Negative Binomial model 
reduces to the Poisson regression model.  The Negative Binomial structural model is: 
µi = exp(a + X1ib1 + X2ib2 + … + Xkibk + εi) 
To test for the hypothesized curvilinear relationships, squared terms for each of 
the appropriate measures are included in the models.  First the normal terms are tested 
for statistical significant and then the squared terms are added individually to isolate 
their influence (if any) on the model.  Moreover, adding the squared terms one at a time 
helps control potential multicollinearity among the variables in the model. 
Mediating effects were tested using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedures.  The 
first step in testing mediation effects is to regress the independent variables against the 
dependent variable.  Following this, the independent variables and controls are regressed 
on the mediating variable.  The third step in testing mediation is to regress both the 
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independent variable and the mediator, along with controls, on the dependent variable.  
If an independent variable which was previously found to be significantly related to the 
dependent variable and to the mediating variable becomes non-significant by including 
the mediating variable in the third step, that independent variable is fully mediated. 
Due to likely multicollinearity concerns with interaction terms, the variables used 
for testing the proposed moderating effect were centered.  Then the centered variables 
were tested by first running a regression including the independent, dependent and 
proposed moderating variable.  Then a new variable (the “interaction term”) was 
calculated as the product of multiplying the centered independent variable by the 
centered moderating variable.  Next a second model was run which included the 
interaction term in addition to the independent, dependent and proposed moderating 
variable.  This process can be represented by the following: 
Step#1: Y = a + b1X + b2Z 
Step#2: Y = a + b1X + b2Z + b3XZ 
Summary 
This chapter has provided a roadmap regarding the methodologies used to test 
hypotheses presented in Chapter III.  Data sources, sampling procedures, and analytical 
techniques utilized in this study are detailed in prior sections.  Thus, data were collected 
according to the procedures described above.  Table 1 provides a summary of the 
hypotheses, variables, measures, data sources and methods used to test the hypotheses.  
The following chapter presents the results from the hypothesis testing via Cross-
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Sectional Time-Series Negative Binomial regression (for count outcomes) and Cross-
Sectional Time-Series regression models (for continuous outcomes) in STATA.
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Hypotheses 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H1a Curvilinear relationship exists between 
the number of social capital 
connections of key executives and 
firm-level undesirable behavior. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Exec Social Capital # of board memberships   
    Exec Social Capital2 # of board memberships2   
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
    Legal actions against firm Count of legal actions Negative Binomial 
Regression 
      JV lawsuits Logistic Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H1b Curvilinear relationship exists between 
strength of social capital connections 
of key executives and firm-level 
undesirable behavior. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Exec Social Capital Strength  # of board-years   
    Exec Social Capital Strength2 # of board-years2   
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
    Legal actions against firm Count of legal actions Negative Binomial 
Regression 
      JV lawsuits Logistic Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H1c Curvilinear relationship exists between 
the number of social capital 
connections of JV parent firms and 
firm-level undesirable behavior. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Firm Social Capital # of joint ventures 
(weighted) 
  
    Firm Social Capital2 # of joint ventures 
(weighted)2
  
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
    Legal actions against firm Count of legal actions Negative Binomial 
Regression 
      JV lawsuits Logistic Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H1d Curvilinear relationship exists between 
strength of social capital connections 
of JV parents firms and firm-level 
undesirable behavior. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Firm Social Capital Strength  # of JV partner-years   
    Firm Social Capital Strength2 # of JV partner-years2   
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
    Legal actions against firm Count of legal actions Negative Binomial 
Regression 
      JV lawsuits Logistic Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H2a The number of social capital 
connections held by a firm and its key 
executives is positively related to the 
quality of knowledge available to the 
firm via its JV network. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Exec Social Capital # of board memberships   
    Firm Social Capital # of joint ventures 
(weighted) 
  
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
    Knowledge Quality Heterogeneity index Cross-Sectional Time-
Series Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H2b The strength of social capital 
connections held by a firm and its key 
executives is positively related to 
quality of knowledge available to the 
firm via its JV network. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Exec Social Capital Strength # of board-years   
    Firm Social Capital Strength # of JV partner-years   
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
    Knowledge Quality Heterogeneity index Cross-Sectional Time-
Series Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H2c The relationship between the number 
of social capital connections and 
likelihood of firm-level undesirable 
behavior is mediated by knowledge 
quality. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Exec Social Capital # of board memberships   
    Firm Social Capital # of joint ventures 
(weighted) 
  
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
    Knowledge Quality Heterogeneity index   
          
    Legal actions against firm Count of legal actions Negative Binomial 
Regression 
      JV lawsuits Logistic Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H2d The relationship between strength of 
social capital connections and 
likelihood of firm-level undesirable 
behavior is mediated by knowledge 
quality. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Exec Social Capital Strength # of board-years   
    Firm Social Capital Strength # of JV partner-years   
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
    Knowledge Quality Heterogeneity index   
          
    Legal actions against firm Count of legal actions Negative Binomial 
Regression 
      JV lawsuits Logistic Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H3a The number of social capital 
connections held by firm and its key 
executives is positively related to 
reciprocity within a firm's network of 
JV partnerships. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since founded   
        
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Exec Social Capital # of board memberships   
    Firm Social Capital # of joint ventures (weighted)   
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
     Firm-Level Reciprocity Weighted Network Density 
(# direct ties/# total ties) 
Cross-Sectional Time-
Series Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H3b The strength of social capital 
connections held by a firm and its key 
executives is positively related to 
reciprocity within a firm's network of JV 
partnerships. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Exec Social Capital Strength # of board-years   
    Firm Social Capital Strength # of JV partner-years   
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
     Firm-Level Reciprocity Weighted Network 
Density (# direct ties/# 
total ties) 
Cross-Sectional Time-
Series Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H3c The relationship between the number 
of social capital connections and 
likelihood of firm-level undesirable 
behavior is mediated by reciprocity. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Exec Social Capital # of board memberships   
    Firm Social Capital # of joint ventures 
(weighted) 
  
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
     Firm-Level Reciprocity Weighted Network 
Density (# direct ties/# 
total ties) 
  
          
    Legal actions against firm Count of legal actions Negative Binomial 
Regression 
      JV lawsuits Logistic Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H3d The relationship between strength of 
social capital connections and 
likelihood of firm-level undesirable 
behavior is mediated by reciprocity. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age Log of # of yrs since 
founded 
  
    Profitability ROA   
          
    Exec Social Capital Strength # of board-years   
    Firm Social Capital Strength # of JV partner-years   
          
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
          
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
          
          
     Firm-Level Reciprocity Weighted Network 
Density (# direct ties/# 
total ties) 
  
          
    Legal actions against firm Count of legal actions Negative Binomial 
Regression 
      JV lawsuits Logistic Regression 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
  Hypothesis Variable Measure Statistical Method 
H4 Status similarity moderates the 
relationship between level of 
reciprocity and likelihood of firm-level 
undesirable behavior. 
Firm size Log sales   
    Firm age # of yrs since founded   
    Profitability ROA   
    Exec Social Capital # of board memberships   
    Firm Social Capital # of joint ventures 
(weighted) 
  
    Exec Social Capital Strength # of board-years   
    Firm Social Capital Strength # of JV partner-years   
    Discretion - industry-level Industry Sales Growth   
   Industry Capital Intensity  
    Discretion - firm-level Firm Sales Growth   
      Firm Capital Intensity   
     Firm-Level Reciprocity Weighted Network 
Density (# direct ties/# 
total ties) 
  
          
    Status similarity Network Centrality 
(closeness & 
betweenness) 
  
    Legal actions against firm Count of legal actions Negative Binomial 
Regression 
      JV lawsuits Logistic Regression 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis conducted to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter III.  In addition to a table providing summary statistics and a 
correlation matrix containing the relevant variables used in the analyses, detailed results 
for each hypothesis are also provided.  The main effects relationships are discussed, 
followed by a discussion of the hypothesized mediating and moderating relationships. 
Sample 1 
The first of two samples collected for this study involves lawsuits between 
current or former joint venture partners in the sample.  This sample was constructed in 
order to test the likelihood of joint-venture partner firms reaching a point in their 
relationship at which one or more of the partners find legal remedies the appropriate 
means for resolving conflicts.  The panel of experts evaluating potential manifestations 
of firm-level undesirable behavior had a high level of agreement (rwg = .8402) with the 
notion that lawsuits between partner firms were likely indicators that undesirable 
behavior by a partner had led to such a lawsuit. 
Lexis-Nexis was used to collect data relating to legal proceedings involving any 
firm in the sample and one or more of its current (former) joint venture partners.  
Interestingly, very few incidences of legal action between joint venture partners in the 
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sample were identified.  Out of a total 1,394 firm-joint venture combinations in the 
study, only 9 lawsuits were identified in Lexis-Nexis.  Therefore, obtaining meaningful 
statistical results from this sample was somewhat challenging.  Several iterations of 
models were run using Poisson, Negative Binomial and Logistic regression.  None of the 
models having joint venture lawsuits as a dependent variable produced any significant 
results.  Furthermore, statisticians have argued that logistic regression to analyze datasets 
with rare events (e.g., the ratio of 0s to 1s particularly high) will likely provide biased 
results (Gelman et al., 1998; King & Zeng, 2001).  King and Zeng developed a modified 
logistic regression algorithm to account for event rarity.  A software add-on for Stata 
was downloaded and utilized in a further attempt to determine if meaningful analysis 
could be conducted with this dataset (King & Zeng, 1999; Tomz et al., 1999).  The 
results of several iterations using this modified algorithm repeatedly suggested that firm 
profitability and sales growth were statistically significant and positively related to the 
likelihood of joint venture partners filing suit against one another (p<.01 for both 
variables).  None of the other variables were significant in these models.  These results 
indicate that successful firms (profitable firms and fast-growing firms) are more likely to 
have lawsuits filed against them.  Thus, their relative success at increasing sales and/or 
profitability may ironically make them more exposed to legal actions.  Given the small 
number of observed lawsuits in this sample, the results generated via this modified 
approach are not reported in detail.  The remainder of this chapter will focus on the 
results from Sample 2. 
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Sample 2 
The second sample data set constructed for this study consists of all material 
legal actions taken against a firm in each year of the study.  The panel of experts 
participating in this research had a fairly consistent view that any legal action taken 
against a firm and reported in the firm’s SEC filings likely represented a manifestation 
of undesirable behavior by the firm (rwg = .7672).  Publicly-traded firms are required by 
the Securities & Exchange Commission to disclose all material legal proceedings to 
which they are a party, as well as all known likely actions by federal regulatory agencies.  
It is important to note that the data collected for this sample involve only actions taken 
against the firm, not actions initiated by the firm.  Furthermore, there was a lack of 
consistency among the panel assessing this study’s measures regarding how to interpret 
legal actions taken by individuals against a firm.  Several panel members suggested that 
large publicly-traded firms are more exposed to potentially frivolous legal actions by 
individuals than smaller firms and/or private firms which have less public visibility.  
Therefore, legal actions initiated by individuals against firms in the sample were 
excluded from the study. 
The analysis reported herein was conducted at firm-year level, with a total 
sample size of 1,405, after aggregating relevant data and accounting for missing 
observations.  The total number of observations at the firm-year-legal action level of 
analysis was 5,689.  This includes data for years 2000 through 2004 for the 300 
randomly S&P 500 firms.  There were a total of 1,394 firm-joint venture observations 
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during this period.  Out of the 300 sample firms, 261 of the firms entered into new joint 
venture partnerships during the study period.  Further, I collected data for 35,567 
observations at the executive-firm-year level of analysis.  The descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix for variables in this sample are reported in Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively. 
The overdispersion of the dependent variable, count of legal actions against the 
firm, is notable as this variable’s mean is 3.23, and its variance is 23.32.  This confirms 
the necessity of utilizing Negative Binomial Regression analysis for models containing 
this dependent variable.  A zero-inflated analysis method was not required, as zeros in 
the model were the same (i.e., all firms in each year of the study had the same exposure 
to potential legal action).  Tests for multicollinearity indicated that no variable used for 
direct effect or mediation effects hypothesis testing had a Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) higher than 2.80, which is below generally accepted limits for the VIF.  The 
average VIF for these variables was 1.82.  However, one of the measures of status 
similarity utilized for testing moderation in Hypothesis 4 had high multicollinearity with 
other variables.  This measure of status similarity is based upon the ‘closeness’ network 
centrality measure and had a VIF of 9.71.  Therefore, this variable was not used in any 
of the models reported below.  The status similarity measure derived from the 
‘betweenness’ network centrality measure was used instead.
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
1.  Legal Action Against Firm 3.23 4.83 
2.  Year (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) 0.30 0.46 
3.  Firm Performance 0.03 0.62 
4.  Firm Age 3.99 0.89 
5.  Firm Sales Growth 0.49 6.70 
6.  Firm Capital Intensity 8.21 1.37 
7.  Industry Sales Growth 0.02 0.06 
8.  Industry Capital Intensity 6.25 1.57 
9.  TMT Board Count 1.26 0.41 
10.  TMT Board Years 2.20 1.41 
11.  Firm Social Capital Ties 1.67 1.88 
12.  Firm Social Capital Strength 1.42 1.70 
13.  Reciprocity 0.15 0.26 
14.  Knowledge Quality 0.64 0.18 
15.  Status Similarity  0.33 0.58 
 
 
The results of the hypothesis testing are reported in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7.  All 
regression models utilized fixed effects to control for potential omitted variables.  First 
the direct effects models are presented in Table 4, with the count of legal actions against 
the firm being the dependent variable.  Then Table 5 reports the results of the 
hypothesized relationships between social capital and knowledge quality.  Table 6 
presents the results of the tests involving social capital’s relationship to reciprocity.  The 
tests for mediation are presented in Table 7.  The tests for the proposed moderating 
influence of status similarity are reported in Table 8.  Table 9 details a simple 
comparison of the influence of executives’ social capital during the pre-SOX Act period 
versus the post-SOX Act period. 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Matrix 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
1.  Legal Action Against Firm 1.00                  
2.  Year (SOX Act) 0.11 * 1.00                
3.  Firm Performance -0.03  -0.01  1.00              
4.  Firm Age 0.03  0.06 * 0.06 * 1.00            
5.  Firm Sales Growth 0.01  -0.04 * 0.01  -0.04 * 1.00          
6.  Firm Capital Intensity 0.26 * 0.17 * 0.05 * 0.33 * -0.01  1.00        
7.  Industry Sales Growth -0.05  -0.05  0.04  -0.05 * 0.00  0.01  1.00      
8.  Industry Capital Intensity 0.18 * 0.10 * 0.00  0.29 * 0.00  0.42 * -0.01  1.00    
9.  TMT Board Count -0.04  -0.10 * 0.03  0.07 * 0.02  0.19 * 0.04  0.02  1.00  
10.  TMT Board Years -0.05  0.21 * 0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.18 * 0.02  0.01  0.31 * 
11.  Firm Social Capital Ties 0.14 * 0.02  0.03  0.20 * 0.04  0.41 * 0.01  0.17 * 0.13 * 
12.  Firm Social Capital Strength 0.12 * 0.21 * 0.03  0.22 * 0.02  0.39 * -0.01  0.21 * 0.11 * 
13.  Reciprocity 0.03  0.11 * 0.01  0.16 * 0.02  0.09 * -0.02  0.09 * 0.10 * 
 
            
  10  11  12  13  14  15 
10.  TMT Board Years 1.00           
11.  Firm Social Capital Ties 0.00  1.00         
12.  Firm Social Capital Strength 0.00  0.49 * 1.00       
13.  Reciprocity 0.00  0.40  0.65 * 1.00     
14.  Knowledge Quality -0.10 * 0.43 * 0.48 * 0.01  1.00   
15.  Status Similarity 0.02  0.53 * 0.41 * -0.20 * 0.30 * 1.00 
            
Notes: N=1405; * p<.05            
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TABLE 4 
Main Effects Regression Models 
(Cross-Sectional Time-Series Negative Binomial Regression) 
Dependent Variable =  
Legal Action Against Firm Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
             
Year (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) 1.296 *** 1.222 *** 1.222 *** 1.223 *** 1.225 *** 1.223 *** 
Firm Performance 0.930  0.968 † 0.969 † 0.968 † 0.968 † 0.968 † 
Firm Age 1.882 ** 1.622 * 1.626 * 1.624 * 1.371  1.618 * 
Firm Sales Growth 1.021  1.013  1.013  1.013  1.011  1.013  
Firm Capital Intensity 1.399 *** 1.063  1.060  1.064  1.118  1.063  
Industry Sales Growth 0.146  0.725  0.725  0.726  0.796  0.724  
Industry Capital Intensity 1.092 *** 0.743 *** 0.746 *** 0.741 *** 0.709 *** 0.744 *** 
             
TMT Board Count   0.912  1.133  0.902  0.918  0.913  
TMT Board-Years   1.044  1.040  1.006  1.047  1.044  
Firm Social Capital Ties   0.606 *** 0.607 *** 0.603 *** 2.097 * 0.606 *** 
Firm Social Capital Strength   1.328 *** 1.327 *** 1.331 *** 1.364 *** 1.339 ** 
             
TMT Board Count2     0.918        
TMT Board-Years2       1.009      
Firm Social Capital Ties2         0.797 ***   
Firm Social Capital 
Strength2           0.999  
              
Wald chi2 107.18 *** 110.81 *** 110.81 *** 111.06 *** 138.61 *** 110.80 *** 
Notes: N=1405; † p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001 
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TABLE 5 
Knowledge Quality Regression Models 
(Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression) 
Dependent Variable =  
Knowledge Quality Model 7a  Model 7b  Model 7c  
       
Year (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) 0.521 *** 0.027  0.047  
Firm Performance -0.290  -0.246 ** -0.129  
Firm Age -0.051  -0.341 * -0.446 ** 
Firm Sales Growth -0.004  0.170 *** 0.056  
Firm Capital Intensity 0.343 *** 0.094 † 0.055  
Industry Sales Growth -0.362  0.045  -0.054  
Industry Capital Intensity 0.140 * 0.000  0.022  
       
TMT Board Count 0.483 ***   0.316 *** 
TMT Board-Years 0.285 ***   0.194 *** 
       
Firm Social Capital Ties   1.615 *** 1.153 *** 
Firm Social Capital Strength   0.425 *** 0.369 *** 
       
Wald chi2 102.10 *** 162.08 *** 217.15 *** 
Notes: N=1654; † p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Reciprocity Regression Models  
(Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression) 
Dependent Variable =  
Reciprocity Model 8a  Model 8b  Model 8c  
       
Year (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) 0.399 *** 0.002  0.022  
Firm Performance 0.000  0.001  -0.004  
Firm Age 0.431 ** -0.196  -0.284  
Firm Sales Growth -0.030  -0.071 † 0.057  
Firm Capital Intensity 0.214 * 0.037  0.036  
Industry Sales Growth -0.480  -0.108  -0.022  
Industry Capital Intensity 0.152 * 0.028  0.018  
       
TMT Board Count 0.482 ***   0.360 *** 
TMT Board-Years 0.151 **   0.107 ** 
       
Firm Social Capital Ties   1.128 *** 1.609 *** 
Firm Social Capital Strength   0.501 *** 0.578 *** 
       
Wald chi2 151.02 *** 281.97 *** 383.42 *** 
Notes: N=1654; † p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001 
  
 109
TABLE 7 
Mediation Models 
(Cross-Sectional Time-Series Negative Binomial Regression) 
Dependent Variable =  
Legal Action Against Firm Model 9a  Model 9b  Model 9c  Model 10a  Model 10b  Model 10c  
             
Year (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) 1.447 *** 1.264 ** 1.198 ** 1.350 *** 1.269 *** 1.225 *** 
Firm Performance 0.765  0.798  0.787  0.967 † 0.968  0.968 † 
Firm Age 1.265  1.400  1.140  1.438  1.369  1.639 * 
Firm Sales Growth 1.009  1.023  1.018  1.007  1.014  1.011  
Firm Capital Intensity 1.143  1.138  1.211 * 1.047  1.042  1.065  
Industry Sales Growth 1.089  0.867  0.851  0.840  0.651  0.742  
Industry Capital Intensity 0.752 ** 0.746 ** 0.645 *** 0.785 ** 0.773 ** 0.735 *** 
             
TMT Board Count 0.968    0.930  0.933    0.893  
TMT Board-Years   1.025  1.086    1.019  1.050  
Firm Social Capital Ties 0.286 ***   0.138 *** 0.727 **   0.583 *** 
Firm Social Capital Strength   1.230 ** 1.408 ***   1.203 ** 1.276 ** 
             
Knowledge Quality 1.772 *** 0.780  1.322 **       
Reciprocity       0.835  1.072  0.945  
             
Wald chi2 97.74 *** 90.55 *** 121.74 *** 102.05 *** 105.56 *** 113.85 *** 
Notes: N=1405; † p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001 
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TABLE 8 
Moderation Models 
(Cross-Sectional Time-Series Negative Binomial Regression) 
Dependent Variable =  
Legal Action Against Firm Model 11a  Model 11b  
     
Year (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) 1.155 * 1.133 † 
Firm Performance 1.169  1.205  
Firm Age 1.441  1.476  
Firm Sales Growth 0.998  0.997  
Firm Capital Intensity 1.179 * 1.183 * 
Industry Sales Growth 1.925 *** 1.797 ** 
Industry Capital Intensity 0.611 *** 0.656 *** 
     
TMT Board Count 1.377 * 1.426 * 
TMT Board-Years 0.846 ** 0.835 ** 
Firm Social Capital Ties 0.351 *** 0.365 *** 
Firm Social Capital Strength 1.400 *** 1.442 *** 
     
Reciprocity 3.268 ** 1.968  
     
Status Similarity 0.529 * 0.488 ** 
     
ReciprocityXStatus Similarity   0.106 * 
     
Wald chi2 122.36 *** 127.32 *** 
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TABLE 9 
Sarbanes-Oxley Effect - Pre-SOX Act versus Post-SOX Act 
(Cross-Sectional Time-Series Negative Binomial Regression) 
Dependent Variable =  
Legal Action Against Firm 
Model 12a 
(Post-SOX Act)  
Model 12b 
(Pre-SOX Act)  
     
Firm Performance 1.002  0.955 † 
Firm Age 0.864  0.904  
Firm Sales Growth 0.945  0.985  
Firm Capital Intensity 1.430 *** 1.328 * 
Industry Sales Growth 0.371  0.196  
Industry Capital Intensity 1.069  1.113 * 
     
TMT Board Count 0.692 * 0.809  
TMT Board-Years 1.023  1.032  
     
Wald chi2 49.09 *** 32.68 ***
 n=562  n=843  
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The results of the statistical analysis to evaluate my hypotheses are generally 
mixed.  Each of the hypotheses developed in Chapter III is restated below.  Then an 
overview of the results relating to each hypothesis is presented.  A detailed discussion of 
these results and their implications follows in the next chapter.  Whenever regression 
models included a count variable for an outcome (i.e., count of legal actions against the 
firm), the reported coefficients are odds ratios.  Odds ratios of greater than 1 indicate that 
firms with higher scores on the focal independent variable have greater odds of having 
material legal action undertaken against them.  Conversely, odds ratios of less than one 
indicate a negative relationship between the focal independent variable and the outcome 
variable. 
Control Variables 
Model 1 presents the control variables utilized in this study.  As expected, the 
control for year (pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act versus post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act) is highly 
statistically significant (p<.001).  Firms in this study were significantly more likely to 
report material legal proceedings undertaken against them after the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley in 2002 than they were prior to this legislation taking force.  Firm performance is 
not related to the likelihood of material legal actions being taken against the firm in the 
control model.  Firm age is positively related to the count of legal actions against the 
focal firm (p<.01).  The sales growth of a firm’s industry is not a statistically significant 
predictor in the controls-only model.  Furthermore, capital intensity was used as a 
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control for executive discretion in this model and is statistically significant at the firm 
level (p<.001) as well as at the industry level (p<.001). 
Hypothesis 1 
The results of the tests for linear and curvilinear relationships between social 
capital’s dimensions and the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behavior are reported in 
Table 4.  The coefficients reported in these models are odds ratios. 
Hypothesis 1a: A curvilinear (U-shape) relationship exists between the number 
of social capital connections held by a firm’s key executives and the likelihood of firm-
level undesirable behaviors. 
As indicated in Model 2 by an odds ratio of less than 1.0, a negative relationship 
seems to exist between the number of social capital relationships held by a firm’s key 
executives (TMT Board Count) and the likelihood of material legal actions against the 
executives’ firm.  The coefficient was not statistically significant.  Moreover, as shown 
in Model 3, adding the squared term does not result in support for the hypothesized 
curvilinear relationship.  Thus, H1a failed to receive support.  Subsequent test of the 
influence of executive level social capital was conducted on a pre- versus post-SOX Act 
basis.  The results are in Table 10 and are discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Hypothesis 1b: A curvilinear (U-shape) relationship exists between the strength 
of social capital connections held by a firm’s key executives and the likelihood of firm-
level undesirable behaviors.
 114 
 
 
 
TABLE 10 
Summary of Results 
  Hypothesis Result 
H1a Curvilinear relationship exists between the number of social 
capital connections of key executives and firm-level undesirable 
behavior. 
Not Supported as 
stated; see pre- versus 
post-SOX Act analysis 
H1b Curvilinear relationship exists between strength of social capital 
connections of key executives and firm-level undesirable 
behavior. 
Not Supported 
H1c Curvilinear relationship exists between the number of social 
capital connections of JV parent firms and firm-level undesirable 
behavior. 
Opposite direction 
(inverted U shape) 
H1d Curvilinear relationship exists between strength of social capital 
connections of JV parents firms and firm-level undesirable 
behavior. 
Positive Relationship, 
no curvilinearity 
H2a The number of social capital connections held by a firm and its 
key executives is positively related to the quality of knowledge 
available to the firm via its JV network. 
Supported 
H2b The strength of social capital connections held by a firm and its 
key executives is positively related to quality of knowledge 
available to the firm via its JV network. 
Supported 
H2c The relationship between the number of social capital 
connections and likelihood of firm-level undesirable behavior is 
mediated by knowledge quality. 
Partial Support 
H2d The relationship between strength of social capital connections 
and likelihood of firm-level undesirable behavior is mediated by 
knowledge quality. 
Partial Support 
H3a The number of social capital connections held by firm and its 
key executives is positively related to reciprocity within a firm's 
network of JV partnerships. 
Supported 
H3b The strength of social capital connections held by a firm and its 
key executives is positively related to reciprocity within a firm's 
network of JV partnerships. 
Supported 
H3c The relationship between the number of social capital 
connections and likelihood of firm-level undesirable behavior is 
mediated by reciprocity. 
Not Supported initially; 
Supported after 
interaction effect 
considered 
H3d The relationship between strength of social capital connections 
and likelihood of firm-level undesirable behavior is mediated by 
reciprocity. 
Not Supported initially; 
Supported after 
interaction effect 
considered 
H4 Status similarity moderates the relationship between level of 
reciprocity and likelihood of firm-level undesirable behavior. 
Supported 
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As indicated in Model 2, no statistically significant relationship was found to 
exist between the strength of the social capital of a firm’s key executives (TMT Board 
Years) and the likelihood of legal action being taken against the firm.  Given the lack of 
a linear effect, adding the squared term to test for curvilinearity in Model 4 produced no 
statistically significant result.  Therefore, H1b did not receive support. 
Hypothesis 1c: A curvilinear (U-shape) relationship exists between the number 
of social capital connections held by a JV parent firm and the likelihood of firm-level 
undesirable behaviors. 
The results in Model 2 suggest a curvilinear relationship between the number of 
social capital connections of a firm and the likelihood of legal action being taken against 
the firm (p<.001).  The inclusion of the squared term changes the sign of the original 
term (odds ratio  for firm social capital ties is less than 1 in Model 2 but becomes 2.097 
in Model 5).  Taken together these results support H1c.  The curvilinear effect is 
depicted in Figure 2.  The results indicate that firms with smaller social networks are 
more likely to experience legal actions.  However, as firms build larger network of joint 
venture relationships, they tend to be less likely to engage in behavior leading to legal 
action being taken against the firm. 
Hypothesis 1d: A curvilinear (U-shape) relationship exists between the strength 
of social capital connections held by a JV parent firm and the likelihood of firm-level 
undesirable behaviors.
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FIGURE 2 
Curvilinear Effect of Firm Social Capital Connections 
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As indicated in Model 2, a positive relationship (p<.001) was initially found 
between the strength of a firm’s social capital connections and the likelihood of legal 
actions being taken against the firm.  However, this effect is the opposite direction of the 
theorized relationship.  The hypothesized curvilinear effect was not found.  Thus, the 
results do not support hypothesis H1d.  These results indicate that strong social capital 
connections between firms tend to increase the likelihood of undesirable firm-level 
behavior.  This supports the notion that firms can become over-embedded in a network 
of relationships.  It is at this point of over-embeddedness that the likelihood for 
undesirable firm-level behavior appears to become problematic. 
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Hypothesis 2 
The results for the hypotheses pertaining to knowledge quality are reported in 
Table 5.  Each relevant hypothesis is listed below, followed by a brief summary of 
associated results.  Because the dependent variable in this table is a continuous variable, 
the coefficients are not odds ratios.  Cross-sectional time-series regression analysis was 
used to test Hypotheses 2a through 2d. 
Hypothesis 2a: The number of social capital connections held by a firm and its 
key executives is positively related to the quality of knowledge exchanged via firm-to-
firm partnerships. 
A positive relationship is found between the number of social capital connections 
held by a firm’s key executives (TMT Board Count) and knowledge quality in Model 7a 
and Model 7c (p<.001 for both models) testing this relationship in Table 5.  Taken 
together, the results support H2a.  Thus, the larger the number of social capital 
connections held by a firm’s key executives, the higher quality the knowledge 
exchanged in its network of joint ventures tends to be. 
This hypothesis was also tested at the firm-level, with the results providing some 
interesting insight.  Both firm-level models (Models 7b and 7c) indicate a strong positive 
relationship (p<.001) between the number of firm-level social capital connections and 
the quality of knowledge available via the firm’s JV network.  This provides strong 
support for H2a.  The results suggest that firms having a larger number of joint venture 
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partners also tend to generally have a more diverse group of partners, thereby enhancing 
the quality of knowledge available via its JV network. 
Hypothesis 2b: The strength of social capital connections held by a firm and its 
key executives is positively related to the quality of knowledge exchanged via firm-to-
firm partnerships. 
Consistent with the hypothesized effects, a positive relationship was found to 
exist between the strength of executives’ social capital connections (TMT Board Years) 
and the quality of knowledge exchange in the firm’s joint venture network.  This 
relationship was highly statistically significant (p<.001) and present in both models 
(Models 7a and 7c) in Table 5 testing this hypothesis.  Collectively these results indicate 
that because strong executive-to-executive relationships may be accompanied by high 
levels of trust between individuals, such relationships likely facilitate the acquisition of 
important complementary sources of knowledge for the firm. 
Regarding the relationship between the strength of firm-level social capital 
connections and the quality of knowledge in the JV network, the results are also 
compelling.  The expected results were found in both models testing this relationship in 
Table 5 (Models 7b and 7c).  Moreover, these results were highly statistically significant 
(p<.001) in both models.  Taken together the results provide strong support for H2b. 
Hypothesis 2c: The relationship between the number of social capital 
connections and the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behaviors is mediated by the 
quality of knowledge available via the firm’s joint venture network. 
 119 
 
 
 
The tests for mediating effects are presented in Table 7.  Models 9a, 9b, and 9c 
involve the tests for the proposed mediating effects of knowledge quality on the 
relationship between social capital’s dimensions and firm-level undesirable behavior.  
Knowledge quality is positively related to legal actions against the firm in Model 9a 
(p<.001) and Model 9c (p<.01).  The results suggest that knowledge quality mediates the 
link between the number of executive-level social capital connections (TMT Board 
Count) and the likelihood of legal actions being taken against the firm.  Nonetheless, the 
results of Model 9a and Model 9c indicate that knowledge quality does not mediate the 
relationship between number of firm-level social capital connections and the likelihood 
of firm-level undesirable behavior.  Although the number of firm-level social capital 
connections is positively related to knowledge quality, and knowledge quality is 
positively related to undesirable firm behavior, no mediating effect was found at the firm 
level of analysis.  Thus, H2c receives partial support. 
Hypothesis 2d: The relationship between the strength of the social capital 
connections and the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behaviors is mediated by the 
quality of knowledge available via the firm’s joint venture network. 
The results reported in Model 9b and Model 9c suggest that knowledge quality 
mediates the link between the strength of executive-level social capital connections 
(TMT Board Years) and the likelihood of legal actions being taken against the firm.  The 
results also seem to indicate that knowledge quality does not mediate the relationship 
between the strength of firm social capital connections and the likelihood of firm-level 
undesirable behavior.  In Model 9b, knowledge quality is not statistically significant, the 
 120 
 
 
 
strength of executives’ social capital ties (TMT Board Years) becomes statistically non-
significant, and the strength of firm social capital connections remains statistically 
significant (p<.01).  Although the strength of social capital connections is positively 
related to knowledge quality, and knowledge quality is positively related to undesirable 
firm behavior, no mediating effect was found at the firm level.  Consequently, H2d also 
receives partial support. 
Hypothesis 3 
The results for the hypotheses pertaining to reciprocity are reported in Table 6.  
Each relevant hypothesis is listed below, followed by a brief summary of associated 
results.  As in Table 5, the coefficients reported are not odds ratios.  Cross-sectional 
time-series regression analysis was used to test Hypotheses 2a through 2d.  Since the 
dependent variable in this table is a continuous variable, the coefficients presented are 
typical regression coefficients. 
Hypothesis 3a: The number of social capital connections held by a firm and its 
key executives is positively related to the level of reciprocity involved in joint venture 
networks. 
The results for H3a and H3b suggest that executive level social capital and firm 
level social capital are accompanied by the behavioral norm of reciprocity having an 
influence on the firm.  The results for this test are presented in Model 8a and Model 8c.  
A positive relationship is found between the number of social capital connections held 
by a firm’s key executives (TMT Board Count) and reciprocity present in the firm’s joint 
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venture network.  The results are highly statistically significant (p<.001) in both of these 
models.  These results collectively provide strong support for H3a.  Thus, the larger the 
number of social capital connections held by a firm’s key executives, the higher the level 
of reciprocity present within its network of joint venture partnerships. 
When tested at the firm level of analysis, the results also provided support for 
H3a.  The results in Models 8b and 8c indicate a positive relationship between the 
number of firm-level social capital connections and the reciprocity present in the joint 
venture network (p<.001 in both models).  Taken together the evidence suggests a strong 
positive relationship, supporting H3a.  The results suggest that firms having a larger 
number of joint venture partners tend to be more constrained by the behavioral norm of 
reciprocity than firms with fewer joint venture partnerships. 
Hypothesis 3b: The strength of the social capital connections held by a firm and 
its key executives is positively related to the level of reciprocity involved in joint venture 
networks. 
This hypothesis was also tested at the executive level as well as at the firm level, 
with the results suggesting a consistency between the influence of executives’ social 
capital relationships and firm-level social capital relationships.  When tested at the 
executive level, the strength of social capital connections was also found to be positively 
related to the level of reciprocity within a firm’s network of joint ventures.  This 
relationship was statistically significant (p<.01) and present in both models (Model 8a 
and Model 8c) in Table 6 testing this hypothesis.  Collectively these results indicate that 
strong executive-to-executive relationships are accompanied by the behavioral norm of 
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reciprocity for the executives’ firms.  Thus, strong executive level social capital 
positively influences the development of reciprocity within a joint venture network. 
As expected, the strength of firm level social connections is also positively 
related to the reciprocity present within a firm’s network of joint ventures.  These results 
are reported in Models 8b and 8c, with a high level of statistical significance found to be 
present (p<.001 for both models).  These results collectively provide strong support for 
H3b.  Thus, the stronger the social capital connections held by a firm, the higher the 
level of reciprocity within its network of joint venture partnerships. 
Hypothesis 3c: The relationship between the number of social capital 
connections and the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behaviors is mediated by the 
level of reciprocity involved in the joint venture network. 
The tests for mediating effects are presented in Table 7.  Models 10a, 10b, and 
10c involve the tests for the proposed mediating effects of network reciprocity on the 
relationship between social capital’s dimensions and firm-level undesirable behavior.  
The results of Model 10a and Model 10c indicate that network reciprocity does not 
mediate the relationship between number of social capital connections and the likelihood 
of firm-level undesirable behavior.  Reciprocity is not found to be statistically significant 
in either of these models.  Although the number of social capital connections (at both the 
executive-level and the firm-level) is positively related to network reciprocity, no 
mediating effect was found.  Moreover, the relationship between the number of firm-
level social capital connections and the likelihood of legal actions against the firm 
remains statistically significant in Model 10a (p<.01) and Model 10c (p<.001).  Thus, 
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H3c fails to receive support.  However, the subsequent inclusion of the moderating 
variable (status similarity) improves the explanatory power of this mediating variable.  
This result is discussed relative to Hypothesis 4 below. 
Hypothesis 3d: The relationship between the strength of the social capital 
connections and the likelihood of firm-level undesirable behaviors is mediated by the 
level of reciprocity involved in the joint venture network. 
The results of Model 10b and Model 10c suggest that reciprocity does not 
mediate the relationship the strength of social capital connections and the likelihood of 
firm-level undesirable behavior.  Although the strength of social capital connections (at 
both the executive-level and the firm-level) is positively related to network reciprocity, 
no mediating effect was found.  Reciprocity is not found to be statistically significantly 
related to the likelihood of legal action against the firm in either of these models.  
Additionally, the relationship between the strength of firm-level social capital 
connections and the likelihood of legal actions against the firm remains statistically 
significant in Model 10b (p<.01) and Model 10c (p<.01).  Thus, H3d also fails to receive 
support.  Thus, no significant relationship was found in these models between the 
reciprocity present in a firm’s network of joint venture partnerships and the likelihood of 
the firm engaging in behavior which would lead to legal action being taken against the 
firm.  Although the strength of social capital connections is positively related to network 
reciprocity, reciprocity does not appear to be a mediating variable. 
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Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4: Status similarity moderates the relationship between the level of 
reciprocity involved a firm’s joint venture network and the likelihood of firm-level 
undesirable behaviors. 
The results reported in Model 11a and Model 11b on Table 8 provide support for 
Hypothesis 4.  In particular, the inclusion of the status similarity measure positively 
moderates the influence of reciprocity on the dependent variable.  These results can be 
seen in Models 11a and 11b.  After including this measure of status similarity, 
reciprocity becomes significant and partially mediates the relationship between the 
strength of social capital connections held by the firm and the likelihood of legal action 
being taken against the firm.  Status similarity is statistically significant in Model 11a 
(p<.05) and Model 11b (p<.01).  Moreover, the interaction term is significant in Model 
11b (p<.05).  The inclusion of this moderating variable makes the relationship between 
the likelihood of legal action against the firm and executive-level social capital (TMT 
Board Count and TMT Board Years) become statistically significant (p<.05 and p<.01, 
respectively).  Thus, reciprocity is a moderated mediating variable.  Furthermore, the 
Sobel (1982) test for indirect effects results in a Z-score of 3.29, which also indicates a 
significant interactive effect (p<.01).  This interaction is depicted in the graph presented 
in Figure 3.  The likelihood of legal actions being taken against a firm is higher 
whenever status differentials between partner firms are high.  This effect is magnified 
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whenever a high level of reciprocity exists within the network of firm-to-firm 
relationships. 
 
FIGURE 3 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Given that social capital can provide a firm with a unique ability to gain access to 
resources from partner firms and economic opportunities, it is one of the important types 
of resources upon which firms can develop a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984).  Although a wealth of empirical evidence exists to support this 
positive view of social capital, this study is among the first to explicit investigate the 
relatively unexplored ‘dark side’ to this resource (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998).  Reciprocity-based behavioral expectations accompanying social capital 
may even lead to undesirable firm-level behavior. 
The research question, literature review, theoretical development and 
methodology are detailed in earlier chapters of this dissertation.  Further, the results of 
the empirical tests on the effects of social capital on the likelihood of firm-level 
undesirable behavior are reported in Chapter V.  This chapter further expands upon the 
results with a discussion of the conceptual insights gained, as well as the implications of 
findings.  The first portion of the discussion addresses the influence of executive 
discretion in the study.  This is followed a discussion of the relationship between 
executive-level social capital resources and firm-level undesirable behavior.  Finally, a 
discussion of link between firm-level social capital and firm-level undesirable behavior 
is presented.  Theoretical, methodological and managerial implications of this study are 
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presented in subsequent sections of this chapter.  Suggestions for future research, a 
discussion of the limitations of this study and the conclusion are presented at the end of 
the chapter. 
Executive Discretion 
The role of a firm’s executives in shaping outcomes for the firm is one of the 
important foundations of strategic leadership research (Certo et al., 2006; Hambrick & 
Abrahamson, 1995; Dalton et al., 1998).  The view of executive discretion presented by 
several researchers (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998) is 
typically that executives with the greatest amount of discretion have the potential to have 
the greatest positive influence on firm performance.  In this view, executives exercise the 
most positive influence when they are free from constraints that limit their ability to 
interpret and execute their roles.  It is in exercising discretion to adjust to environmental 
constraints, customer demands and economic exchange opportunities that executives are 
most likely to influence firm behaviors, all else equal (Finkelstein, 1992; Perrone et al., 
2003).  This study takes an important step towards building a more complete picture of 
executive discretion in that it highlights the potential for discretion to lead to undesirable 
firm behaviors.  Firms in this study at which executives are presented with the highest 
levels of discretion were significantly more likely to have material legal actions 
undertaken against them by federal regulatory agencies and non-partner firms.  As a 
result, this study provides important empirical support to serve as a cautionary counter-
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balance to the generally positive framing of executive discretion in the management 
literature. 
Executive-Level Social Capital 
The social capital resources held by a firm’s key executives are considered by 
many to be a source of potential value for the firm (Hitt et al., 2006; Sirmon et al., 2007).  
Of particular interest for this study was how the board memberships of a given firm’s 
executives affect important firm-level outcomes.  The outcomes tested here include the 
quality of knowledge existent within a joint venture network, the level of reciprocity 
developed between partnering firms and the likelihood of a focal firm engaging in 
behavior which leads to legal action being taken against it by important organizational 
stakeholders. 
Knowledge Quality  
One of the important insights garnered via this study is the positive influence 
exerted by executive-to-executive relationships on the quality of knowledge within a 
network of partnering firms.  The results support the view that firms exposed to the 
highest quality knowledge within their joint venture networks are those whose 
executives hold the largest number of board seats.  Executives with higher levels of 
social capital via board memberships are exposed to a broader array of knowledge than 
executives without such memberships.  Having insights regarding decision making 
across firms enhances the ability of an executive to recognize parallel situations and 
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learn from others’ experiences.  Thus, executives with multiple board memberships are 
expected to be better equipped to provide their employing firms with a greater variety of 
comprehension and knowledge, which likely enhance the quality of firm decisions. 
Furthermore, the strength of each individual executive-to-executive social capital 
relationship also influences the quality of knowledge within the joint venture network.  
Stronger executive-level social capital relationships are found to be associated with 
greater knowledge quality.  This is consistent with the view that repeated interaction 
between executives builds trust between them and that such trust between partners 
serves as a governance mechanism which promotes voluntary exchanges of resources 
(Luo, 2002a, 2002b; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004). 
The extent to which a firm gains access to and utilizes high quality knowledge 
has been argued to be a potential source of firm-level competitive advantage (Collins & 
Hitt, 2006; Grant, 1996; Spender & Grant, 1996).  Thus, firms capable of effectively 
leveraging knowledge resources internally and between partner firms are much more 
likely able to integrate complementary resources to achieve a sustained competitive 
advantage (Harrison et al., 2001; Ireland et al., 2002).  Evidence is presented herein that 
the number of executive-level social capital connections and the strength of these 
connections are both significant antecedents to the development of high quality 
knowledge within a firm’s network of joint venture relationships. 
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Reciprocity 
Evidence is also found to support the idea that executive-level social capital 
resources are significantly related to the development of the social norm of reciprocity 
within a network of joint venture partner firms.  Reciprocity exists not only between 
actors with a history of direct interactions, but also with each actor’s other partners in the 
network (Westphal & Zajac, 1997).  The norm of reciprocity obligates actors to assist an 
actor connected indirectly to the focal actor, even if a direct exchange between the two 
parties is unlikely in the future (Hagen & Choe, 1998).  By promoting cooperative 
behaviors and reducing opportunism among network member firms, reciprocity aids all 
firms within the network.  It also promotes the development of new firm-to-firm 
connections and the exchange of resources among firms in the network not directly 
connected to one another.  Thus, by promoting reciprocity, executive-level social capital 
resources are also an important mechanism for reducing opportunistic behavior between 
network firms and for gaining access to a variety of resources. 
Undesirable Behavior 
One of the interesting results of this research is the failure to find a link between 
executive-level social capital and firm-level undesirable behavior in the fully-specified 
models.  Although the social capital of executives is a significant predictor of the quality 
of knowledge within a firm’s JV network and the level of reciprocity within that 
network, it was not found to be related to undesirable firm behavior.  This lack of 
statistically significant findings to support the related hypotheses compels an 
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explanation.  Based on prior research dealing with the positive value associated with 
social capital, it seems both intuitively appealing and logically-sound to conclude that 
executives’ social capital relationships have an influence on the outcomes for their 
respective firms (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Kostova & Roth, 2003; Lin, 1999).  A proposed 
explanation of this study’s non-results in this area is offered below. 
This study spans a period of years in which executives’ responsibility for 
corporate behavior have been highly scrutinized (Bernard, 2006; Trevino & Brown, 
2004).  Further, the imposition of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX Act) was a direct effort 
to limit unwanted behavior by firms (Buchan, 2005; Rockness & Rockness, 2005).  The 
results of subsequent analysis comparing the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley period versus the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley period demonstrate a negative relationship between executive-level 
social capital (number of total board seats held by members of the firm’s TMT) and the 
number of material legal actions in the years after this act took effect.  Given that the 
number of observations in the pre-SOX Act period is significantly higher than the 
number of observations post-SOX Act, the effect of executive-level social capital 
appears to be muted in the overall sample.  These results can be seen in Table 9.  As can 
be seen in Model 12a, firms with TMT members holding a higher number of board seats 
in the post-SOX Act period are significantly less likely to have material legal action 
taken against them.  This is demonstrated by the odds ratio of less than zero (0.692) 
being statistically significant at the p<.05 level.  Thus I expect that a sample including 
only post-SOX Act observations would also find this statistically significant effect.  
These data provide confirmation that the SOX Act has improved stakeholders’ visibility 
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into important legal issues being faced by the firm.  Furthermore, the results in Table 9 
demonstrate that the improved transparency brought about by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
facilitates an improved understanding of the mechanisms at work within organizations. 
Overall, these results suggest that executive-level social is an important predictor 
of the likelihood of undesirable firm-level behavior.  More specifically, the odds of a 
given firm having material legal actions taken against it is inversely related to the 
number of social capital connections held by that firms’ key executives.  This result is 
consistent with the positive view of social capital typically presented in the management 
literature.  Not only does social capital serve to ease the flow of high quality knowledge 
between actors within a network, but it also serves as an effective governance 
mechanism, limiting undesirable behaviors by firms.  Simultaneously, the results 
reported in Table 9 also support the notion that executives can influence firm-level 
outcomes via their networks of social capital resources. 
In tests not reported herein, no curvilinearity was found between the number of 
social capital connections held by executives and firm-level undesirable behavior for the 
post-SOX Act period.  This result suggests that firms benefit as executives’ networks of 
social capital connections grow ever larger.  It also suggests that the larger society may 
be benefiting as the incidence of undesirable firm behavior decreases as executives’ 
social capital networks increase in size. 
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Firm-Level Social Capital 
Knowledge Quality  
This study provides evidence supporting the position that the quality of 
knowledge exchanged between partners is affected by the quantity and nature of the 
firms’ social capital resource portfolio.  The number and strength of firm-level social 
capital resources are both found to be positive predictors of the quality of knowledge 
within a firm’s joint venture network.  As firms develop a larger group of relationships, 
they also tend to expand the breath of their joint venture relationships.  Firms with the 
largest network of joint venture relationships were found to have the greatest diversity in 
partners’ primary industries.  Social capital portfolios with greater heterogeneity of 
partners provide increased levels of diversity in knowledge available to the focal firm.  
Such diverse sources of knowledge enable firms to take advantage of existing 
complementarities between their knowledge stocks and the knowledge held by partners 
(Harrison et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2000).  As demonstrated in earlier research (Currall & 
Inkpen, 2002; Kostova & Roth, 2003), a direct relationship exists between the levels of 
trust at the individual level and organizational-level trust.  Through ongoing interactions, 
partner firms develop a willingness to share resources, which is necessary to ensure that 
both partners gain from the relationship (Hitt et al., 2000).  As exchange partners engage 
in repeated interaction with each other, their relationships tend to strengthen and the 
partners become more willing and able to share knowledge with each other.  Partners are 
better able to understand knowledge from each other in long-lasting partnerships, and 
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have more efficient exchange relationships, than those who have not developed long-
term relationships (Bouty, 2000; McFadyen & Cannella, 2004). 
Reciprocity 
Additionally, the number and strength of firms’ social capital relationships were 
found to positively influence the development of reciprocity within a firm’s joint venture 
network.  As firms become increasingly embedded in their joint venture network, they 
are subject to increasing levels of reciprocity.  This means that they are obligated to 
conform to behavioral expectations of the network.  One common expectation 
accompanying reciprocity is that a firm with assist others in the network, even when no 
direct benefit to the firm is expected.  A second common expectation of reciprocal 
relationships is that undesirable behavior will face potential sanction by others within the 
network.  Therefore, as the social capital relationships of firms increase in number and 
strength, they are likely to become evermore constrained in their behavior within the 
network.  Thus, they become less likely to behave undesirably towards a partner firm. 
This result is tempered, however by the finding that status differentials between 
partner firms moderates the relationship between reciprocity and the likelihood of 
undesirable behavior.  All else equal, firms are more likely to engage in behavior leading 
to legal action against them whenever their partners are of lower status in the network.  
This suggests that firms have less fear of reputational damage due to exposure of any 
undesirable behavior when they are of higher status than their partner firm(s).  Firms of 
lower status position the network are likely to be more exposed by intra-network 
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undesirable behavior by a partner firm than are firms occupying higher status network 
positions.  Undesirable behaviors towards stakeholders outside a focal firm’s JV network 
are discussed below. 
Undesirable Behavior 
Among the most interesting results from this study are the findings that: a) a 
curvilinear relationship exists between the number of firm-level social capital 
connections and firm-level undesirable behavior, and b) a positive relationship exists 
between the strength of the firm-level social capital connections and firm-level 
undesirable behavior.  Although the first of these two was the theorized relationship, the 
results were the opposite of the hypothesis (i.e., the result was an inverted U-shaped 
curve).  As the number of social capital connections held by a firm increases, the 
likelihood of undesirable behavior initially increases.  In essence, having a larger 
portfolio of social capital (larger number of joint venture partners than held previously) 
apparently creates more “degrees of freedom” for a firm.  Whereas the exposure of any 
undesirable behavior by the firm may hold the potential to damage individual firm-to-
firm relationships, holding a larger number of social capital connections increases the 
likelihood that the firm can find an alternative partner. 
Firms desire to maintain a positive reputation within its JV network and avoid 
collective sanction within the network, which effectively limits intra-network 
undesirable behavior.  Conversely, stakeholders outside the firm’s JV network are more 
exposed to undesirable behavior by the firm as they may not have direct visibility into 
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the firm’s actions, and any potential reputational damage due to conflict with outsiders is 
likely to have less of a direct effect on the firm’s ability to compete.  For example, 
although regulatory agencies are certainly important stakeholders, these agencies 
typically do not have frequent, on-going contact with most firms over which they have 
regulatory responsibility.  Contact between a given firm and a federal regulatory is likely 
more sporadic, with the information being exchanged on a structured, as-needed basis.  
JV partner firms tend to have frequent interactions with each other, and information 
exchanges can be quite informal and organic.  Detection by non-JV partner stakeholders 
of any undesirable behavior on behalf of the firm is less likely than detection by a JV 
partner.  Even if stakeholders outside the JV network detect undesirable behavior, their 
ability to effectively sanction the firm may be a less effective control mechanism than 
the influence of inter-network reputation and reciprocity.  The loss of reputation within a 
network can have an immediate negative impact on a firm’s ability to acquire resources 
and economic exchange opportunities via the network.  Violators can be sanctioned 
quickly and effective by others in the network.  Whereas legal actions against the firm 
by a non-JV partner are never a positive for the firm, such actions can be time-
consuming and expensive to implement.  Thus, only the most egregious acts of 
undesirable behavior towards non-network members are likely to result in effective 
sanction against the firm. 
Eventually, however, firms appear to reach a point at which they have a large 
enough network of relationships as to negate this effect, as the influence of reciprocity 
begins to be seen.  Once a firm reaches the point at which the effects of reciprocity 
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within the network are stronger than the incentive to engage in undesirable behavior, the 
likelihood of such behavior begins to diminish.  This non-monotonic relationship 
between the number of social capital connections held by a firm and the likelihood to 
engage in undesirable behavior leading to legal action against the firm is depicted in 
Figure 2. 
The result listed in b) above is also somewhat surprising.  There seems to be a 
linear positive relationship between the strength of the firm-level social capital 
connections and firm-level undesirable behavior.  As relationships become stronger 
between firm partners, the number of legal actions taken against that firm by regulatory 
agencies and other firms also increases.  Although very few legal actions could be 
identified in which joint venture partners in this sample were taking action against one 
another, nearly all of the legal actions against these firms were brought by federal 
regulatory agencies and other, non-partner firms.  This suggests that while the 
constraints of reciprocity may be effective in controlling behavior within the network, 
network norms of reciprocity do not constrain joint venture firms in terms of their 
undesirable behaviors towards stakeholders outside the joint venture network.  The 
evidence actually suggests that firms that have very strong social capital relationships 
with relatively few partner firms are the most likely to engage in behavior which leads to 
legal action by a stakeholder outside the JV network. 
Although strong ties between firms enhance trust and facilitate the exchange of 
knowledge between partners, strong ties can be accompanied by a competitive myopia.  
This problem develops as firms become so committed to existing relationships that they 
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have very limited interactions with actors outside their existing network and, instead, 
develop an us-vs.-them mentality in regards to those within the network versus outside 
the network (Kern, 1998; Krackhardt & Stern, 1988).  In this scenario, firms may 
become so committed to their existing relationships that they become disadvantaged vis-
à-vis other firms in their respective markets.  Being at such a competitive disadvantage 
can cause firms to engage in behavior they otherwise would not consider acceptable 
from their counterparts (Arino & de la Torre; 1998; Hutt et al., 2000).  Combined with 
the insularity than can develop within highly cohesive networks (Coleman, 1988; 
Granovetter, 2005), this situation appears highly conducive to undesirable behavior by 
firms. 
An important conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that the relative 
paucity of legal actions between joint venture partners suggests firms tend to be reluctant 
to sue their partners.  Legal action appears to be a course of last resort, as evidenced by 
the extremely rare incidence of partners suing one another.  Instead, relational norms of 
governing partnerships and contractual completeness tend to discourage legal actions 
between partners (Doz, 1996; Luo, 2002a, 2002b; Zaheer et al., 1998).  Other 
researchers have found that partnerships tend to adapt to resolve conflict (Hutt et al., 
2000; Kale & Puranam, 2004; Weber & Camerer, 2003), thus avoiding lawsuits between 
partners. 
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Theoretical and Methodological Implications 
This study holds implications for social capital theory and the outcomes 
associated with social capital resources.  One of the clearest implications from this 
research is that social capital is a Janus-faced resource, holding the potential for creating 
value for the firm, while also holding the potential for unwanted outcomes.  Empirical 
evidence is reported in this dissertation which illuminates both positive and negative 
aspects of social capital resources.  This is an area in the field which seems ripe for 
development (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Borgatti & Foster, 2003).  Researching the positive 
aspects of social capital without also considering the negative aspects limits the 
theoretical potential for this literature stream.  Thus, the field of social capital research 
can be improved by a more explicit consideration of the dark side of social capital and 
its influence on firm strategies. 
In a period characterized by heightened scrutiny of corporate behavior (Buchan, 
2005; Trevino & Brown, 2004), a theoretically-driven assessment of factors influencing 
undesirable firm behavior seems much needed.  Very few studies in the management 
literature have explicitly sought to explain why some firms engage in such unwanted 
behavior while others do not.  Instead, more attention has tended to be given to the 
question of how to control these behaviors through existing governance mechanisms.  
This question of what types of governance mechanisms are most effective in controlling 
undesirable firm behavior has received significant attention, from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives (Daily et al., 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Lane et al., 1998).  I suggest a 
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contextualized perspective on undesirable firm behavior is needed.  Firms behave 
differently towards different constituencies, based on different constraints and 
motivations.  This research indicates that a more comprehensive understanding of causal 
reasons for such behavior is needed in order to develop effective governance 
mechanisms.  Only by understanding the context in which firm behaviors occur can 
governance researchers develop theoretically-sound insights.  Social capital is a unique 
type of resource in that it is generally accompanied by a range of behavioral constraints 
and expectations.  By developing a better understanding on how these behavioral 
constraints and expectations of social capital resources influence firm-level behavior, 
governance theory can be improved. 
More specifically, this study demonstrates a difference in the types of 
mechanisms appropriate for controlling undesirable behavior likely depends on whether 
those behaviors are directed within the firm’s network, towards a firm’s partners, other 
non-partner firms, or the larger society in general.  As such, governance mechanisms can 
influence behavior in unexpected ways.  For example, the behavioral norm of reciprocity 
and contracts appear to be effective deterrents of undesirable behavior within joint 
ventures.  However, the norm of reciprocity may actually lead to a higher rate of 
undesirable behavior directed towards stakeholders outside a firm’s joint venture 
network (i.e., non-partner firms and the larger society).  More research is needed to 
better understand how the governance mechanisms which help JVs operate effectively 
influence a firm’s behavior towards others outside the JV network.  Further, the 
development of a thorough understanding of how to design and implement governance 
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mechanisms which operate as quickly and effectively as the network norm of reciprocity 
would be a significant contribution to the literature. 
This study also has methodological implications for researchers interested in the 
non-traditional research relating to the dark side of firm strategies and behaviors.  A 
challenge exists for organizational researchers to gain access to reliable, relevant data.  
This challenge is particularly acute when considering undesirable behaviors of firms, as 
firms have an incentive to actively limit public access to such data.  A variety of options 
are available for collection of secondary data from the public record pertaining to 
undesirable firm behaviors, including article searches, Lexis-Nexis searches, and court 
filings.  This study demonstrates the value in using SEC filings in such research.  
Admittedly, firms do have some latitude in how they interpret their legal obligations to 
disclose these data.  However, the federal regulations pertaining to data disclosure 
provide assurance that the data reported are consistent in terms of the nature of the legal 
actions against a firm and the potential severity of those legal actions.  Therefore, 
researchers interested in the topic of firms’ undesirable behavior towards various 
constituencies can benefit from utilizing the data collection methods presented in this 
study. 
Managerial Implications 
This study contains a number of important implications for the practice of 
managing joint ventures and for corporate governance in general.  First, the influence of 
top executives in shaping firm-level outcomes has long been a topic of debate.  Evidence 
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presented in earlier chapters of this dissertation indicates that a relationship exists 
between undesirable behaviors by firms and the level of discretion (industry-level and 
firm-level) with which executives operate.  These results are important for three reasons: 
a) they demonstrate that executives can influence firm outcomes, b) they demonstrate 
specifically that executive discretion is associated with undesirable firm-level behavior, 
and c) they demonstrate that having a larger number of social capital connection at both 
the executive-level and firm-level reduces the likelihood of the firm engaging in 
undesirable behavior.  The implications of these findings are a further call for a multi-
faceted approach to corporate governance which takes industry level effects and firm 
level effects into consideration. 
Secondly, social capital is demonstrated in this study to be a valuable resource 
which can be utilized to improve the quality of knowledge to which the firm has access.  
Others have made a thoroughly convincing argument that the ability of a firm to 
optimize its resource portfolio is directly related to its ability to build and maintain a 
competitive advantage (Berman et al., 2002; Sirmon et al., 2007; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
Collaborative strategies (such as strategic alliances and joint ventures) are one important 
approach for providing firms access to knowledge resources (Ireland et al., 2002; Luo, 
2002b).  Executives who can deliberately and effective build a knowledge management 
capability likely have the potential to benefit the most from social capital resources 
(Collins & Hitt, 2006; Hitt et al., 2002). 
Moreover, the extent to which executives can minimize undesirable firm actions 
within the context of collaborative ventures, and resulting from the reliance upon these 
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ventures, can be of significant benefit to the firm and society at large (Brass et al., 1998; 
Raab & Milward, 2003).  Executives need to be cognizant of the potential highlighted in 
this study for social capital, and the associated behavioral norms of reciprocity, to lead to 
undesirable behavior by the firm.  By being aware of this potential, firms can implement 
governance mechanisms to minimize this potential dark side of social capital.  Firms are 
encouraged to embrace a comprehensive governance approach, based upon the use of a 
variety of governance mechanisms (relational, contractual, legal, incentive 
compensation, etc). 
Lastly, this study suggests a balance is needed between the use of social capital 
resources at the executive- and firm-level versus the use of arms-length relationships.  
Firms that rely heavily on existing social capital relationships are exposed to the risk of 
becoming overly embedded within their existing network.  In addition to problems 
highlighted by other researchers including slower decision speed, lower profit margins 
and reduced rates of innovation (Hitt et al., 2006; Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002; Uzzi & 
Lancaster, 2004), embeddedness is demonstrated herein to be associated with the 
likelihood of engaging in firm-level undesirable behaviors.  Firms in this study with the 
strongest social capital connections in their joint venture networks are significantly more 
likely to have material legal action taken against them by non-network firms or 
regulatory agencies than firms with weaker ties within their networks.  Firms with fairly 
weak ties are generally more exposed to potential sanction by others in the network 
should an undesirable behavior be detected.  Relatedly, the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the number of firm-level social capital connections and legal 
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actions against the firm indicates a lower risk of legal action for firms with the largest 
number of JV partners.  The test of executive-level social capital in the post-Sox Act 
period also demonstrates that having a larger number of social capital connections 
reduces the likelihood of legal action being taken against the firm.  Collectively these 
findings indicate that firms wishing to limit their exposure to legal actions should not 
become overly reliant upon strong network ties, and instead should maintain a portfolio 
of social capital resources comprised of a relatively large number of weaker ties. 
Limitations 
It is prudent to explore some of the important limitations of this study.  Ideally 
this type of research would include insight into the actual undesirable behaviors in which 
firms engage.  However, due to a general lack of transparency into individual firm 
behaviors such as taking advantage of partner firms, violating federal regulations and 
infringement on contractual rights of non-partner firms, proxies for such behavior are 
necessary.  At best we have to rely upon publicly-reported incidences of undesirable 
behavior.  It is likely that a large number of undesirable behaviors go unreported.  The 
measures utilized in this study were developed specifically for this research, and thus, 
merit additional validation via future research.  Although the panel assembled to assess 
these measures represents a broad cross-section of industries and the average member 
has significant corporate experience, the potential exists conceptually for sampling error 
in panel member selection.  By utilizing these measures repeatedly in a multiple of 
settings, their validity can be confirmed. 
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In addition, the measure used to capture firm-level undesirable behavior is 
admittedly course-grained.  The outcome of interest in this study was the count of legal 
actions taken against the firm by federal regulatory agencies and other non-partner firms.  
A couple of issues merit caution in regards to this measure.  First, firms have much 
latitude in what they interpret to be “material” legal proceedings.  The exact same type 
of legal action could be interpreted as material by the executives of one firm, yet deemed 
immaterial by the executives of a similar firm.  This is an instance in which discretion is 
available to firms’ executives in regards to what legal actions are reported in the firms’ 
SEC filings.  Thus, firms vary significantly in the level of detail provided for legal 
proceedings in the reports they file with the SEC. 
Secondly, legal proceedings initiated against sample firms by individuals had to 
be excluded from the sample.  As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, panel members 
generally believed that large publicly-traded firms were often targets for legal action by 
individuals due to their size, profitability and visibility.  Thus, they are unlikely to 
represent undesirable behavior on the part of the firm.  The net effect of this decision 
was to reduce the number of legal actions considered in the hypothesis testing.  
Attorneys consulted for this research agreed that legal action initiated by individuals 
often can be highly important indicators of undesirable firm-level behavior.  However, 
we could not sort out the frivolous lawsuits.  Thus, the cumulative impact of these 
limitations is an enhanced confidence in the results, as the data collected are expected to 
be a conservative representation of the actual state of legal actions taken against sample 
firms. 
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This study is limited insofar as factors having an influence on the likelihood to 
engage in undesirable behavior may not have been included in the models.  As has been 
suggested by earlier research (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; 
Salk & Brannen, 2000), characteristics of individual executives are likely to be 
influential in determining actions by the firm.  However, no individual characteristics of 
top management team members were considered in this research.  The data available for 
each executive were limited to demographic characteristics (age and race), which have 
been criticized as imperfect measures of cognitive processes among TMT members 
(Certo et al., 2006).  Thus, demographic data were excluded from the model.  A more 
fully specified model could have been developed with data relating to the executives’ 
experiences (Carpenter et al., 2001), the functional and tenure heterogeneity of TMT 
members (Certo et al., 2006), and/or personality and psychological characteristics 
(Trevino & Brown, 2004; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990).  Further, this study could 
likely have been improved by the inclusion of measures of corporate culture and industry 
culture.  Some firms are more prone to unethical or unwanted behavior as a result of the 
culture developed within the firm and across its industry over a long period of time 
(Bernard, 2006; Buchan, 2005; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). 
Another limitation of this research is the focus on sample firms’ joint venture 
network, without also considering their multitude of other external relationships such as 
supplier relationships, customer relationships, non-JV partnerships with other firms, as 
well as their relationships with unions and other stakeholder groups.  The nature of 
social capital and social network research is such that it is nearly impossible to develop 
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an accurate, holistic view of all the networks in which firms operate (Carrington et al., 
2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  As a result, researchers are forced to draw boundaries 
around the portion of a firm’s social network to be examined.  The multiple levels of 
complexity in this research necessitate simplifying assumptions which potentially mute 
the effects of causal relationships.  There are almost certainly interactions between social 
constraints across levels of a network and between different types of firm networks (joint 
ventures, alliances, supplier-vendor relationships, etc.).  A broader sample of firms’ 
networks of relationships is encouraged in future research in this area. 
Conclusion 
The research presented in this dissertation is an important, if incremental, step in 
developing a richer understanding of factors influencing firm-level undesirable 
behaviors.  Currently a relative dearth of empirical research exists which specifically 
takes into consideration both organization-level and individual-level social capital 
influences on undesirable outcomes for the firm.  Empirical results from this study 
reveal that social capital does indeed have a ‘dark side.’  Social capital is found to be 
predictive of the likelihood of firms engaging in behavior which leads to material legal 
action by stakeholders.  Results also demonstrate that executive discretion is associated 
with undesirable firm behaviors. 
On a positive note, results reported here also support the link between the quality 
of knowledge found in a firm’s JV network and social capital at both the executive- and 
firm-levels.  Social capital at both of these levels is also found to enhance the reciprocity 
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found within a firm’s JV network.  Both of these results reinforce the typically positive 
view held of social capital as a resource for the firm.  Taken collectively, the results of 
this study highlight the need for a broader recognition that social capital is not 
universally beneficial.  The characteristics of social capital can be the catalyst for 
detrimental firm-level behavior.  Researchers and executives alike are encouraged to 
take note of this dark side of social capital when considering questions of corporate 
governance and the development of resource portfolios. 
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CNUM COMPANY PERMNO SIC FOUNDED 
002824 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 20482 2834 1888 
000886 ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC 50906 3661 1935 
00724F ADOBE SYSTEMS INC. 75510 7372 1982 
025537 AEP TEXAS CENTRAL CO 24109 4911 1906 
00130H AES CORP.  (THE) 76712 4991 1981 
00817Y AETNA INC 88845 6324 1850 
00846U AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC 87432 3825 1966 
009158 AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC 28222 2810 1940 
013104 ALBERTSONS INC 50032 5411 1939 
013716 ALCAN INC 24264 3350 1902 
017361 ALLEGHENY ENERGY INC 10137 4911 1925 
01741R ALLEGHENY TECHNOLOGIES INC 43123 3312 1996 
018490 ALLERGAN INC 75646 2834 1950 
019589 ALLIED WASTE INDUSTRIES INC 76887 4953 1987 
020002 ALLSTATE CORP 79323 6331 1931 
020039 ALLTEL CORP 41443 4812 1943 
021441 ALTERA CORP 75577 3674 1983 
023139 AMBAC FINANCIAL GP 76757 6351 1971 
023551 AMERADA HESS CORP 28484 2911 1919 
023608 AMERENENERGY GENERATING CO 24985 4911 1922 
023608 AMERENENERGY GENERATING CO 24985 4911 1922 
025537 AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER 24109 4911 1906 
025816 AMERICAN EXPRESS 59176 6199 1850 
026375 AMERICAN GREETINGS  13059 2771 1906 
026874 AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP 66800 6311 1919 
029066 AMERICAN POWER CONVERSION CP 11970 3620 1981 
031162 AMGEN INC 14008 2836 1980 
001765 AMR CORP/DE 21020 4512 1934 
032165 AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 62770 6020 1970 
032511 ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP 70332 1311 1959 
032654 ANALOG DEVICES 60871 3674 1965 
034425 ANDREW CORP 14323 3357 1937 
035229 ANHEUSER-BUSCH COS INC 59184 2082 1852 
037389 AON CORP 61735 6411 1947 
037411 APACHE CORP 39490 1311 1954 
037833 APPLE COMPUTER INC 14593 3571 1976 
038020 APPLERA CORP CELERA GENOMICS 86806 3826 1981 
038222 APPLIED MATERIALS INC 14702 3559 1967 
03822W APPLIED MICRO CIRCUITS CORP 85522 3674 1979 
039483 ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND CO 10516 2070 1902 
044204 ASHLAND INC 24272 5160 1924 
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CNUM COMPANY PERMNO SIC FOUNDED 
001957 AT&T CORP 10401 4813 1885 
052769 AUTODESK INC 85631 7372 1982 
053015 AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING 44644 7374 1949 
053332 AUTOZONE INC 76605 5531 1979 
053499 AVAYA INC 88587 3663 2000 
053611 AVERY DENNISON CORP 44601 2670 1935 
054303 AVON PRODUCTS 40416 2844 1886 
057224 BAKER HUGHES INC 75034 3533 1907 
058498 BALL CORP 57568 3411 1880 
060505 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 59408 6020 1784 
064057 BANK OF NEW YORK CO INC 49656 6020 1784 
06423A BANK ONE CORP 65138 6020 1874 
067383 BARD (C.R.) INC 46877 3841 1907 
067901 BARRICK GOLD CORP 71298 1040 1983 
071707 BAUSCH & LOMB INC 26518 2834 1853 
071813 BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC 27887 3841 1931 
054937 BB&T CORP 71563 6020 1872 
073902 BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC 68304 6211 1923 
075887 BECTON DICKINSON & CO 39642 3841 1897 
075896 BED BATH & BEYOND INC 77659 5700 1971 
079860 BELLSOUTH CORP 65883 4813 1879 
081437 BEMIS CO INC 43772 2670 1858 
086516 BEST BUY CO INC 85914 5731 1966 
090597 BIOGEN INC 11983 2836 1978 
090613 BIOMET INC 18092 3842 1977 
091797 BLACK & DECKER CORP 20220 3540 1917 
055921 BMC SOFTWARE INC 11976 7372 1980 
097023 BOEING CO 19561 3721 1916 
101137 BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP 77605 3841 1979 
109043 BRIGGS & STRATTON 17961 3510 1908 
111320 BROADCOM CORP   85963 3674 1991 
111412 BROADVISION INC 83630 7373 1993 
117043 BRUNSWICK CORP 10874 3510 1845 
12189T BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE 50227 4011 1850 
122014 BURLINGTON RESOURCES INC 75333 1311 1988 
131347 CALPINE CORP 83981 4991 1984 
134429 CAMPBELL SOUP CO 25320 2030 1869 
14040H CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 81055 6141 1995 
14149Y CARDINAL HEALTH INC 21371 5122 1971 
143658 CARNIVAL CORP 75154 4400 1972 
149123 CATERPILLAR INC 18542 3531 1925 
151313 CENDANT CORP 25487 6500 1971 
152312 CENTEX CORP 53831 1531 1950 
156700 CENTURYTEL INC 60599 4813 1930 
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CNUM COMPANY PERMNO SIC FOUNDED 
160903 CHARTER ONE FINANCIAL INC 10725 6020 1828 
170040 CHIRON CORP 23318 2834 1981 
171232 CHUBB CORP 59192 6331 1882 
125509 CIGNA CORP 64186 6324 1792 
172062 CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP 23473 6331 1950 
172474 CINERGY CORP 22947 4911 1904 
172737 CIRCUIT CITY STORES INC 84577 5731 1949 
17275R CISCO SYSTEMS INC 76076 3576 1984 
125577 CIT GROUP INC-OLD 85599 6172 1972 
172967 CITIGROUP INC 70519 6199 1812 
177376 CITRIX SYSTEMS INC 82686 7372 1989 
184502 CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS 24046 4832 1972 
189054 CLOROX CO/DE 46578 2842 1913 
191216 COCA-COLA CO 11308 2080 1894 
191219 COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES 70500 2086 1986 
194162 COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO 18729 2844 1806 
200340 COMERICA INC. 25081 6020 1849 
204912 COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTL INC 25778 7372 1976 
205363 COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP 40125 7370 1959 
205638 COMPUWARE CORP 78139 7372 1973 
205862 COMVERSE TECHNOLOGY INC 10942 3661 1984 
205887 CONAGRA FOODS INC 56274 2000 1861 
207142 CONEXANT SYSTEMS INC 86496 3674 1880 
208251 CONOCOPHILLIPS 87029 2911 1875 
208464 CONSECO INC 89841 6321 1979 
210371 CONSTELLATION ENERGY GRP INC 24221 4931 1816 
212485 CONVERGYS CORP 86305 7389 1984 
216831 COOPER TIRE & RUBBER CO 27430 3011 1914 
222372 COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP 64565 6162 1969 
126408 CSX CORP 62148 4011 1805 
231021 CUMMINS INC 41080 3510 1919 
126650 CVS CORP 17005 5912 1963 
235811 DANA CORP 11607 3714 1904 
235851 DANAHER CORP 49680 3823 1982 
244199 DEERE & CO 19350 3523 1804 
24702R DELL INC 11081 3571 1987 
247361 DELTA AIR LINES INC 26112 4512 1928 
248019 DELUXE CORP 61743 2780 1915 
25179M DEVON ENERGY CORP 87137 1311 1971 
254067 DILLARDS INC  -CL A 49429 5311 1938 
254687 DISNEY (WALT) CO 26403 7370 1923 
256669 DOLLAR GENERAL CORP 30382 5331 1939 
257867 DONNELLEY (R R) & SONS CO 38682 2750 1870 
260003 DOVER CORP 25953 3559 1888 
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CNUM COMPANY PERMNO SIC FOUNDED 
260561 DOW JONES & CO INC 58990 2711 1882 
233331 DTE ENERGY CO 11674 4911 1903 
264399 DUKE ENERGY CORP 27959 4931 1904 
26816Q DYNEGY INC 23720 1311 1970 
277461 EASTMAN KODAK CO 11754 3861 1881 
278058 EATON CORP 11762 3714 1911 
281020 EDISON INTERNATIONAL 15720 4911 1886 
28336L EL PASO CORP 77481 4922 1928 
268648 EMC CORP/MA 10147 3572 1979 
292845 ENGELHARD CORP 62834 2810 1938 
293561 ENRON CORP 23317 5172 1985 
26875P EOG RESOURCES INC 75825 1311 1999 
294429 EQUIFAX INC 52476 7320 1899 
30161N EXELON CORP 21776 4911 1880 
313586 FANNIE MAE 51043 6111 1938 
31410H FEDERATED DEPT STORES 77462 5311 1929 
31428X FEDEX CORP 60628 4513 1971 
343412 FLUOR CORP 88853 1600 1924 
302491 FMC CORP 19166 2800 1883 
345838 FOREST LABORATORIES  45241 2834 1954 
349631 FORTUNE BRANDS INC 10225 3490 1969 
354613 FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC 37584 6282 1947 
35671D FREEPRT MCMOR COP&GLD  75294 1000 1987 
364760 GAP INC 59010 5651 1969 
367626 GATEWAY INC 79973 3571 1985 
369604 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 12060 9997 1892 
370334 GENERAL MILLS INC 17144 2040 1866 
370442 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 12079 3711 1908 
372460 GENUINE PARTS CO 46674 5013 1928 
373298 GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 23915 2600 1927 
375766 GILLETTE CO 16424 3420 1901 
382550 GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO 16432 3011 1898 
384802 GRAINGER (W W) INC 52695 5000 1927 
390568 GREAT LAKES CHEMICAL CORP 32379 2890 1936 
401698 GUIDANT CORP 81126 3841 1994 
41163G HARCOURT GENERAL INC 40838 2731 1919 
412822 HARLEY-DAVIDSON INC 70033 3751 1903 
416515 HARTFORD FINL SVCS GRP INC 82775 6331 1810 
418056 HASBRO INC 52978 3944 1928 
421924 HEALTHSOUTH CORP 10693 8093 1984 
423074 HEINZ (H J) CO 23077 2030 1869 
427866 HERSHEY CO 16600 2060 1894 
432848 HILTON HOTELS CORP 23309 7011 1919 
437076 HOME DEPOT INC 66181 5211 1978 
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437614 HOMESTAKE MINING 12319 1040 1880 
441815 HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL INC 20124 6141 1865 
444859 HUMANA INC 48653 6324 1961 
446150 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES 42906 6020 1866 
452308 ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS 56573 3540 1912 
453258 INCO LTD 12546 3330 1902 
G4776G INGERSOLL-RAND CO LTD 12431 3560 1871 
458140 INTEL CORP 59328 3674 1968 
460690 INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS 53065 7311 1873 
459506 INTL FLAVORS & FRAGRANCES 40272 2860 1958 
461202 INTUIT INC 78975 7372 1983 
46612J JDS UNIPHASE CORP 79879 3663 1981 
475070 JEFFERSON-PILOT CORP 48485 6311 1907 
478366 JOHNSON CONTROLS INC 42534 2531 1885 
487836 KELLOGG CO 26825 2040 1906 
492386 KERR-MCGEE CORP 25769 1311 1929 
49337W KEYSPAN CORP 24360 4931 1880 
494368 KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 17750 2621 1872 
495582 KING PHARMACEUTICALS INC 86176 2834 1994 
482480 KLA-TENCOR CORP 46886 3827 1976 
500255 KOHL'S CORP 77606 5311 1962 
501044 KROGER CO 16678 5411 1883 
524908 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC 80599 6211 1850 
529771 LEXMARK INTL INC  82643 3577 1991 
532716 LIMITED BRANDS INC 64282 5621 1963 
534187 LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP 49015 6311 1968 
539320 LIZ CLAIBORNE INC 49905 2330 1976 
539830 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 21178 3760 1909 
543162 LONGS DRUG STORES CORP 53612 5912 1938 
546347 LOUISIANA-PACIFIC CORP 56223 2400 1973 
548661 LOWE'S COMPANIES INC 61399 5211 1946 
502161 LSI LOGIC CORP 48267 3674 1981 
571903 MARRIOTT INTL INC 85913 7011 1927 
571748 MARSH & MCLENNAN COS 45750 6411 1871 
577081 MATTEL INC 39538 3942 1945 
578592 MAYTAG CORP 13119 3630 1893 
580033 MCDERMOTT INC 26534 3510 1923 
58155Q MCKESSON CORP 81061 5122 1833 
585055 MEDTRONIC INC 60097 3845 1949 
589405 MERCURY INTERACTIVE CORP 79718 7372 1989 
59156R METLIFE INC 87842 6311 1863 
594918 MICROSOFT CORP 10107 7372 1975 
608554 MOLEX INC 76234 3678 1938 
620076 MOTOROLA INC 22779 3663 1928 
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637640 NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 51377 3674 1959 
650111 NEW YORK TIMES CO 47466 2711 1851 
651229 NEWELL RUBBERMAID INC 60986 3089 1902 
654106 NIKE INC 57665 3021 1971 
65473P NISOURCE INC 38762 4931 1853 
656568 NORTEL NETWORKS CORP 58640 3661 1895 
670006 NOVELL INC 90609 7370 1981 
674599 OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP 34833 1311 1920 
681919 OMNICOM GROUP 30681 7311 1986 
693718 PACCAR INC 60506 3711 1905 
704326 PAYCHEX INC 61621 8721 1971 
712713 PEOPLESOFT INC 78083 7372 1987 
723484 PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL CORP 27991 4911 1885 
693475 PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC 60442 6020 1969 
69351T PPL CORP 22517 4911 1920 
74144T PRICE (T.  ROWE) GROUP 10138 6282 1937 
742718 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 18163 2840 1837 
747277 QLOGIC CORP 80266 3674 1987 
758110 REEBOK INTERNATIONAL LTD 91380 3021 1895 
803062 SAPIENT CORP 83413 7372 1991 
808513 SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP 75186 6211 1974 
833034 SNAP-ON INC 60206 3420 1920 
844730 SOUTHTRUST CORP 71686 6020 1887 
852061 SPRINT CORP 86414 4813 1899 
852061 SPRINT CORP 86414 4812 1899 
854616 STANLEY WORKS 43350 3420 1843 
855030 STAPLES INC 75489 5940 1986 
855244 STARBUCKS CORP 77702 5812 1971 
85590A STARWOOD HOTELS&RESORTS  54690 7011 1969 
857477 STATE STREET CORP 72726 6020 1792 
866005 SUMMIT BANCORP 51588 6020 1784 
866810 SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC 10078 3571 1982 
86764P SUNOCO INC 14656 2911 1886 
867914 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 68144 6020 1811 
868536 SUPERVALU INC 44951 5411 1926 
871508 SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES 73940 3577 1975 
87161C SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CP 20053 6020 1885 
871829 SYSCO CORP 52038 5140 1970 
879131 TEKTRONIX INC 40061 3825 1946 
879664 TELLABS INC 75257 3661 1974 
879868 TEMPLE-INLAND INC 66114 2631 1925 
880770 TERADYNE INC 51369 3825 1960 
881694 TEXACO INC 14736 2911 1901 
882508 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 15579 3674 1930 
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883203 TEXTRON INC 23579 9997 1923 
88355R THERMO ECOTEK CORP 81192 4991 1956 
884315 THOMAS & BETTS CORP 38578 3640 1912 
886547 TIFFANY & CO 75100 5944 1837 
887389 TIMKEN CO 14795 3562 1899 
872540 TJX COMPANIES INC 40539 5651 1976 
891027 TORCHMARK CORP 62308 6311 1900 
891490 TOSCO CORP 61663 2911 1955 
892335 TOYS R US INC 61065 5945 1948 
G90078 TRANSOCEAN INC 79237 1381 1960 
896047 TRIBUNE CO 65787 2711 1847 
872649 TRW INC 18681 3714 1901 
899896 TUPPERWARE CORP 83462 3089 1945 
907818 UNION PACIFIC CORP 48725 4011 1848 
908068 UNION PLANTERS CORP 78263 6020 1971 
909214 UNISYS CORP 10890 7373 1873 
913017 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 17830 3720 1929 
91529Y UNUMPROVIDENT CORP 71175 6321 1970 
911905 US AIRWAYS GROUP INC 28847 4512 1939 
902911 UST INC 15077 2100 1822 
923436 VERITAS SOFTWARE CORP 80055 7372 1983 
92343V VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC 65875 4813 1984 
918204 VF CORP 43553 2300 1899 
925524 VIACOM INC 76226 4833 1971 
92839U VISTEON CORP 88319 3714 1920 
928497 VITESSE SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 77173 3674 1987 
929160 VULCAN MATERIALS CO 15202 1400 1909 
929771 WACHOVIA CORP 68443 6020 1879 
931142 WAL-MART STORES 55976 5331 1962 
938864 WASHINGTON HOMES INC 78920 1531 1889 
94106L WASTE MANAGEMENT INC 11955 4953 1968 
942683 WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS INC 78916 2834 1984 
949746 WELLS FARGO & CO 38703 6020 1852 
950590 WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL INC 63060 5812 1969 
962166 WEYERHAEUSER CO 39917 2400 1900 
963320 WHIRLPOOL CORP 25419 3630 1911 
969133 WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES 82959 2621 1900 
969457 WILLIAMS COS INC 38156 4922 1909 
974280 WINN-DIXIE STORES INC 24803 5411 1914 
981811 WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES 83601 3310 1955 
982526 WRIGLEY (WM) JR CO 15472 2060 1891 
983024 WYETH 15667 2834 1926 
98389B XCEL ENERGY INC 23931 4931 1944 
984121 XEROX CORP 27983 3577 1906 
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983919 XILINX INC 76201 3674 1984 
984332 YAHOO INC 83435 7370 1994 
 
 186 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
PARTNERSHIPS FORMED DURING STUDY PERIOD
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COMPANY CNUM PERMNO PARTNERSHIPS FORMED 
ADC Telecommunications 000886 50906 1 
AMR Corp. 001765 21020 4 
AOL Time Warner Inc. 00184A 77418 14 
AT&T Corp. 001957 10401 19 
Advanced Micro Devices 007903 61241 3 
Air Products & Chemicals 009158 28222 7 
Albertson's 013104 50032 2 
Alcan Inc. 013716 24264 1 
Alcoa Inc 013817 24643 9 
Allegheny Technologies Inc 01741R 43123 2 
ALLTEL Corp. 020039 41443 3 
ALZA Corp. 022615 64856 1 
Amerada Hess 023551 28484 6 
American Electric Power 025537 24109 4 
American Express 025816 59176 16 
American Int'l.  Group 026874 66800 18 
Anheuser-Busch 035229 59184 1 
Aon Corp. 037389 61735 3 
Apache Corp. 037411 39490 3 
Apple Computer 037833 14593 1 
Applera Corp-Applied Biosystems Group 038020 86806 3 
Archer-Daniels-Midland 039483 10516 4 
Ashland Inc. 044204 24272 3 
Automatic Data Processing Inc. 053015 44644 1 
Avery Dennison Corp. 053611 44601 2 
Baker Hughes 057224 75034 3 
Ball Corp. 058498 57568 1 
Bank of America Corp. 060505 59408 5 
Bank of New York 064057 49656 4 
Bank One Corp. 06423A 65138 5 
Barrick Gold Corp. 067901 71298 2 
Baxter International Inc. 071813 27887 4 
Becton, Dickinson 075887 39642 1 
BellSouth 079860 65883 8 
Best Buy Co., Inc. 086516 85914 1 
Biomet, Inc. 090613 18092 1 
Block H&R 093671 49373 1 
Boeing Company 097023 19561 9 
Briggs & Stratton 109043 17961 1 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 110122 19393 1 
Broadvision Inc 111412 83630 4 
Brown-Forman Corp. 115637 29946 1 
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Brunswick Corp. 117043 10874 1 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe 12189T 50227 1 
Burlington Resources 122014 75333 1 
CIGNA Corp. 125509 64186 3 
CIT Group 125577 85599 1 
CMS Energy 125896 81770 6 
CSX Corp. 126408 62148 6 
CVS Corp. 126650 17005 2 
Cardinal Health, Inc. 14149Y 21371 4 
Caterpillar Inc. 149123 18542 4 
Cendant Corporation 151313 25487 3 
CINergy Corp. 172474 22947 2 
Cisco Systems 17275R 76076 18 
Citigroup Inc. 172967 70519 19 
Clear Channel Communications 184502 24046 3 
Clorox Co. 189054 46578 1 
Coastal Corp. 190441 38893 6 
Coca Cola Co. 191216 11308 4 
Colgate-Palmolive 194162 18729 1 
Comcast 200300 25022 3 
COMPAQ Computer 204493 68347 14 
Computer Associates Intl. 204912 25778 15 
Computer Sciences Corp. 205363 40125 4 
Compuware Corp. 205638 78139 1 
Comverse Technology 205862 10942 1 
ConAgra Foods, Inc. 205887 56274 5 
Conoco Inc. 208251 87029 2 
Phillips Petroleum 20825C 13928 1 
Cooper Tire & Rubber 216831 27430 1 
Coors (Adolph) 217016 59248 2 
Corning Inc. 219350 22293 5 
Countrywide Credit Industries 222372 64565 1 
Cummins  Inc. 231021 41080 5 
DTE Energy Co. 233331 11674 5 
Dana Corp. 235811 11607 5 
Deere & Co. 244199 19350 6 
Delphi Automotive Systems 247126 86591 6 
Delta Air Lines 247361 26112 2 
Walt Disney Co. 254687 26403 12 
Donnelley (R.R.) & Sons 257867 38682 2 
Dow Chemical 260543 20626 18 
Dow Jones & Co. 260561 58990 10 
Du Pont (E.I.) 263534 11703 28 
Duke Energy 264399 27959 9 
Dynegy Inc. 26816Q 23720 3 
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EMC Corp. 268648 10147 1 
Eastman Chemical 277432 80080 6 
Eastman Kodak 277461 11754 9 
Eaton Corp. 278058 11762 6 
El Paso Corp. 28336L 77481 3 
Electronic Data Systems 285661 83596 5 
Emerson Electric 291011 22103 2 
Engelhard Corp. 292845 62834 2 
Enron Corp. 293561 23317 16 
Entergy Corp. 29364G 24010 5 
Equifax Inc. 294429 52476 1 
Exelon Corp. 30161N 21776 2 
Exxon Mobil Corp. 30231G 11850 19 
FMC Corp. 302491 19166 3 
First Data 319963 77546 7 
FirstEnergy Corp. 337932 23026 2 
Ford Motor 345370 88394 24 
Fortune Brands, Inc. 349631 10225 1 
Freeport-McMoran Cp & Gld 35671D 75294 2 
GPU Inc. 36225X 22541 1 
General Dynamics 369550 12052 1 
General Electric 369604 12060 95 
General Mills 370334 17144 1 
General Motors 370442 12079 41 
Georgia-Pacific Group 373298 23915 4 
Gillette Co. 375766 16424 3 
Goodrich Corporation 382388 12140 1 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 382550 16432 2 
Grainger (W.W.) Inc. 384802 52695 1 
Great Lakes Chemical 390568 32379 2 
Guidant Corp. 401698 81126 1 
HCA - The Health Co 404119 76171 4 
Halliburton Co. 406216 23819 6 
Harley-Davidson 412822 70033 1 
Hasbro Inc. 418056 52978 1 
Heinz (H.J.) 423074 23077 6 
Hercules, Inc. 427056 18016 3 
Hewlett-Packard 428236 27828 14 
Hilton Hotels 432848 23309 3 
Homestake Mining 437614 12319 4 
Honeywell Int'l Inc. 438516 10145 11 
IMS Health Inc. 449934 84020 1 
ITT Industries, Inc. 450911 12570 5 
Inco, Ltd. 453258 12546 1 
Intel Corp. 458140 59328 14 
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International Bus.  Machines 459200 12490 34 
International Paper 460146 21573 3 
Interpublic Group 460690 53065 8 
J.P.  Morgan Chase & Co. 46625H 47896 14 
Johnson & Johnson 478160 22111 1 
Johnson Controls 478366 42534 6 
K mart 482584 12749 3 
Kellogg Co. 487836 26825 2 
Kerr-McGee 492386 25769 2 
KeyCorp 493267 64995 3 
Kimberly-Clark 494368 17750 2 
Kroger Co. 501044 16678 1 
Lehman Bros. 524908 80599 9 
Lilly (Eli) & Co. 532457 50876 6 
Lockheed Martin Corp. 539830 21178 16 
Loews Corp. 540424 26710 2 
Longs Drug Stores 543162 53612 1 
Louisiana Pacific 546347 56223 3 
Lucent Technologies 549463 83332 15 
USX-Marathon Group 565849 15069 1 
Marsh & McLennan 571748 45750 5 
Marriott Int'l. 571903 85913 4 
Mattel, Inc. 577081 39538 2 
McDonald's Corp. 580135 43449 2 
McGraw-Hill 580645 17478 1 
McKesson Corp. 58155Q 81061 2 
Medtronic Inc. 585055 60097 1 
Mellon Bank Corp. 58551A 59379 6 
Merck & Co. 589331 22752 5 
Merrill Lynch 590188 52919 9 
MetLife Inc. 59156R 87842 9 
Microsoft Corp. 594918 10107 40 
Micron Technology 595112 53613 1 
Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter 617446 69032 15 
Motorola Inc. 620076 22779 17 
NCR Corp. 62886E 84372 4 
National City Corp. 635405 56232 1 
National Semiconductor 637640 51377 1 
Navistar International Corp. 63934E 12503 3 
Newmont Mining 651639 21207 6 
Nextel Communications 65332V 77284 2 
NICOR Inc. 654086 48274 1 
Nortel Networks Corp Hldg Co. 656568 58640 1 
Northern Trust Corp. 665859 58246 1 
Northrop Grumman Corp. 666807 24766 4 
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Novell Inc. 670006 90609 2 
Nucor Corp. 670346 34817 1 
Occidental Petroleum 674599 34833 6 
Omnicom Group 681919 30681 5 
Oracle Corp. 68389X 10104 11 
PPG Industries 693506 22509 2 
Pall Corp. 696429 35051 1 
Peoples Energy 711030 13821 1 
PepsiCo Inc. 713448 13856 7 
Pfizer, Inc. 717081 21936 1 
Pharmacia Corp 71713U 18382 1 
Phelps Dodge 717265 17806 7 
Philip Morris 718154 13901 1 
Praxair, Inc. 74005P 77768 7 
Procter & Gamble 742718 18163 1 
Public Serv. Enterprise Inc. 744573 23712 3 
Pulte Homes, Inc. 745867 54148 3 
QUALCOMM Inc. 747525 77178 6 
Quintiles Transnational 748767 80470 2 
Qwest Communications Int 749121 85032 3 
Raytheon Co. 755111 24942 8 
Rohm & Haas 775371 23990 4 
Royal Dutch Petroleum 780257 25267 28 
Ryder System 783549 27633 1 
SBC Communications Inc. 78387G 66093 2 
Safeway Inc. 786514 76149 1 
St.  Paul Cos. 792860 59459 2 
Sapient Corp 803062 83413 1 
Sara Lee Corp. 803111 22840 2 
Schlumberger Ltd. 806857 14277 2 
Charles Schwab 808513 75186 5 
Scientific-Atlanta 808655 45671 1 
Sempra Energy 816851 86136 4 
Siebel  Systems Inc 826170 83693 1 
Solectron 834182 75857 1 
Southern Co. 842587 18411 2 
Sprint Corp.  FON 852061 39087 4 
Starbucks Corp. 855244 77702 14 
Starwood Hotels & Resorts 85590A 54690 1 
State Street Corp. 857477 72726 8 
Sun Microsystems 866810 10078 10 
Sunoco., Inc. 86764P 14656 2 
SunTrust Banks 867914 68144 1 
TRW Inc. 872649 18681 9 
Tektronix Inc. 879131 40061 1 
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Temple-Inland 879868 66114 1 
Tenet Healthcare Corp. 88033G 52337 5 
Texaco Inc. 881694 14736 27 
Texas Instruments 882508 15579 2 
Textron Inc. 883203 23579 3 
Thomas & Betts 884315 38578 1 
Minn.  Mining & Mfg. 88579Y 22592 1 
Time Warner Inc. 887317 77418 4 
Timken Co. 887389 14795 5 
Tribune Co. 896047 65787 2 
UST Inc. 902911 15077 2 
U.S. Bancorp 902973 66157 1 
Unilever N.V. 904784 28310 2 
Union Pacific 907818 48725 1 
Unisys Corp. 909214 10890 2 
United Technologies 913017 17830 26 
Unocal Corp. 915289 14891 14 
V.F.  Corp. 918204 43553 1 
Veritas Software 923436 80055 1 
Verizon Communications 92343V 65875 5 
Viacom Inc. 925524 76226 3 
Visteon Corp. 92839U 88319 2 
Vulcan Materials 929160 15202 1 
Wal-Mart Stores 931142 55976 5 
Washington Mutual 938864 78920 1 
Watson Pharmaceuticals 942683 78916 1 
Wells Fargo 949746 38703 6 
Westvaco Corp. 961548 21186 1 
Weyerhaeuser Corp. 962166 39917 3 
Williams Cos. 969457 38156 11 
WorldCom Inc. 98157D 11042 2 
Worthington Ind. 981811 83601 3 
Xcel Energy Inc 98389B 23931 1 
Xilinx, Inc 983919 76201 1 
Xerox Corp. 984121 27983 2 
Yahoo Inc. 984332 83435 3 
Cooper Industries G24182 21979 1 
Ingersoll-Rand G4776G 12431 1 
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FINAL YEAR OF STUDY PERIOD
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CNUM COMPANY YEAR LEGAL ACTIONS 
002824 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 2004 21 
000886 ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC 2004 2 
00724F ADOBE SYSTEMS INC. 2004 3 
00130H AES CORP.  (THE) 2004 20 
00817Y AETNA INC 2004 1 
00846U AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC 2004 1 
009158 AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC 2004 3 
013104 ALBERTSONS INC 2004 6 
013716 ALCAN INC 2004 16 
017361 ALLEGHENY ENERGY INC 2004 12 
01741R ALLEGHENY TECHNOLOGIES INC 2004 1 
018490 ALLERGAN INC 2004 3 
019589 ALLIED WASTE INDUSTRIES INC 2004 3 
020002 ALLSTATE CORP 2004 8 
020039 ALLTEL CORP 2004 0 
021441 ALTERA CORP 2004 0 
023139 AMBAC FINANCIAL GP 2004 0 
023551 AMERADA HESS CORP 2004 7 
023608 AMERENENERGY GENERATING CO 2004 0 
025537 AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER 2004 12 
025816 AMERICAN EXPRESS 2004 15 
026375 AMERICAN GREETINGS   2004 0 
026874 AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP 2004 8 
029066 AMERICAN POWER CONVERSION CP 2004 2 
031162 AMGEN INC 2004 7 
001765 AMR CORP/DE 2004 14 
032165 AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 2004 0 
032511 ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP 2004 6 
032654 ANALOG DEVICES 2004 3 
034425 ANDREW CORP 2004 2 
035229 ANHEUSER-BUSCH COS INC 2004 3 
037389 AON CORP 2004 3 
037411 APACHE CORP 2004 3 
037833 APPLE COMPUTER INC 2004 8 
038020 APPLERA CORP CELERA GENOMICS 2004 15 
038222 APPLIED MATERIALS INC 2004 9 
03822W APPLIED MICRO CIRCUITS CORP 2004 5 
039483 ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND CO 2004 2 
044204 ASHLAND INC 2004 4 
001957 AT&T CORP 2004 7 
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052769 AUTODESK INC 2004 3 
053015 AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING 2004 1 
053332 AUTOZONE INC 2004 1 
053499 AVAYA INC 2004 5 
053611 AVERY DENNISON CORP 2004 8 
054303 AVON PRODUCTS 2004 6 
057224 BAKER HUGHES INC 2004 7 
058498 BALL CORP 2004 7 
060505 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 2004 7 
064057 BANK OF NEW YORK CO INC 2004 1 
06423A BANK ONE CORP 2004 0 
067383 BARD (C.R.) INC 2004 1 
067901 BARRICK GOLD CORP 2004 3 
071707 BAUSCH & LOMB INC 2004 1 
071813 BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC 2004 2 
054937 BB&T CORP 2004 0 
073902 BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC 2004 15 
075887 BECTON DICKINSON & CO 2004 5 
075896 BED BATH & BEYOND INC 2004 0 
079860 BELLSOUTH CORP 2004 6 
081437 BEMIS CO INC 2004 2 
086516 BEST BUY CO INC 2004 1 
090597 BIOGEN INC 2004 4 
090613 BIOMET INC 2004 0 
091797 BLACK & DECKER CORP 2004 0 
055921 BMC SOFTWARE INC 2004 2 
097023 BOEING CO 2004 10 
101137 BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP 2004 12 
109043 BRIGGS & STRATTON 2004 1 
111320 BROADCOM CORP   2004 2 
111412 BROADVISION INC 2004 2 
117043 BRUNSWICK CORP 2004 5 
12189T BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE 2004 2 
122014 BURLINGTON RESOURCES INC 2004 0 
131347 CALPINE CORP 2004 15 
134429 CAMPBELL SOUP CO 2004 3 
14040H CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 2004 2 
14149Y CARDINAL HEALTH INC 2004 19 
143658 CARNIVAL CORP 2004 5 
149123 CATERPILLAR INC 2004 2 
151313 CENDANT CORP 2004 5 
152312 CENTEX CORP 2004 2 
156700 CENTURYTEL INC 2004 0 
160903 CHARTER ONE FINANCIAL INC 2004 0 
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170040 CHIRON CORP 2004 7 
171232 CHUBB CORP 2004 3 
125509 CIGNA CORP 2004 12 
172062 CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP 2004 0 
172474 CINERGY CORP 2004 6 
172737 CIRCUIT CITY STORES INC 2004 0 
17275R CISCO SYSTEMS INC 2004 2 
125577 CIT GROUP INC-OLD 2004 3 
172967 CITIGROUP INC 2004 13 
177376 CITRIX SYSTEMS INC 2004 0 
184502 CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS 2004 0 
189054 CLOROX CO/DE 2004 0 
191216 COCA-COLA CO 2004 8 
191219 COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES 2004 6 
194162 COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO 2004 2 
200340 COMERICA INC. 2004 0 
204912 COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTL INC 2004 5 
205363 COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP 2004 0 
205638 COMPUWARE CORP 2004 3 
205862 COMVERSE TECHNOLOGY INC 2004 1 
205887 CONAGRA FOODS INC 2004 2 
207142 CONEXANT SYSTEMS INC 2004 3 
208251 CONOCOPHILLIPS 2004 12 
208464 CONSECO INC 2004 4 
210371 CONSTELLATION ENERGY GRP INC 2004 7 
212485 CONVERGYS CORP 2004 0 
216831 COOPER TIRE & RUBBER CO 2004 0 
222372 COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP 2004 0 
126408 CSX CORP 2004 2 
231021 CUMMINS INC 2004 0 
126650 CVS CORP 2004 2 
235811 DANA CORP 2004 5 
235851 DANAHER CORP 2004 2 
237194 DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC 2004 3 
244199 DEERE & CO 2004 1 
24702R DELL INC 2004 0 
247361 DELTA AIR LINES INC 2004 8 
248019 DELUXE CORP 2004 0 
25179M DEVON ENERGY CORP 2004 1 
254067 DILLARDS INC   2004 0 
254687 DISNEY (WALT) CO 2004 3 
256669 DOLLAR GENERAL CORP 2004 2 
257867 DONNELLEY (R R) & SONS CO 2004 1 
260003 DOVER CORP 2004 0 
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260561 DOW JONES & CO INC 2004 2 
233331 DTE ENERGY CO 2004 0 
264399 DUKE ENERGY CORP 2004 11 
26816Q DYNEGY INC 2004 11 
277461 EASTMAN KODAK CO 2004 3 
278058 EATON CORP 2004 0 
281020 EDISON INTERNATIONAL 2004 1 
28336L EL PASO CORP 2004 0 
268648 EMC CORP/MA 2004 1 
292845 ENGELHARD CORP 2004 1 
293561 ENRON CORP 2004 0 
26875P EOG RESOURCES INC 2004 0 
294429 EQUIFAX INC 2004 4 
30161N EXELON CORP 2004 4 
313586 FANNIE MAE 2004 0 
31410H FEDERATED DEPT STORES 2004 1 
31428X FEDEX CORP 2004 2 
343412 FLUOR CORP 2004 1 
302491 FMC CORP 2004 2 
345838 FOREST LABORATORIES   2004 5 
349631 FORTUNE BRANDS INC 2004 2 
354613 FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC 2004 9 
35671D FREEPRT MCMOR COP&GLD   2004 0 
364760 GAP INC 2004 0 
367626 GATEWAY INC 2004 8 
369604 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 2004 2 
370334 GENERAL MILLS INC 2004 0 
370442 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 2004 6 
372460 GENUINE PARTS CO 2004 0 
373298 GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 2004 3 
375766 GILLETTE CO 2004 0 
382550 GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO 2004 9 
384802 GRAINGER (W W) INC 2004 2 
390568 GREAT LAKES CHEMICAL CORP 2004 6 
401698 GUIDANT CORP 2004 12 
41163G HARCOURT GENERAL INC 2004 0 
412822 HARLEY-DAVIDSON INC 2004 1 
416515 HARTFORD FINL SVCS GRP INC 2004 4 
418056 HASBRO INC 2004 0 
421924 HEALTHSOUTH CORP 2004 17 
423074 HEINZ (H J) CO 2004 0 
427866 HERSHEY CO 2004 0 
432848 HILTON HOTELS CORP 2004 0 
437076 HOME DEPOT INC 2004 0 
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437614 HOMESTAKE MINING 2004 0 
441815 HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL INC 2004 7 
444859 HUMANA INC 2004 1 
446150 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES 2004 0 
452308 ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS 2004 2 
453258 INCO LTD 2004 0 
G4776G INGERSOLL-RAND CO LTD 2004 2 
458140 INTEL CORP 2004 1 
460690 INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS 2004 0 
459506 INTL FLAVORS & FRAGRANCES 2004 2 
461202 INTUIT INC 2004 3 
46612J JDS UNIPHASE CORP 2004 8 
475070 JEFFERSON-PILOT CORP 2004 1 
478366 JOHNSON CONTROLS INC 2004 2 
487836 KELLOGG CO 2004 0 
492386 KERR-MCGEE CORP 2004 5 
49337W KEYSPAN CORP 2004 9 
494368 KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 2004 1 
495582 KING PHARMACEUTICALS INC 2004 14 
482480 KLA-TENCOR CORP 2004 1 
500255 KOHL'S CORP 2004 0 
501044 KROGER CO 2004 2 
524908 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC 2004 17 
529771 LEXMARK INTL INC   2004 2 
532716 LIMITED BRANDS INC 2004 1 
534187 LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP 2004 1 
539320 LIZ CLAIBORNE INC 2004 1 
539830 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 2004 4 
543162 LONGS DRUG STORES CORP 2004 2 
546347 LOUISIANA-PACIFIC CORP 2004 3 
548661 LOWE'S COMPANIES INC 2004 0 
502161 LSI LOGIC CORP 2004 3 
571903 MARRIOTT INTL INC 2004 1 
571748 MARSH & MCLENNAN COS 2004 5 
577081 MATTEL INC 2004 6 
578592 MAYTAG CORP 2004 0 
580033 MCDERMOTT INC 2004 13 
58155Q MCKESSON CORP 2004 8 
585055 MEDTRONIC INC 2004 13 
589405 MERCURY INTERACTIVE CORP 2004 0 
59156R METLIFE INC 2004 17 
594918 MICROSOFT CORP 2004 10 
608554 MOLEX INC 2004 0 
620076 MOTOROLA INC 2004 15 
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637640 NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 2004 5 
650111 NEW YORK TIMES CO   2004 0 
651229 NEWELL RUBBERMAID INC 2004 1 
654106 NIKE INC   2004 0 
65473P NISOURCE INC 2004 6 
656568 NORTEL NETWORKS CORP 2004 13 
670006 NOVELL INC 2004 5 
674599 OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP 2004 2 
681919 OMNICOM GROUP 2004 1 
693718 PACCAR INC 2004 0 
704326 PAYCHEX INC 2004 2 
712713 PEOPLESOFT INC 2004 0 
723484 PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL CORP 2004 0 
693475 PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC 2004 5 
69351T PPL CORP 2004 11 
74144T PRICE (T.  ROWE) GROUP 2004 1 
742718 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 2004 1 
747277 QLOGIC CORP 2004 3 
758110 REEBOK INTERNATIONAL LTD 2004 0 
803062 SAPIENT CORP 2004 0 
808513 SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP 2004 4 
833034 SNAP-ON INC 2004 1 
844730 SOUTHTRUST CORP 2004 0 
852061 SPRINT CORP 2004 3 
854616 STANLEY WORKS 2004 0 
855030 STAPLES INC 2004 0 
855244 STARBUCKS CORP 2004 1 
85590A STARWOOD HOTELS&RESORTS  2004 5 
857477 STATE STREET CORP 2004 2 
866005 SUMMIT BANCORP 2004 0 
866810 SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC 2004 3 
86764P SUNOCO INC 2004 3 
867914 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 2004 0 
868536 SUPERVALU INC 2004 0 
871508 SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES 2004 4 
87161C SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CP 2004 1 
871829 SYSCO CORP 2004 0 
879131 TEKTRONIX INC 2004 2 
879664 TELLABS INC 2004 2 
879868 TEMPLE-INLAND INC 2004 1 
880770 TERADYNE INC 2004 2 
881694 TEXACO INC 2004 0 
882508 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 2004 3 
883203 TEXTRON INC 2004 1 
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88355R THERMO ECOTEK CORP 2004 1 
884315 THOMAS & BETTS CORP 2004 4 
886547 TIFFANY & CO 2004 1 
887389 TIMKEN CO 2004 1 
872540 TJX COMPANIES INC 2004 0 
891027 TORCHMARK CORP 2004 3 
891490 TOSCO CORP 2004 0 
892335 TOYS R US INC 2004 1 
G90078 TRANSOCEAN INC 2004 7 
896047 TRIBUNE CO 2004 3 
872649 TRW INC 2004 2 
899896 TUPPERWARE CORP 2004 0 
907818 UNION PACIFIC CORP 2004 7 
908068 UNION PLANTERS CORP 2004 0 
909214 UNISYS CORP 2004 0 
913017 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 2004 0 
91529Y UNUMPROVIDENT CORP 2004 19 
911905 US AIRWAYS GROUP INC 2004 8 
902911 UST INC 2004 12 
923436 VERITAS SOFTWARE CORP 2004 2 
92343V VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC 2004 0 
92343V VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC 2004 0 
918204 VF CORP 2004 0 
925524 VIACOM INC  -CL B 2004 2 
92839U VISTEON CORP 2004 0 
928497 VITESSE SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 2004 0 
929160 VULCAN MATERIALS CO 2004 6 
929771 WACHOVIA CORP-OLD 2004 4 
931142 WAL-MART STORES 2004 58 
938864 WASHINGTON HOMES INC 2004 1 
94106L WASTE MANAGEMENT INC 2004 12 
942683 WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS INC 2004 7 
949746 WELLS FARGO & CO 2004 0 
950590 WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL INC 2004 0 
962166 WEYERHAEUSER CO 2004 9 
963320 WHIRLPOOL CORP 2004 4 
969133 WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES 2004 0 
969457 WILLIAMS COS INC 2004 17 
974280 WINN-DIXIE STORES INC 2004 2 
981811 WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES 2004 0 
982526 WRIGLEY (WM) JR CO 2004 0 
983024 WYETH 2004 24 
98389B XCEL ENERGY INC 2004 14 
984121 XEROX CORP 2004 13 
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983919 XILINX INC 2004 7 
984332 YAHOO INC 2004 7 
988498 YUM BRANDS INC 2004 3 
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PANEL MEMBERS
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Member Firm Industry 
Chris Williams Accenture Consulting 
Blake Steward AT&T Telecommunications 
Joe Alapat Channel Dynamix Software Design 
Jeff Cannon Cingular Telecommunications 
Sean Foley Cingular Telecommunications 
Dan Watkins DFJ Mercury Venture Capital 
Howard Green Green & Associates Private Equity 
Kapil Nanda Infogain Corp. Consulting 
James Baumoel Jones Day Legal 
Keven Richardson Reliant Energy Energy 
Richard Scruggs Texas A&M University Education 
Ricky Griffin 
Robert Ulrich 
Christine Collins 
Texas A&M University 
Vanguard Ventures 
Education 
Venture Capital 
Viewpointe Archive Banking Services 
  
 
204 
 
VITA 
JAMIE D. COLLINS 
 
EDUCATION 
Ph.D., Mays Business School, 2006 
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 
Emphasis: Strategic Management 
Master of Business Administration, May 1997 
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 
Bachelor of Science in Finance, May 1994  
• Honors Graduate: Magna cum laude, Missouri State University, Springfield, MO 
 
TEACHING/WORK EXPERIENCE 
Assistant Professor, Management & Entrepreneurship – Hankamer School of Business, 
Baylor University, Waco, TX – Beginning Fall 2006 
Instructor – Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, Fall 2004 – Spring 2006 
• Strategic Management;  International Management 
Product Marketing & Strategy Manager – iVita Corp, Houston, TX, 2000 – 2001 
Director of Strategy – Bresina-Hawkins & Willis, LLC, Houston, TX, 1999 – 2000 
Business Development Manager – Koch Industries, Houston, TX, 1997 - 1999 
Consultant – Texas Engineering Extension Service, College Station, TX, 1996 –1997 
Financial Controls Analyst – McDonnell Douglas, St.  Louis, MO, 1994 – 1995 
 
REFEREED PUBLICATIONS 
• Collins, J.D. and Hitt, M.A.  2006.  Leveraging tacit knowledge in alliances: The 
importance of using relational capabilities to build and leverage relational capital. 
Journal of Engineering & Technology Management, (in press). 
• Hitt, M.A., Bierman, L. and Collins, J.D.  2006.  The strategic evolution of 
professional service firms: The case of large U.S. law firms. Business Horizons, 
(forthcoming). 
• Collins, J.D. and Uhlenbruck, K.  2004.  How Firms Respond to Government 
Corruption: Insights from India.  In K.M. Weaver (Ed.), Proceedings of the Sixty-
fourth Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (CD), ISSN 1543-8643. 
• Doh, J., Rodriquez, P., Uhlenbruck, K., Collins, J. and Eden, L.  2004.  Coping with 
corruption in foreign markets: Costs, dimensions, entry modes and strategic 
responses.  In M.A. Trick (Ed.) International Management Series: Vol. 4, 
Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University Press. 
• Doh, J., Rodriquez, P., Uhlenbruck, K., Collins, J. and Eden, L.  2003.  Coping with 
corruption in foreign markets.  Academy of Management Executive, 17(3): 114-127. 
